

THE ANDOVER REVIEW

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
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THE
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VOL. X.—AUGUST, 1888.—No. LVI.

WHAT SHALL BE DONE WITH TRUSTS?

SEVERAL courses are open to society with reference to "Trusts." First, the effort may be made to crush and prevent them; secondly, they may be let alone and permitted to work out their possibilities without interference of law; thirdly, government might undertake control of the industries monopolized by them, with the ultimate end of becoming owner of the same; or, fourthly, government might assume the office of regulator and place restrictions.

A brief statement of the objections to the "trust" will help us to determine which of these courses is best. Competition is destroyed; the trusts do not endeavor to decrease prices by lessening the cost of production, and if they lessen the cost of production it is rather incidental than a part of their method; they affect prices by arbitrary control of the product, underselling rivals until the field is their own, and then limiting the output to save expenses and raise prices; they deprive workmen of employment by curtailing production.

In opposition to any reform of these abuses we have the enormous power of the trusts due to their concentrated wealth, the ease with which secret combinations can be effected if open ones are prohibited, the prevalent opinion that prices are lowered by combines. Combined capital can buy legislation and influence judicial decisions, and it directly employs, or furnishes the best openings for, the brains of the country. A natural tendency is at work favoring combination. In every industry where the addition of new capital yields more than proportionate return, the number of independent producers will diminish until at length, in one form or another, the industry will pass under one head. The farther

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this process of absorption goes the more difficult will the suppression of trusts become, because the fewer the persons there are to unite the more readily can they evade the law by tacit understandings. The fact that economy is possible through production on a large scale, favors the trust also, because it affords means for a healthy reduction of prices. The public can readily comprehend this advantage, and it disarms their opposition to abuses, some of which do not at once reach the light or are hard to prove. The Standard Oil Trust has many friends because it has decreased the price of oil to the consumer. This seems to justify its sins. But it does not follow that the price was reduced as much as it should have been, nor that other consequences of its methods were not injurious.

The suppression of the trust must therefore be decided against as both impossible and undesirable. It may be retarded, but the development is a natural one and will happen, whether through combination, or consolidation, or extermination. Legislation may obstruct and introduce needless evils and severity, but in the end the trust will remain, and the problem will be as it is to-day. "What shall we do with it?" Besides the loss of time, many thriving firms will have suffered extinction.

A second proposition was to leave the trusts wholly alone. Probably only the trusts themselves would approve of this course. They would be left irresponsible and, having disposed of competition, free to set their own prices and to levy general tribute. Private enterprise might at length gather courage to compete, but the trusts could discomfit new competitors by returning to their earlier methods, and when the field was again clear they could remunerate themselves for temporary losses and inconvenience by still higher prices. Some plead for unhampered trusts to make things insupportable, and to induce a crisis for the destruction of the entire industrial system. Probably unchecked trusts would cause a cataclysm, but the Anglo-Saxon method is to seek remedies for each evil as it becomes oppressive, and not to attempt to legislate or revolutionize perfection into existence at one stroke. It may be true, as the cataclysmists say, that the situation is changed because the adverse forces are generating new energy with the suddenness and swiftness of a chemical combination, that centralized money has legislatures and congresses, judges, the press, the pulpit, college chairs, and lawyers in its service, that we are realizing its power and perniciousness too late, and can now only await the crisis and start afresh. Nevertheless, there is still con-

siderable light. The trust is to some extent its own antidote, for its unabashed disregard of all accepted principles more stinging than sermons, or demonstrations of anarchists, convinces of danger and arouses.

As to the third suggestion, that government should take steps to make itself owner of monopoly industries, it is perhaps enough to say that in the present state of public opinion such a move cannot be contemplated. That such may be the consummation of the future does not help us now. Even collectivists, or most of them, would oppose immediate state assumption of ordinary industries, recognizing that society must pass through some intermediate stages of training and experience.

State regulation is the course that remains. Some have argued that efficient regulation is out of the question for the same reasons that render prevention impossible, and this is perfectly true of such intervention as does not comprehend and adapt itself to the principle of growth in the trust. But it does not apply to natural restrictions; and while public sentiment may waver as to what shall be done, it is not uncertain about the need of doing something. It knows that the right thing if found would be comparatively easy, but the wrong thing very hard. This principle has been enunciated by Professor Arthur T. Hadley, who says: "A really sound principle, uttered by a public authority which commands respect, becomes law with surprising ease. A false principle, however often repeated, is evaded and nullified."¹

In searching for a sound principle in this crisis of Trusts, are there any analogies by which we can be guided? Precisely the instruction that we need is furnished by the history of railroads. For many years it was supposed that railroads were amenable to the ordinary laws of trade, and no end of trouble was encountered in trying to regulate them upon this theory. All this legislative activity failed of its object, at a cost, however, to the English companies of £80,000,000. The truth was at last discovered that the laws of competition do not apply to railroads, for, in the often quoted words of George Stephenson, where combination is possible, competition is impossible. The situation was briefly summarized by the Parliamentary committee of 1872, which said that "competition between railroads exists only to a limited extent, and cannot be maintained by legislation."² The result of this awaken-

¹ "The Workings of the Interstate Commerce Law," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Jan., 1888.

² *Railroads: their Origin and Problems.* By Charles Francis Adams, Jr., p. 88.

ing is well stated by Mr. Adams: "After more than forty years of blundering it was then at last realized in 1872 that the railroad system was a thing *sui generis*, — a vast and intricate formative influence, as well as a material power, the growth of which was to be curiously watched in the expectation that in due time it would develop some phase which again would call forth a corresponding development in the machinery of government, through which its political and economical relations with the community would be finally established on some rational and permanent basis."¹

Society would like to believe that the railroad is the only exception to the law of competition, and this has caused it to look upon the trust as a monstrosity. But competition is merely an early stage of industrial development, and at length the point is reached where combination naturally takes its place. This occurs first with those industries where the application of capital brings increasing returns, but finally it must extend to all branches of trade. Where there is any business life, competition soon becomes destructive, and is nullified by agreement or combination; where the industrial life is slow, the development beyond the competitive stage may not happen, but here also the principle of competition is largely nullified by its subordination to other forces, especially to custom. The law of competition supposes trade to be self-adjusting, so that prices can never remain abnormally high because of new competitors, or be long below the cost of production, because people will not produce at a loss. Professor Hadley has pointed out the fallacy of this hypothesis as applied both to railroads and factories.² There are times when it is better to pro-

¹ Adams: *Railroads: their Origin and Problems*, pp. 82, 83.

² "Let us take an instance from railroad business, — here made artificially simple for the sake of clearness, but, in its complicated forms, occurring every day. A railroad connects two places not far apart, and carries from one to the other (say) 100,000 tons of freight a month at 25 cents a ton. Of the \$25,000 thus earned, \$10,000 is paid out for the actual expenses of running the trains and loading or unloading the cars; \$5,000 for repairs and general expenses; the remaining \$10,000 pays the interest on the cost of construction. Only the first of these items varies in proportion to the amount of business done; the interest is a fixed charge, and the repairs have to be made with almost equal rapidity, whether the material wears out, rusts out, or washes out. Now suppose a parallel road is built, and, in order to secure some of this business, offers to take it at 20 cents a ton. The old road must meet the reduction in order not to lose its business, even though the new figure does not leave it a fair profit on its investment; better a moderate profit than none at all. The new road reduces to 15 cents; so does the old road. A 15-cent rate will not pay interest,

duce at a loss than not to produce at all, and that is when the expenses go on whether production takes place or not. In such a case any income diminishes the total loss. As against the action of competition this rule holds "wherever there are large permanent investments of capital." Professor Hadley sees "a marked difference of principle between mercantile competition, such as Ricardo had in mind, and the competition of railroads or factories. In the former case its action is prompt and healthful, and does not go to extremes." Even this showing, when tried by the facts, is too favorable to competition, as may be seen from a closer analysis of the illustration with which the writer in question fortifies his position: "If Grocer A sells goods below cost, Grocer B need not follow him, but simply stop selling for the time. For: 1. This involves no great present loss to B. When his receipts stop, most of his expenses stop also. 2. It does involve a present loss to A. If he is selling below cost, he loses more money the more business he does. 3. It cannot continue indefinitely. If A returns to paying prices, B can again compete. If A continues to do business at a loss he will become bankrupt, and B will find the field clear again."¹ The actual process is by no means so simple. Rent is an expense that continues, and, unless B closes his store entirely, clerk hire is a similar item. The store is like the factory, for to the myriad of small dealers who never get more than a living out of their business any cessation brings embarrassment, while to the larger ones, whose continuous expenses are correspondingly high, the loss would be heavy. It may be thought that the loss would be still greater if goods were at the same time being sold below cost, but this involves the principle, overlooked in Professor Hadley's illustration, that not only present but future business is alienated by those who do not compete. The dealer who sells cheapest attracts customers, and the one who unless there are new business conditions developed by it; but it will pay for repairs, which otherwise would be a dead loss. The new road makes a still further reduction to 11 cents. This will do little toward paying repairs, but that little is better than nothing. If you take at 11 cents freight that cost you 25 cents to handle, you lose 14 cents on every ton you do not carry. If you refuse to take it at that rate, you lose 15 cents on every ton you do not carry. For your charges for interest and repairs run on, while the other road gets the business." *Railroad Transportation*, pp. 70, 71. "Factories are often built in times of high prices and afterwards profits fall. Then the factories will struggle to continue to operate, even at a steady loss, since to close means something worse, namely, total loss of business and ruin." The same, pp. 72, 73.

¹ The same, p. 73.

waits for his competitor to stop selling below cost will lose his customers, together with his business reputation. He must accept shrinkage of business or follow his neighbor's low prices, and the only end of this warfare is ruin to one or the other, or a mutual understanding. This is precisely the outcome of factory or railroad strife. The difference between the two is, that the railroad or factory can continue the struggle longer than the storekeeper without absolute bankruptcy. The railroad may make only enough to pay its operating expenses and to keep it in repair, and have nothing to pay interest on the cost of construction, and yet its capital will remain intact. The trader, however, must pay for his goods, and if he sells them below cost his capital begins to melt away. But, in spite of this, if he has a reckless competitor he is just as much bound to keep up the fight as the rival of a bankrupt railroad, for the loss of his business also means loss of capital, since it takes labor and money to move and to establish a business, and because one who is compelled to sell out his stock for want of trade must usually sacrifice it.

To make the case complete, let us examine another phase of it. In trades where a variety of articles are sold, it is seldom that destructive competition is waged over many things at a time. The grocery business is a fair example. It will be said that Grocer B can simply cease to sell such articles as Grocer A is selling below cost, thereby throwing the entire loss upon A. But this would impair B's trade in other articles, for people usually do all their buying at the store that sells some things cheapest. Grocer B would, therefore, lose his customers, while A, though selling certain things at a loss, would be more than remunerated by the increased sale of others. If A at length returns to paying prices on the competitive articles, B can again compete, but he must find a way to win back those who have been attracted to A. He will probably be forced to offer some things below cost, which he might better have done with the previous articles, thereby saving his customers and their trade on profit-bearing articles; and he will now have more to overcome than before, having established the reputation of being "dear."

When discussing the destructive competition between railroads, Professor Hadley calls particular notice to the fact "that when a competing road does not carry the war to this point, it is not a competitive rate."¹ If they agree upon some reasonable rate, "such a rate is actually determined by combination." Store-

¹ *Railroad Transportation*, p. 71.

keepers, as well as railroads and factory owners, have learned how fatal it is to their interests to allow unrestricted competition to determine prices, and they, too, have made use of the principle of combination. Merchants in the same line of business form associations and hold meetings to promote the interests of the trade, and an important function of these conferences is to determine rates to which all pledge themselves to adhere for self-protection. Not that this association is universal, or always successful to prevent cutting prices, but it is widely prevalent, and it is a necessary tendency resulting from the self-destructiveness of the principle of competition.

When, therefore, we turn to railroad history for light on trusts, it is because the railroad is not anomalous in outgrowing and defying the principle of competition, but is typical of all business, and brings into strong relief the necessary subordination of competition to combination wherever there is industrial life and growth. The parallelism is most marked of those industries where the trust is appearing, but further development will disclose wider similarity and raise additional problems. It is better to realize and acknowledge the truth early, that competition can no longer be relied upon, and that new principles for the regulation of industry must be substituted for its random and uncertain operations.

English legislation blundered and failed until it accepted the principle of combination and substituted regulation for futile efforts at suppression. The Parliamentary committee of 1872 determined that "the railroad system was to be left to develop itself in its own way, as a recognized monopoly, held to a strict public accountability as such."¹ A few great companies now possess the entire railroad system of England and are recognized as monopolies. The same process of consolidation has been going on in this country, but we still have faith in competition, as the provision against pools in the Interstate Commerce Act shows. But the Interstate Commerce Commission has been going in the right direction. One of its most significant acts was its assumption, in several instances, of the power to regulate rates. Either pools and consolidation can be prevented or they cannot. If pools are prohibited the struggle will be between shippers and the railroads and among the railroads themselves. In the struggle between competing railroads to get the patronage of shippers, it has been shown by experience that the former are at the mercy of the lat-

¹ Adams: *Railroads: their Origin and Problems*, p. 91.

ter, and can be plunged into a war of rates in which the shippers pay much less than fair transportation rates. But why should this be allowed? It is in principle the same as when the railroads unite to plunder the shippers; the case is merely reversed, for the shippers combine and plunder the railroads. The dilemma is obvious. The government may sanction pools in order that the railroads may protect themselves against shippers, and then it must supervise rates to protect the shippers from the railroads; or it may prohibit pools, for the protection of shippers, and then it must determine what rates the shippers shall pay in order to protect the railroads against the shippers. In either case the government must regulate rates. In the long run, amalgamation can no more be resisted in this country than it was in England, and the only recourse of the people will be state control of rates.

The railroad combination is simply the advance body of an army of combinations. Trust industries do not differ from railroads save that a longer period is necessary to bring them to the point where union or consolidation is possible; but when this is an accomplished fact the public is at their mercy precisely as it is at the mercy of the railroad monopoly. It can only protect itself in the same way: by regulating the rates which the trusts may charge for their products.

Some seemingly important differences may, however, be pointed out, and these must be considered. As a remedy for railway monopoly Mr. James F. Hudson has advocated legislative restoration of "the character of public highways to the railways, by securing to all persons the right to run trains over their tracks under proper regulations, and by defining the distinction between the proprietorship and maintenance of the railway and the business of common carriers."¹ In other words, the tracks shall be free to all who wish to compete as carriers upon them. If this is a cure for railroad monopoly it is plain that the trust monopoly, which cannot open its shops or mines to be worked at the same time by different competing companies, must be dealt with in another way. But it only circumscribes the disease. Government would regulate the road-bed, which would be well, but the same evils of competition and the same necessary tendency to combination among the carriers would appear. Experience is also against this plan. For a long time the English theory of the railroad supposed that the owner of the road-bed and the carrier would be different persons, and in the earlier charters provision was made

¹ *The Railways and the Republic*, p. 372.

for this separation.¹ But the theory never worked practically, and there was monopoly of the road-bed from the first. The separation could only be accomplished and maintained with the greatest difficulty, and too large a part of the problem would still remain unsolved to justify the undertaking.

It is likely to be assumed that the trust is never safe from new competitors, and to think that on this account it can never become as complete and formidable a monopoly as the railroad. In support of this belief the new foe of the Standard combination may be cited, or the antagonism of Claus Spreckles to the Sugar Trust. The facts, however, do not sustain this view. In a letter from Mr. Wallace P. Willett to "*Bradstreet's*,"² it is shown that after the trust took full control of the markets in January of the present year the difference between standard raw sugar (centrifugal) and standard refined (granulated) changed from $\frac{3}{4}$ c. per pound to $1\frac{3}{8}$ c. per pound in January and $1\frac{1}{4}$ c. per pound in February. Mr. Willett concludes that the trust must be "considered a permanent calamity unless a legislature, a congress, a tariff bill, or several Claus Spreckles step in to remove it. One Claus Spreckles, with one refinery, cannot do it. . . . As to building a refinery to fight the 'trust,' it is absurd. One refinery would have no more cause or opportunity for fighting the 'trust' than have the three non-trust refineries now running. The trust controls seventy-eight per cent. of the consumption of the United States, and one new refinery would reduce this control only seven to twelve per cent., as to size."

Tariff reduction is the panacea for trusts upon which many persons hopefully rely. The New York "*Herald*" has argued this view of the case in the following manner: "If there were no high protective duties trusts would be impossible, because the moment manufacturers here combined to limit production and raise prices, that moment goods would rush in from abroad to supply the market. It is the high tariff, therefore, which is the basis of trusts. The tariff shuts out foreign goods; thereupon manufacturing capitalists combine to limit production and raise prices at home; and in doing this they necessarily injure their own workmen, because they deprive them of full work, and injure the people at large by forcing them to pay artificially high prices for goods."³ It is interesting to recall that this remedy was the reliance of the Parliamentary committee on railroads, of which Sir Robert Peel was a member, which assumed that no further regulation than free trade

¹ Adams, pp. 83, 84.

² March 10, 1888.

³ April 4, 1888.

would be needed. Injurious as high protective duties are, it is not clear that their removal would render trusts impossible, for already we are acquainted with international trusts, and as every day is making their formation easier the reduction of the tariff would be but a temporary check upon them. Besides, tariff reform would not prevent trusts in those articles which cannot be imported at all, or only at great expense, or in which we have superiority in production.

The trust monopoly, like the railroad monopoly, has the elements of stability and permanence, and belongs as much as the latter to the "nature of things." The first act that government must perform in regulating the trust is to dissipate the secrecy in which its operations have been veiled. The objection to publicity which may be defended under perfectly free competition does not hold of trusts, for with free competition the public is at least measurably protected, while under monopoly protection wholly vanishes. Competition tends to force down prices, whereas the trust raises them. The right of secrecy is maintained under competition on the ground that without it competitors would slaughter one another, but the trust in doing away with competition not only does away with the occasion for secrecy, but makes openness a strict necessity. This exchange of concealment for publicity which the trust necessitates is, in fact, one of the advantages of evolution in business from competition to combination. In disputes between employer and employed it is now impossible to say with accuracy whether the former can pay higher wages and survive, and this gives rise to a confusion of ideas that is very helpful to all other employers. Where there are many employers some may claim that they are compelled to pay low wages by the action of competitors. This is often true and often untrue, but it is impossible for one not in the secrets of a firm to know the facts. Now it is just those who could afford to pay more but do not want to do so who derive especial advantage from this uncertainty, for if employers who are actually unable to raise wages can convince their workmen and the public of their inability, the general impression is that all engaged in the business are in the same condition. In this manner responsibility is evaded by those who should bear it, the public mind is kept hazy, and popular sympathy prevented from forming or focusing; for all the while other manufacturers may be having a great profit, and, by the practices to which they resort with their own employees, and by cutting prices, may be the cause of low wages all along the line. When

all industry of a given kind is under one head, this confusion would disappear, and there would be a basis for intelligent consideration of the claims of the wage class. The problem would be essentially simplified. It would be: What is this single responsible manager doing? not, What are a variety of disconnected managers, producing under dissimilar conditions and having different degrees of success, doing? Secrecy, the multiplicity of employers, and the exaggerated complexity of business due to their competition, have been among the chief difficulties of satisfactory adjustment between employer and employed. The trust brings unity out of this chaos, and since the whole industry becomes a single business, wages will be determinable by what the whole industry can afford to pay without the complication that some can pay more and others less. Under these circumstances arbitration is possible.

This indicates another function of government in its control of trusts. The knowledge that is possessed by government of the industry of the country is meagre and unsatisfying in many respects. It cannot be supposed that a wise public policy is possible under these circumstances. A complete picture of all the conditions of the industrial world, and of all that is taking place there, is needed before the simplest problems can be dealt with or the soundest principles intelligently applied. Although industry has become enormously involved, there is no corresponding science that reflects it, or has mastered its details and principles, and since government must at length act, or at least decide whether to act or not, it should arm itself with a full knowledge of the situation. A National Bureau of Labor, Industry, and Commerce is needed to supply this information.

It is evident that the trust renders a great service by preparing the way for government supervision of industry, and by doing naturally much that government would otherwise be compelled to do. The directors of the trust "have the power to cause one concern to be closed, limit the production of another, consolidate the different establishments, or centralize production at one point. The various parties are not injured, since their part of the profits comes from the whole 'trust,' and not from their particular establishment."¹ For the direction of all the productive agencies which it so carefully controls the trust must possess full information of all that relates to these agencies, and this information the government can utilize, without the labor of collecting it. In the

¹ William W. Cook: *Trusts*, p. 5.

case of railroads, it has been found that it is easier to regulate large and prosperous companies than those of doubtful solvency, and where capital is concentrated, and has a legally recognized footing, a new sense of responsibility is engendered in its managers, and they become more cautious and conservative. Trusts, when they obtain an acknowledged standing in organized industry, will, doubtless, exhibit the same phenomena.

Following still the analogy of railroads, the creation of a Trust Commission seems to be the next decisive action required of the government. So far as commissions have been tried, either in England or America, they have succeeded, although the failure of our Railroad Commission was anticipated. One of the apparently most cogent objections to it, and one that is always used against any extension of the province of government, was the probability of incompetent and corruptible commissioners. It must be acknowledged that nearly everything turns upon this point. Mr. Hudson put the objection forcibly. "No matter," he said, "how stringent or specific the law may be, in prohibiting extortionate rates, discrimination, or pooling, its effectiveness, if its enforcement is put into the hands of a commission, will depend entirely upon the vigor and faithfulness of that body. What guarantee have we, in the provisions of the bill, or in the influences that would control the selection of commissioners, that they would display these qualities? It must be remembered that this legislation seeks to restrain the greatest power in the country, except the united and aroused popular will."¹ In England, however, the members of the commission have proved both competent and unpurchasable, and the ability and integrity displayed by our Interstate Commerce Commission are fresh in all minds. We may gather some important hints from the following estimate of the latter: "Its work has been a surprise both to its advocates and its opponents. . . . Never, perhaps, has an important body of new law been so rapidly created and so generally obeyed. The authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission was as indefinite as that of the English Commission established in 1873, and its departure from accepted legal traditions has been much wider. Yet the American Commission has done more work, in making and settling questions of law, in seven months, than was accomplished by the English Commission in twice that number of years."² Our Commission has, of course, failed to satisfy those

¹ *The Railways and the Republic*, p. 339.

² Professor Arthur T. Hadley: *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, January, 1888.

who hold extreme views, and who would like to see the railroads conducted in the interests of the entire people. It must be remembered by these, however, that many of the principles on which they base their claims are quite new to general discussion, and that they can only make their way into public policy through an elaborate process of public education. It should be noted in the last citation that the authority vested in the commission was "indefinite," which means that the difficulties have been met by the commission itself rather than by the provisions of the enactment creating the commission.

The soil in which the Trust Commission would work will likewise be new, and the commission would be thrown largely upon its own resources to learn the conditions of the problem before it, and to develop a new body of law suitable thereto, as the Interstate Commission did. As we have pointed out, our present knowledge of facts and our study of the subject up to this time are insufficient for more than general legislation. But we are not altogether in the dark. Where trusts do not already exist, their formation should be made to depend, as far as possible, upon their ability to economize in production instead of upon their arbitrary power as monopolists. Without the support of railroads the Standard Trust could hardly have ruined many of its competitors,¹ but there is probably no doubt that it could, in time, have brought the same competitors to terms had it been compelled to rely upon its power to cheapen production by the aggregation of capital. It would be the duty of the commission to see that a producer who was fairly undersold should not be ruined and his plant sacrificed, but that he should be allowed to become a member of the trust on equitable conditions. Having access to the books of the trust, the commission would always be able to determine whether the trust was selling low through legitimate cheapening of the process of production or on other grounds. Where it is selling low to kill its competitors the government should place a check upon its operations. If the

¹ "It was during these [railroad] wars that the Standard Oil Company acquired its first strength and prestige, and that the rebating system grew up, which was afterwards exposed by the Hepburn investigation. The Standard Oil Company, for a long time, received rebates from the railroads, averaging over a half million per month, and in every trade and industry which used the railroads largely rates were honeycombed everywhere with rebates to those smart enough to get them." E. Porter Alexander: *Railway Practice*, p. 25. These artificial aids to the formation of trusts no longer exist, thanks to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

trust sells without profit, or at loss, its intention is to remunerate itself by excessive prices when the whole field is its own. Competitors have a right to protection against this form of elimination, and the community should be protected from excessive after-prices. The commission must, therefore, be empowered to define the range of competition by determining the percentage in advance of cost of production, below which the trust should not be permitted to dispose of its products. It is customary to test anything that happens in the industrial world mainly by its effect on the cost of articles to the consumer, and to excuse whatever cheapens prices, regardless of further consequences. Railroad wars cheapen prices, but, Professor Sumner to the contrary, they are an injury to the community. The German government has realized this, and, to avoid them, has legalized pools, and even made them obligatory. We have seen that, because these wars were possible, the Standard Trust could dictate rebates to the railroads and build itself up by destroying one competitor after another. Under healthy growth of industry, legitimate producers would not be driven to the wall and crushed, but would remain a part of the business in its new form, reaping some of the rewards that they had helped to prepare. Although capital would continue to concentrate, the present tendency for a lessening number to enjoy its fruits would be partially counteracted.

But assuming the trust to be formed, whether, as with some of those already existing, by fraudulent means, or by mutual agreement of all concerned, or by cheapening processes of production, the community could only preserve itself from extortionate prices by some limitation of profits, to be determined by the commission. Interference to prevent excessive reduction of prices for the extinction of rivals would probably be unnecessary if the possibility of subsequent enormous gains were removed.

Objections will of course be raised to this plan. Some will deny to government the right to interfere to this extent with their private affairs; others will say that attempts of the same character have been made before and have invariably failed, and that the undertaking is too involved and enormous to offer any promise of success. Would not any rate of profits that might be authorized as legitimate be purely arbitrary, and would not the task of holding the trust industries of the country to this limitation be simply impossible? In reply to the first objection, one must bear in mind that under the complete trust, competition is dead, and that principles more or less acceptable while competition lasts have

no validity without it. The claim that this question of profits under monopoly is a private question, and to be decided always by the persons immediately concerned, is of course wholly without foundation. Up to a certain point profits are legitimate, but when it is left to the handful of producers constituting the trust to decide by vote the amount of their own business profits, it is simply conferring upon them the power to put their hands in the pockets of the people and take out what they choose. To this proceeding the people are certainly not indifferent. Either the handful who are supremely interested in getting all they can must be allowed to have their own way and take from the people as much as they want, or the people, constituting the extensive majority, and who do not exist in order to support the manufacturing, but for whom the manufacturing is done, must assist in determining the remuneration to which those who perform this service are entitled. The objection of the few to government intervention is its arbitrariness: they are opposed to any arbitrary determination of the amount of their profits. But it is not really arbitrariness to which they take exceptions, but merely having any one exercise it but themselves. For nothing could be more arbitrary than their own absolute determination of their own profits. It has been stated by the newspapers that the profits of the Standard Trust during fifteen years were \$300,000,000. This is what happens when the minority, consisting of a few individuals, are allowed to fix their own profits.

It is said that government limitation of railroad rates has been tried and has failed. Mr. Hudson declares that "it is a hopeless task to adjust the schedules to suit all circumstances, and it is futile to expect an adequate reform of railway abuses by such means. The uselessness of attempts to establish equitable rates by law appears in the fact that every such schedule which has been in existence for ten years is now obsolete, being far above the rates now fixed by the railways."¹ In the light of what has already been said in this paper, the only reply that is needed to this objection is that the past cannot be taken as a criterion of the future on this question. But, to appeal to experience, the mere fact of the existence of a commission with certain powers in England has rendered the exercise of these powers almost wholly unnecessary.²

Combination forces the question, what a reasonable remunera-

¹ *The Railways and the Republic*, pp. 329, 330.

² Adams: *Railroads: their Origin and Problems*, p. 93.

tion for the service of production is. One of the elements upon which political economists have continually dwelt as entitling successful producers to high rewards is that of chance. All or some portion of what it cost those who failed, those who succeed are supposed to deserve in payment for the risks they assumed. But where business is elaborately organized and through combination has the field to itself, the uncertainties arising from competition are removed, and the occasion that might have formerly existed for speculative rewards ceases. A business that is reared and sustained amid the fierce eddies of competition is usually a monument of skill and unsleeping watchfulness and application; and one who dedicates himself to this exhausting life is certainly worthy of rewards to which those who are free from responsibility can advance no claim. But in the new phase of industrial development that is now preparing the case is different, for the chief causes of strain and anxiety disappear. It is no longer necessary to be devising day and night against rivals who are likewise sleepless to discover new modes of getting uppermost. This growing certainty greatly simplifies the problem of the limitation of profits. No one can longer dodge the fact that chance, and so-called "natural law," and individual rapacity have one and all failed of an equitable apportionment of the rewards of industry, and it will have to be acknowledged that science, patiently gathering all the facts and hearing the full details of every claimant, and judging always from the point of view of the whole, is the only arbiter of this question deserving confidence.

The disadvantages not solely to the warring producers but to business itself from the competitive method are oppressive. One of the principal causes of disaster in industry is the failure of individual producers to correctly calculate the market and to adjust their production to it. But if they could estimate the demand for an article, they cannot tell how much others in the same field of production will put forth. And this is a fruitful cause of financial crises. It is the material on which fear and suspicion feed. "We know how some slight cause, acting on the fears and imaginations of men, will overthrow the commercial structure of a nation in a few weeks, or even days, prostrating the proudest houses, and spreading ruin far around."¹ Production is now highly organized, but it is not firm and safe. Stability must be achieved, and it can be done by uniting those who are most intricately related to, and dependent upon one another, and the action of any

¹ Francis A. Walker: *Money, Trade, and Industry*, p. 129.

one of whom may involve all in loss or ruin. Stability is to be won through harmonious action, and the indications are that the trust is the shortest and surest way to harmonious action.

This line of development seems to many to be fatal to the impulse to improve in all the ways now due to the desire of the individual to distance his fellows, and to be unfavorable to the growth of individuality. A passage from Professor Sumner, who is the champion of individualism, contains a sufficient reply to this objection. He says of the effects of our industrial system: "The conditions of competition in such a system are no doubt onerous to the last degree. The conditions of success are numerous and complicated. The nerve strain of comprehending and justly estimating the factors, and of following their constant variations, is too great for any one to endure. Foresight must be used, yet there are so many unknown quantities that foresight is impossible. If the attempt is made to master all the unknown quantities, then the task is so enormous that it cannot be accomplished. Furthermore, the relations with other persons in the industrial system are necessarily close. It is impossible to escape such relations, and it is impossible to avoid a share in the consequences of the mistakes and incompetency of the others."¹ There is no uncertainty as to the consequences of the great strain the industrial leaders are under to attain the impossible. On this point medical men speak with one voice. It will be sufficient to hear from one who is eminent among them. Dr. S. Weir Mitchell says: "All classes of men who use the brain severely, and who have also — and this is important — seasons of excessive anxiety or of grave responsibility, are subject to the same form of disease [nervous exhaustion]; and this is why, I presume, that I, as well as others who are accustomed to encounter nervous disorders, have met with numerous instances of nervous exhaustion among merchants and manufacturers." "Men have confessed to me that for twenty years they had worked every day, often traveled at night or on Sunday to save time; and that in all this period they had not taken one day for play. These are extreme instances, but they are also in a measure representative of a frightfully general social evil."²

All our stimulus to individual initiative does not secure the maximum of production, and the action of unregulated trusts is the willful curtailment of the product. But whatever the obstacles

¹ *New York Independent*, April 19, 1888.

² *Wear and Tear*, pp. 46, 48.

may be, society will press on to the full utilization of its powers of production, and the obvious benefits of copious production will call forth energy and originality. If this increase of production brings more necessities and comforts into the lives of the poorer classes, as it undoubtedly will, the effect upon character will be immediately felt, and the level of personality will rise. This improvement would react upon production, to again increase it. The fear that personality or production will suffer through combination is groundless, provided the benefits of combination accrue to the whole community rather than to the few. Whatever may be thought of this, however, the point of impossibility has been reached. Things cannot go on as they are, and the question is not, Shall we do what we have been doing, or is something else preferable? We must do something else, and the question is, What is best of the courses open? I have undertaken to show that the acceptance and thoroughgoing regulation of combination is best.

Morrison I. Swift.

ASHTABULA, OHIO.

THE UNITY OF THE TRUTH: A CRITICISM.

THE desire to apprehend as *one* the revelation of nature and the revelation of the Bible is neither satisfied nor discouraged by the many attempts made to meet it. Probably to an increasing number of minds this desire assumes the form of an intellectual craving. It is not satisfied because, in the nature of things, it cannot be, so long as the horizon of our knowledge is widening and the critical faculty is alive. It is not discouraged because the scientific interpretation of nature, while it furnishes to theology problems difficult of solution, at the same time affords new and unexpected corroborations of theistic beliefs.

Any lucid writer, therefore, who has satisfied his own mind as to the unity of the truth in science and religion is tolerably sure of a hearing. He may even count on the profound gratitude of some sincere seekers after truth whose difficulties have been his difficulties, and who finds help where he has found it. But, on the other hand, the office which such a mediator assumes is an important and a delicate one. It provokes criticism, nay, it demands it. Protestantism has no other security for the doctrinal treasures, which it refuses to put under bolts and bars, than that which an ever watchful criticism affords.

As regards the book¹ that has suggested this article, we must frankly say, that, while approving its intention and its spirit, we find in it more to condemn than to approve. The author has developed some aspects of the truth clearly and with a needed emphasis; but, on the whole, his thought seems to us untrue and yet particularly worthy of attention, because its form of untruth is one that ever appears to be better than it is. Ostensibly it effects the sublimation of Christianity by the removal of crudities and impurities. But, in fact, by translating its symbolism into the terms of a lower category of thought, it degrades it. The author seems to himself to be doing a great service to Christianity by separating its accidents from its essentials; and by then demonstrating the intrinsic accord of the latter with the latest generalizations of science. But, if I read the New Testament aright, the characteristics which he discards are the most vital elements of the divine message considered as a revelation of God to man.

It is not as a code of morals that Christianity distinctively appeals to the world. It is not as a summary of the principles that ought to govern men in their relations to each other that it claims to be the supreme religion. Confucianism and Buddhism are its rivals in this department. The most elevated of the Stoics enunciated the purely human virtues almost as distinctly as Christ himself. Christianity takes a higher position than these, because it offers itself as a clear declaration of the nature of the Supreme Being. And all the distinctness and positiveness of this particular revelation of God is gained by means of its unflinching anthropomorphism. The God of the Hebrews was a power in the national life of that people, because He was conceived of as an intense and supremely elevated human being, who yet was not bound by human limitations. All the inspiration of their Scriptures flows directly from this idea; and when we come to the New Testament, instead of finding an abatement of this element, we encounter a far more extreme and pronounced development of it. The great fact of the New Testament is the incarnation. The chief end and object of it is the manifestation of God to men through the medium of One made in all points as they are, yet without sin.

History shows us that the natural tendency of all men is to some form of anthropomorphism in their religion. But this tendency is antagonized by their first attempts in philosophy. Reflection suggests that God cannot be like man in this respect and in that re-

¹ *The Unity of the Truth in Christianity and Evolution.* By J. Max Hark, D. D. New York. 1888.

spect; and so, by a succession of negations, they empty the thought of deity of all content. He is, if He is, the unknowable. Christianity is the antithesis of that philosophy of negation. It declares the primitive, unsophisticated reasoning of man is correct, so far as its method and principle is concerned, though crude as regards its results. Nor is this presentation of God in the form of man an accidental or unessential part of the revelation. It constitutes the very essence and kernel of it. It affirms that men may know God, that they may sustain personal relations to Him, that they may communicate with Him, influence Him, and be acted upon by Him, because the human and the divine nature are essentially homogeneous. The one is not the full measure of the other, but, so far as the measure of the less extends, it furnishes conceptions that are relatively true and reliable for the regulation of conduct.

When, therefore, any adjustment of Christianity to science is offered which surrenders the idea of God as a being having personal attributes like our own, let us not be deceived. There is no unification of Christianity and science; but simply a substitution of mechanical concepts for spiritual ones. The lion and the lamb have lain down together, but "the lamb is inside the lion." The two aspects of the truth to be harmonized have been mixed up together, and the identity of each has been obscured in a cloud of words. But when we look for the net result, one of the truths with which we started in has disappeared altogether, and its rival is in peaceful possession of the situation.

Throughout the book which we are criticising the terms of anthropomorphism are retained. God is said to be a person, He is said to be an absolutely free and self-determining spirit. All the scriptural affirmations with regard to his nature and his relations to men are accepted and countersigned by Dr. Hark. But the relation which these acceptances sustain to the ordinary Christian conception of the personality and conscious intelligence of God is similar to that which a sham fortification, made of paint and pasteboard, sustains to real masonry.

The Supreme Being is a person, but we must not for a moment think that the intelligence and personality of God can be associated with the thought of human intelligence and personality. The former differs from the latter not only in degree, but necessarily in kind. The one can give us no conception whatever of the other. Though we may discern a likeness in the results of the activity of the ultimate reality of the world and our own acts, we

cannot infer any likeness between its nature and our own. Although the cosmos appears to be an ordered whole, in which all objects and forces and events are adjusted and adapted to one another, we may not, therefore, say that its author is intelligent. For "intelligence is a term of limitation and imperfection. It is altogether a human quality, determined by human conditions, and bringing about results by human processes of reasoning, choice, and volition." Again, we may not apply the words "wise" and "good" to God himself, lest we thereby misconceive and degrade his infinite and absolute being.

As a compensation for thus emptying of every particle of meaning the terms in which our theistic conceptions have hitherto been expressed, the author tells us that he, in common with Mr. Spencer, recognizes the possibility of "a mode of being as much transcending intelligence and will as these transcend mechanical motion;" and, further, that he himself recognizes "the necessity of regarding the divine, from what we already know of it, as such a mode of being."¹ This has a most reverent sound, and may impose on the ear as the enunciation of a more elevated, transcendent conception of deity than that offered by the plain, homely analogies of the Bible. But it is, in fact, the strongest possible negation of all knowledge of God from the side of mind.

The two concepts — mechanical motion on the one hand, intelligence and will on the other, represent the poles of our ordinary thinking. The one is the last result of analysis, the bare and empty abstraction that remains when all qualities have been eliminated. The other is the most concrete, the most comprehensive category of thought. Mechanical motion is the first term of evolution, absolutely simple, and without characteristics. Mind is the latest, the most highly evolved product of the process. The necessity which Dr. Hark lays open, therefore, is equivalent to the strongest possible affirmation of the absolute unknowableness of God. For if we must necessarily regard his nature as transcending the highest terms of our thought as much as these transcend the simplest and most barren concepts, there is no hope for us. Having reached the highest round of our intellectual ladder, we are still looking off into empty space, and there is no possibility of getting higher.

But now comes the strangest part of this unification of thought. Dr. Hark is not, like Mr. Spencer, whom he quotes, an agnostic. For though he is even more certain than that philosopher of the

¹ The italics are mine.

absolute impossibility of reaching any knowledge of God by the way of analogies drawn from the mind of man, he has discovered another way, — a narrow entrance, lately unearthed by science, which Mr. Spencer has strangely overlooked. By this postern-gate, as it were, we may penetrate, not simply into the audience-room of Deity, but into the very secrets of his being. To find this way, we have to descend the intellectual ladder even to its lowest round. We must enter the holy of holies by that very concept *mechanical motion* which a moment since stood for the point farthest removed from the knowledge of God.

"Evolution," we are told, "enables us, to a certain extent, to apprehend God's essential self, without the need of pictures, symbols, and representations, and to understand more fully than ever before his methods and modes of being and action, the exercise of his power, the manner of his government, the nature of his love. The law of the Persistence of Force brings us face to face with Him, the Spirit-power, without whom was not anything made that was made." This is indeed a most unlooked for result. Modern science, which cuts off our approach to a knowledge of God by the way of the highest concept, *mind*, suddenly brings us face to face with the "Spirit-power" by the way of the concept *force*.

That our author says all this in serious earnest is put beyond doubt by the use which he makes of his newly discovered knowledge of God. This knowledge, although small in amount, is, he declares, of the highest value, because it is clear, certain, absolute; that is to say, we have in it a form of truth that may be applied as a final test to all our religious ideas. Its great merit is "that it strips our belief of so many cumbersome pseud-ideas." All our conceptions may be brought before the judgment-seat of this law of the persistence of force. If they are approved at its tribunal they stand evermore as positive knowledge; if not, they must be thrown aside as rubbish which the human mind has accumulated during its prolonged and weary struggle upward from homogeneous atoms.

Among the "pseud-ideas" which have been thus disposed of are the following. The idea that the Almighty sustains personal relations to us; that He is conscious of us in any such way as human beings are conscious of each other; that He has love to us in any such sense as a human parent has love for his child; that He has feelings, motives, impulses that in the remotest degree resemble ours; that He distinctly manifests himself anywhere or in any

way other than in the mechanical order of natural phenomena. Furthermore, the law of the persistence of force demonstrates the falseness of the idea that God answers prayer, or that He will, in any way, modify the course of events because of what man may say or do.

Now, as regards the value of the affirmative part of this reconstruction of our religious thought, I have not much to say. It seems to me to find its full measure in the power which certain individuals possess of imposing upon themselves by playing fast and loose with words. But its negations are worthy of more attention. When a writer who, while representing Christianity, has for fifteen years been studying the bearing of modern scientific thought upon it, marks out the boundaries of the possible and the impossible in religious thought, his authority, if not challenged, is likely to carry weight, — weight at least sufficient to disturb, if not to convince. It therefore seems worth while to show my reasons for pronouncing the coercive scientific necessities of Dr. Hark to be nothing more than the fog giants of a false metaphysic.

The all-constraining truth to which we are asked to adjust our ideas is said to be evolution. But though the word evolution frequently appears in this volume, its phenomena receive almost no attention. The real dictator and reorganizer of thought is the law of the persistence of force.

In this, as in most other respects, our author implicitly follows Mr. Herbert Spencer. To Mr. Herbert Spencer, therefore, let us go.

The whole leverage of this philosopher's system, both for building up and for tearing down, is obtained from the following assumption: "The phenomena of evolution have to be deduced from the persistence of force. To this an ultimate analysis brings us down; and on this a rational synthesis must build up."¹ Now, although Mr. Spencer says that the phenomena of evolution *must* be deduced from the law of the persistence of force, and although he succeeds in persuading a large number of his readers that he does so deduce them, he, in fact, does nothing of the kind; nor can he; nor can any one. These phenomena cannot be so deduced.

The generalization known as the law of the persistence of force is one thing, the generalization known as evolution is another, and quite distinct thing. The latter connotes a set of relations not in any way regarded by the other, — a set of rela-

¹ *First Principles*, p. 398.

tions that carries our minds in quite an opposite direction; and which, taken by itself, leads to conclusions which seem contradictory of those urged upon us by the law of the persistence of force. From this latter we can deduce nothing but the necessity of uniform sequences. Variation of any kind, not introduced from without, is a stranger to it.

Evolution, on the other hand, is a generalization from the phenomena of change, of never-ending differentiation. It has to deal with what appears to be the continual introduction of new factors, by means of which continually higher results are reached. It confronts us with the most inexplicable of all problems. It overwhelms the imagination with an unending succession of apparently uncaused beginnings and equally uncaused interruptions. It crowds science, as it has never been crowded before, to resort to the concept mind for the interpretation of a process which at every point suggests the intelligent foresight and purposive action of man. Instead of rebuking our anthropomorphism, it powerfully indorses and strengthens it. Whereas we formerly thought of the work of creation as a flash of magic, a result produced instantaneously, without process and without instrumentalities, an event that could find no analogy whatever in the works of man, — we are now asked to apprehend it as a process that everywhere suggests the slow tentative methods of an experimenting human mind.

One of the most wonderful products of man is the elaborate machinery that he has invented and constructed by the slow accumulation of innumerable little improvements and new adjustments. And now evolution presents the process of creation to us as the counterpart of this. Looked at without regard to metaphysical prepossessions, it appears to be the work of a being of vast intelligence, who is at the same time limited in his methods, — a being who creates and destroys by means of instrumentalities, the inherent natures and possibilities of which are unalterable, but whose combinations are infinitely modifiable.

We have, then, two generalizations to deal with, — two laws that have been derived from sets of relations, or aspects of phenomena, which differ widely from each other. The task that the Synthetic Philosophy undertakes is the unification of these diverse aspects of the world. How does it accomplish this? By the exceedingly simple, but equally arbitrary, method of imposing the terms that properly express the relations of one category upon the relations of the other category which they do not properly express. But,

it will be asked, how can such a very common and transparent artifice fail to be detected? How can Mr. Spencer have imposed upon himself and his most respectable following to this extent? There is nothing, I reply, so wonderful in this. Mr. Spencer himself has shown us how liable even the most disciplined minds are to illusion; and if his own philosophy illustrates this liability, it is no more than a previous calculation of chances would have rendered probable.

The fallacy that underlies his reasoning is one which is most easily fallen into, especially by a system-maker. Stallo has called attention to four metaphysical errors, which he likens to the organic diseases incident to bodily life, and which he terms "structural fallacies of the intellect." The second of these, if I mistake not, fits the case in hand. It is the fallacy of assuming "that the more general or extensive concepts, and the realities corresponding to them, preëxist to the less general, more comprehensive concepts and their corresponding realities; and that the latter concepts and realities are derived from the former, either by a successive addition of attributes or properties, or by a process of evolution; the attributes and properties of the former being taken as implications of those of the latter."¹

The process by which we reach the generalizations of science, which we also call laws of nature, gains its ends by abstraction. It separates from all the objects of our knowledge certain particular qualities or relations in which they are like each other. This process it continues till it can go no further, and the set of relations which remains is one which is common to all, and which binds all together. To have obtained such a result is of the greatest importance, not only for science, but for the interests of thought in general. But just because this discovery does so much for us, we are apt to see in it more than it contains. Our imagination plays us a trick. Because the set of relations which we have discovered is seen to be universal, we further picture it to ourselves as all-comprehensive. When we concentrate our attention on this point, it is clear that the ideas of all-extensiveness and all-comprehensiveness are not convertible, and that the latter is not attached to the former as a necessary inference. But, all the same, the one strongly suggests the other, and is easily substituted for it; and so a foundation is laid for the assumption from which the synthetic philosophy is deduced.

This assumption is that any set of relations that has been

¹ *Concepts of Modern Physics*, p. 138.

proved to be universal necessarily contains within itself the potency of every form and quality of being; and, further, that any supposed reality that refuses to be deduced from this set of relations is thereby proved to be unreal. We must not fail to remember at this point that Mr. Spencer distinctly disavows the belief that the law of the persistence of force brings us face to face with the ultimate reality of the world. There is, he affirms, an unknowable reality lying back of this. But, while declaring himself an agnostic as regards this ultimate reality, he proceeds with his constructive philosophy as if he possessed the inmost secrets of being. The doctrine of the persistence of force is said to represent the ultimate reality to our minds, and it is therefore invested with the absolute power of life and death over all our other ideas.

What we find fault with, therefore, in the Synthetic Philosophy is not its agnosticism. To one who approaches the problem of existence, as Mr. Spencer does, solely by the way of abstraction and generalization, there is no other answer to the great question than that which he gives. His false step is in assuming that the last result of abstraction, the lowest and most barren category of thought, represents the ultimate reality of the world to our minds more fully and truly than the highest and most comprehensive category, — that the concept persistence of force takes precedence of the concept mind for the interpretation of the world.

As a result of this false step, his synthesis meets with greater and still greater difficulties as it ascends the scale of being. And when it reaches the sphere of conscious mind it becomes the absolute contradiction of experience. It not only cannot find room for intelligence as a causative agency, but it demonstrates the impossibility of its being a cause. But why, it may be asked, do we not become convinced of the insufficiency of the mechanical explanation before we reach the phenomena of mind? For two reasons: firstly, because mechanical relations do constitute a large part of the reality of all things; and, secondly, because of the uncritical habit of mind that thankfully accepts a partial explanation of phenomena as if it were the whole.

The progress of science reveals to us more and more the universality and the importance of the part played by mechanical relations; and every time we are called to recognize the agency of these in quarters where hitherto we had not dreamed of their existence, the impression that they constitute the sum and sub-

stance of all things is deepened. We fail to apprehend the fact that the same progress of science that reveals these relations, at the same time reveals a proportional number of qualities of things that are not, and cannot be, deduced from the persistence of force. It is only, therefore, when we come to the phenomena of conscious mind, through which we gain, as it were, an inside view of things, and to those of personal experience in which we test concepts by acting upon them, that the absolute collapse of this attempt to explain the world by an abstraction is demonstrated.

The author of the *Synthetic Philosophy* does not, it is needless to say, recognize this collapse, though he acknowledges the dead-lock between his philosophy and the philosophy of all human experience. But, nothing daunted, he claims right of way for the law of the persistence of force, and calls upon whatever stands athwart that way to efface itself. He confronts us with this dire alternative, — either there is no such thing as free will, or the synthetic philosophy must be regarded as sheer nonsense.¹ If we are really shut up to this dilemma, we know very well which horn of it we should choose to avoid. That one which calls on us to renounce free-will is even far more dangerous than it looks.

To believe that there is no such thing as free will is, for men who are not metaphysicians, difficult; and to act on the belief is still more difficult. But this is only a part of what will be required of us. A consistent application of the *Synthetic Philosophy* obliges us not only to regard free will as an illusion, but equally to assume that there is no such thing in the world as purposive action. That which we have been in the habit of calling purposive intelligence is really only the inner aspect or face of a physical sequence which is all-sufficient to itself. It cannot be an originating or modifying cause in any special sense, because the physical chain is complete. It is a closed circle. In short, that very completeness, which gives to the philosophy of force its appearance of absoluteness and power of exclusion, has become a source of great embarrassment to it. The most valuable part of the reality of the world it cannot assimilate.

How are we to get over this difficulty? The completeness is certainly there. The doctrine of force is a statement of the reality of the world which forms a consistent, perfect whole. Does not this completeness, this self-sufficiency, which science every day contributes to establish, prove the *all-sufficiency* of the law of

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, p. 503.

force as an explanation of phenomena, and the unreality of all that conflicts with it? It would seem so.

But, now, suppose that an equal degree of completeness, an equal degree of self-sufficiency and power of exclusion should prove to be attainable by starting with a different principle and by following out the set of relations with which it connects us. This is not an idle supposition. Pure idealism confronts us with just such a complete, self-consistent, exclusive explanation of the world. As a reasoned system it has stronger claims upon us than the physical realism that we have been considering. It takes its stand upon the unquestionable fact that we have no *immediate* knowledge of anything except mental states, that these are therefore the certainties of the world before which everything else must give way. From this point of view the very existence of an external world is an unwarrantable assumption. It is unwarrantable because it is unnecessary. The sphere of ideas is sufficient unto itself.

Now, are we obliged to side with one of these antagonistic views of the world and pronounce the other to be false? On the contrary, their rival claims upon reason open our eyes to the fact that their completeness is not absolute, but only relative to our view of things. They are the products of abstraction, and their reality is an abstract reality. There are elements of profound truth in each. But, regarded as exhaustive explanations of the world, they are profound falsehoods.

The most effectual demonstration of their falseness, in each case, is obtained through experience. No matter how strong the reasoning that proves the non-existence of an external world, we go on believing in its reality because the conduct of life, nay, the very preservation of life itself, coerces us into this belief. And for the very same reason, on the other hand, we must believe in the reality of mind as a modifying and constructing cause of a peculiar nature.

The situation may be illustrated by supposing ourselves set down to the task of discovering the secret of the existence of an elaborate, man-made machine. Let us imagine our minds absolutely free from any prepossessions with regard to intelligent causation. We pursue the investigation on exclusively physical lines. Are we at fault? On the contrary, we arrive at satisfactory and proximately exact results. Physics and chemistry put us in possession of apparently all the elements that go to make this machine what it is. The circle of causation is complete. The

machine is accounted for. But the satisfactoriness of this result vanishes the moment we compare it with our knowledge of, what may be called, the inside history of the machine. The investigation on purely physical lines has not only failed to bring into view the part that human intelligence has played in its construction, but it even seems to exclude intelligence from any participation in the process. We are therefore obliged to begin all over again, and to affirm that, notwithstanding the apparent completeness of the physical explanation, the essential reality of the machine as a machine has not been touched by it.

As an aggregate of different forms of force, its existence may have been expressed truly in mechanical terms. But as a definite unity related to the accomplishment of specific ends it is the embodiment of human inventive power. It is mind expressing itself through material or physical instrumentalities. And however difficult it may be to reconcile the one conclusion with the other, or to imagine how these two sets of relations interpenetrate each other, we know, and live by the knowledge, that no machine ever was or ever will be produced without the combination of these two apparently mutually exclusive agencies.

To apply this illustration, let us observe that when the law of the persistence of force is said to exclude the possibility of interference with or modification of the physical sequences of the universe by deity, it is just as if, on the strength of our physical investigation, we should deny that intelligence has anything to do with the production of a machine. Intelligence can have had a part in the latter process only by interfering with, that is by modifying and altering physical sequences; and if man can and does accomplish results in this way, there is surely no absurdity in believing that the being who is at the centre of all things *may* do the same.

This belief does not involve the idea that the laws of nature are set aside in either case. The pioneer does not turn a wilderness into a farm by working against the laws of nature, but by availing himself of them, and by working through them. A father modifies events in answer to the petition of a child, not by traversing physical laws, but by somehow turning the direction of the streams of energy. In such cases we never dream that there has been a break in the physical chain or any rupture of the mechanical order; but in some way, we know not how, the desired changes have been effected, and effected through the application of intelligence. Even though we should be unable to give any answer to

the arguments disproving the truth of this explanation of phenomena, we should all the same be coerced by the necessities of life into acting upon this construction of them. And if such conceptions are essential to the conduct of life in our relations with each other, there is every reason to believe that they afford the best working analogies for the guidance of our lives as related to the supreme being.

So much for the law of the persistence of force. Let us now turn to evolution. Whatever else may be said of this hypothesis, there is one aspect of it that makes it appear to be the absolute contradiction of theism. Evolution declares that the work of creation has been a process of growth or gradual elaboration, dating from the simplest elements; and that the human mind is the latest, most complex product of this process. Now, theism takes its departure from the human mind. By analogical reasoning it constructs the great world of natural phenomena on the model of the little world of human experience. On the assumption that the mind of man has been the cause of many known combinations, it postulates a supreme creative mind as the pre-existent cause of all things. Is it not, we ask ourselves, the stultification of thought to use the last term of the evolutionary series as the cause of the series? Certainly it does seem so, if we confine our thought to the one cycle of phenomena with which we are acquainted and regard it as the sum of all things.

But evolution does not permit us to make such an assumption. It distinctly forbids it on the ground of the analogy from which, as a concept, it has originated. The *idea* of evolution, like that of mind, must be traced to its origin in some concrete experience. That experience, without question, is the process of growth with which we are made familiar in the continual creation of complex, adult forms from what appear to be absolutely simple germs. Could we look no further in each case than the particular cycle of individual development, it would be impossible for us to trace the cause farther than the simple undifferentiated germ. But as matter of fact we know that every such simple germ has proceeded from an organism of the greatest complexity, — a complexity of which the germ itself gives not the slightest hint.

In short, when from the analogy of *known* processes of evolution we strive to construe the creation of the world as such a process, reason demands an antecedent complex to account for the simple elements in which that process takes its rise, as much as it demands antecedent simple elements to account for the complex.

But, now, if we imagine simply a complex of the same order, we make no progress. We have only a succession of cycles. To get out of this repetition of forms and processes we must postulate a principle of an entirely different order, — a principle lying altogether outside the round of physical sequences, which may be conceived of as *originating*, and not simply as inheriting and transmitting the forms and qualities of things.

To postulate such a principle is not unscientific. It is simply to follow out in the sphere of categories the method which science has always pursued when dealing with different elements in the sphere of nature itself. This has been clearly pointed out by Lotze. "Wherever," he says, "we see an element produce results, such as neither its ordinary nature nor the motion in which it is for the moment engaged enables us to understand, we seek the complementary ground of this effect in the different constitution of a second element, which, acted upon by that movement, evolves from itself the part or the form of the result which we would in vain try to derive from the former."¹ This method, he argues, may be applied with equal propriety when we have to do with the relations which principles or categories sustain to each other. If material states cannot be made to explain mental results, we are justified in calling in another principle.

It is true that if experience furnished us with no principle which could be thought of as lying outside this round of physical sequences, we should be shut up to agnosticism. But it would be a painless, unconscious agnosticism. It is just because such a principle is known to experience that we are conscious of agnosticism as a state of privation. This principle, the principle of mental causation, of which physical sequences can make nothing, and for which they can find no place, presses for recognition in the great sum of things, and, at the same time, reason demands just such a principle to make the world thinkable.

But, it may be said, all this reasoning rests simply upon analogy; and the so-called demand of reason is nothing more than an intellectual craving to round out our thought of the immeasurable universe by constructing it on the plan of the little world of our experience. True, but is analogy to be despised? All our constructive thinking proceeds by analogies; and the justification of analogical reasoning is based, not, as we may sometimes think, upon fancied resemblances, but upon the scientifically attested fact that the order of the universe repeats itself on a scale of infi-

¹ *Microcosmus*, Book ii., chap. i. sec. 2.

nite gradations, that the principles which underlie the most extended, most elaborate combinations are found also to govern those that are relatively simple. It is therefore in harmony with the demands of science in general, and with those of evolution in particular, to resort to the analogy of mind, of self-conscious personality, for the explanation of the great world process. But, once more, we are told that there are metaphysical difficulties which forbid our ascribing to the Supreme Being personal attributes like our own. We must not say that He is intelligent, because intelligence implies limitation. We must not say that He loves as we love, because as absolute He cannot be moved at all.

To reason in this way is simply to deliver ourselves over to be the dupes of our own definitions. We invent a term to express our sense of the illimitableness of God, and then turn round and use this very term as a means of limitation. We say, because God is infinite and absolute He cannot be thus and so. Does, then, the word infinity represent a positive element in our thought? It certainly does not. It is simply the beyond of our knowledge, — a region in which vision is lost in imagination, and imagination faints from sheer exhaustion. It is a region without necessities. We can bring back nothing from it for the limitation of our experimental or inferential knowledge of God.

Let us ask ourselves, "How do we know that God is infinite?" We know nothing about it except as related to our knowledge. The only truth the word contains is this: the Supreme Being is unfathomable by our minds. He transcends every thought that we are able to form of Him. Our conception of God, based upon the analogy of the human mind, must always be incomplete. But it is capable of indefinite purification and enrichment concomitantly with our development. Its truth at every stage is a relative and not an absolute one. An infant son, with his exceedingly limited range of thought, may conceive truly of the being of his father. And though the mind of that father should be freighted with the cares of an empire, the child may construe without fault the relations existing between it and his own.

To cast aside anthropomorphism because it is seen to afford an insufficient representation of God, is as if a man should jump overboard in mid-ocean because overcome with the thought of the insignificance of his frail vessel in comparison with the great waste of waters on which it is tossed.

F. H. Johnson.

ANDOVER.

WALTER PATER.¹

So much to read, and so little time to read it! It makes one jealous of every new author, of every new book. With Dante and Shakespeare and Goethe on the shelves — alas, so rarely off them — why do the new books ever tempt us? And yet they do. All of us read them. Many of us read nothing else, and this is surely an abuse. But, after all, Dante and Shakespeare and Goethe are dead, their day is past; and the dead cannot be sufficient for the living. It is one-sided and narrow to forget that past; but it is more one-sided and more narrow to forget the present. That which is modern is ours, and speaks to us as the past, even the past of Pericles, of Elizabeth, never can. So much is true in the abstract; but when it becomes a question of what to read among what is modern, one almost gives it up in despair. The rubbish of a hundred years ago has faded out, so that you do not have to weed an acre to find a flower. But the rubbish of to-day! — it is at least safe to say that there is rubbish, if we name no names.

And even for what is not rubbish tastes are so different. Emerson is not rubbish, nor is Flaubert; yet it is a waste of time for some people to read either. I am very sure it would be equally a waste of time for some people, for very many people, to read the three volumes of Mr. Walter Pater, and I am as sure that there are people who will read them all with infinite delight, and only wish, as I do, that there were three times as many.

I.

Mr. Pater's first volume is an attempt to seize and follow, or rather to catch here and there, a definite thread of development in the great spiritual movement of the Renaissance. His preface is important, as giving at the beginning his idea of criticism.

“‘To see the object as in itself it really is,’ has been justly said to be the aim of all true criticism whatever; and in æsthetic criticism the first step towards seeing one's object as it really is, is to know one's own impression as it really is, to discriminate it, to realize it distinctly.”

¹ *The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry.* By Walter Pater. 2d Ed. Macmillan & Co. London.

Marius the Epicurean; His Sensations and Ideas. By Walter Pater. 2d Ed. Macmillan & Co. London.

Imaginary Portraits. By Walter Pater. 2d Ed. Macmillan & Co. London.
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That will lead in Mr. Pater's work to much fine and close analysis, to a delicate insight. And again: —

"What is important, then, is not that the critic should possess a correct abstract definition of beauty for the intellect, but a certain kind of temperament, the power of being deeply moved by the presence of beautiful objects."

That will give us imagination and sensibility. Delicate analysis and imaginative sensibility — these Mr. Pater possesses as few have possessed them, these give his work its great, and I must believe its permanent, value. In the eight or ten essays of this early volume these qualities are everywhere apparent. If a fault is to be found, it is with the too great delicacy and subtlety, the overfinish. It is the defect, perhaps, of all Mr. Pater's work: the analysis is so subjective, deals so much with fine points and deeper meanings. It is true that too much abstract theory is dangerous; but the critic must generalize at last. His task should be to detect relations, not only those which are subtle and microscopic, but those which are broader and visible to the general gaze of men if they would open their eyes to see them. He should not stop with the impression things make on himself, but allow just a grain of arbitrariness, and tell us what impression they make on us or ought to make. It is as well that we should have it out with Mr. Pater now, so that we may praise with a clear conscience. All of his work is a little too fine-spun. Heaven forbid that we should ask for theories of "vigor and rigor"; but the mind of man is an unstable thing and likes firm ground to rest upon. When we read three volumes word for word — and Mr. Pater's words are too precious to be skipped — we hunger for something which shall savor of conclusions.

But this is fault-finding enough. Let us turn to something pleasanter. One of the first things which strikes one in Mr. Pater's work is its unity of tone. I mean something more than a unity of style, though that, too, is very marked; I mean something almost as distinctive as the indefinable individuality of color which marks some of the great Italian painters, a certain subtle quality hardly to be defined in words. And, indeed, though the application of painters' terms to literature is to be deprecated, color is really the word to apply to what I mean. You feel it before you have read a page in any of these volumes, a tinge of melancholy, of inexplicable sadness, not morbid exactly, certainly not pessimistic, and yet irresistible, leaving an impression for days afterwards. Mr. Pater has described this himself better than I

can. It makes one think of his Watteau: "A seeker after something in the world, that is there in no satisfying measure, or not at all."

But I must say a few words of the Renaissance Studies before we come to Marius. Certainly the most charming of them, the most sensitive and delicate, is that on Lionardo, and in it the Mona Lisa: "She is older than the rocks among which she sits; like the vampire she has been dead many times and learned the secrets of the grave; and has been a diver in deep seas, and keeps their fallen day about her; and trafficked for strange webs with eastern merchants; and as Leda was the mother of Helen of Troy, and, as Saint Anne, the mother of Mary; and all this has been to her but as the sound of lyres and flutes, and lives only in the delicacy with which it has moulded the changing lineaments and tinged the eyelids and the hands."

The long essay on Winckelmann has much that is deep and true about the Greek world and its relation to us moderns. And the conclusion is especially noticeable because it gives us the clearest and most definite statement we can obtain in regard to Mr. Pater's theory of life.

"Well, we are all *condamnés*, as Victor Hugo says: 'Les hommes sont tous condamnés à mort avec des sursis indéfinis;' we have an interval and then our place knows us no more. Some spend this interval in listlessness, some in high passions, the wisest in art and song. For our one chance is in expanding that interval, in getting as many pulsations as possible into the given time. High passions give this quickened sense of life, ecstasy and sorrow of love, political or religious enthusiasm or the enthusiasm of humanity. Only be sure it is passion, that it does yield you this fruit of a quickened, multiplied consciousness. Of this wisdom, the poetic passion, the desire of beauty, the love of art for art's sake has most; for art comes to you professing frankly to give nothing but the highest quality to your moments as they pass and that simply for those moments' sake."

We shall find this theory of life again in Marius, the younger Marius, for the later Marius passes out of it and beyond it apparently, or at least modifies it to a great degree. Whether Marius and Mr. Pater are one and the same I do not know. But the theory is not altogether a new one. It was Goethe's, as Mr. Pater himself points out. It has been and is that of some very lovely souls, not only of those who own it, but of many who follow it unconsciously, opening their lives daily and hourly to the sweet

influences of the world. But — oh, there is another side! Think of the small number to whom such a path is open. "All spiritual progress is confined to a few," says Mr. Pater himself. But the many, the many, to whom culture is an unheard-of, far-off, impossible thing! The many who toil and suffer and curse day by day an unbeautiful, unlovable world! Must there not be some place for them, too, in one's scheme of things? Shut them out as you can, they will break in. Your sweet, passionate world-dream will be marred if human woe can mar it. Sénancour has said it: "How can a life be happy passed in the midst of those who suffer?"

II.

We are just beginning to learn how near the later Roman world is to us, and how much it has to teach us. Read M. Gaston Boissier's "Religion Romaine" and his "Opposition sous les Césars." Read M. Constant Martha's "Moralistes sous l'Empire Romaine." Read Pliny's Letters, and, above all, the "Thoughts" of Marcus Aurelius. It surprises one to see so much of what we think and feel anticipated there to the very life. That is what gives its interest to the story of "Marius the Epicurean," and one should read it, as Mr. Pater has evidently written it, with such books ready to one's hand. For Marius is not a novel, at least not what we commonly understand by that name. Doubtless many people have avoided it, as I did, fearing some "Zenobia, Queen of Palmyra," or some "Last Days of Pompeii"; for certainly no one has yet succeeded in reproducing in fiction the manners of antiquity without pedantry and affectation. Even Mr. Pater has here and there a touch which recalls the "Last Days": "The neat head projecting from the collar of his gray *paenula* or travelling cloak." That sort of thing is what jars in Bulwer's novel. But in Marius such things sink and are lost. What is profound and thoughtful in it outweighs and hides them wholly. Yet, as I said, Marius is not a novel, and whoever reads it as one will be disappointed. It has no plot, no climax, and only one character. It is, in short, what its second title calls it: "The Sensations and Ideas of Marius the Epicurean." But, if I dare whisper it, it will be even more interesting, read as the sensations and ideas, not of an Epicurean seventeen hundred years ago, but now, to-day, and here. Whether one should still call him Marius or not, I cannot tell.

We see the young Marius first living in his "old country-house, half-farm, half-villa," his father dead, growing up with the country sights and sounds around him, still, as a boy, tenderly and

seriously alive to the ceremonies of the religion of his ancestors. There is many a lovely picture here of that youthful life and its surroundings, more lovely in contrast with the perturbed world which meets us later. Here, as so often afterwards, does not many a one among us see himself? And then that strange journey to the temple of *Æsculapius* with its healing dreams and the sweet Greek legend of the god's children: "But being made like to the immortal gods, they begin to pass about through the world, changed thus far from their first form that they appear eternally young, as many persons have seen them in many places, — ministers and heralds of their father, passing to and fro over the earth, like gliding stars."

But, alas, these childish days cannot last forever. Would they could! And next it is the youth who in his new hopes and aspirations comes before us. It is art now and beauty, which has replaced the old, traditional piety, art, or, more properly, the artist, personified in *Flavian*. For one cannot but treat all these characters as personifications, they so evidently appear and disappear only to fill a place in *Marius's* life. With this new companion much is learned and much forgotten. They imbibe together the richness of this new phase of the world.

But we must hurry on, past the lovely dream of "*Cupid and Psyche*," past the death of *Flavian*. Life begins to look more serious now, and this outward loss and deprivation drives the thought of *Marius* within. It is delicately conceived that the death of his beloved friend and helper should not make him feel more strongly the reality of a future world, as happens so often with commoner, or rather more emotional, natures. Precisely this union of intellectual probity with the finest sensibility is what gives the character its charm; for there are others who have seen the tomb close over all they loved, and yet have felt bound to trust their passion less and their reason all the more, in spite of the heart's cry, "We must press those lips again." It is this subtlety everywhere present, which cuts off *Mr. Pater* from a wide-spread popularity, and will make him all the nearer to the few for whom he writes. But *Marius* in the mean while doubts and questions and reasons until he comes to his *Epicureanism* proper, his clear and settled, and, as it seems to him, final view of life: the real *Epicureanism* of *Epicurus*, that is to say, a complete intellectual skepticism, a resolution to make the most of life simply as it is, day by day, coupled, and here is the essential limitation, with the finest and most delicate moral nature in the holder of the theory. *Mr.*

Pater has shown excellently the nature of this true Epicureanism, with a perfect consciousness that it is an anomaly; for the theory, in its very essence, requires to be modified by what it denies, a belief in the ideal, else it leads quickly to unalloyed hedonism. This Marius finds out as he goes on; but, for the present, life and sensation, not coarse, not animal sensation, but the joy and delight of beauty in every form, calm him, satisfy him. He has formulated his mystical religion of the eye: that which is vulgar and disgusting and repulsive to the eye must be rejected, must be wrong. And this is a religion of Mr. Pater's own, as every one must feel, who notices how, again and again, he judges everything by color, judges and describes everything by delicate degrees of light.

And now comes Rome, "The most religious city in the world." Marius goes thither, ostensibly that he may fill some office near the person of the emperor; but evidently because his experience requires it. And after this his intellectual progress is a little difficult to trace. It seems as if, from the first, he had almost unconsciously felt a flaw in this new principle of his, and now it cannot quite satisfy him in the presence of men and of the moving world. The emperor himself, so like him in some respects, stands to Marius in many things as an example of what he ought to avoid. How? It would be hard to say. The question now is not one of theories for the intellect, but of a new mode of action, a new way of taking life. And it is here that Marius comes across the strange light, which had just dawned upon the Roman world. The character through which this light first comes to him, Cornelius, is somewhat vague. Like Flavian, he stands for a type, a side of the ideal which Marius requires and has not found. In himself he is not likely to interest or detain the reader. By his means Marius, as I said, is brought in contact with Christianity, and the most masterly part of the book is the treatment of the effect of this contact on his mind. It is not an intellectual effect. Never, I think, is the intellectual side of Christianity considered or discussed, nor does Marius ever wholly resign his original Cyrenaicism, his reliance on the guidance of the eye. But his old theory, his Epicureanism, was narrow, limited, cold; it needed largeness and humanity. We must, indeed, stand intellectually isolated, alone. The sweet ideal can have no assured value out of ourselves. It is foolish to deny it, foolish to mourn for it, and yet — Something must be heard besides logic, something must be allowed to sweeten, to soften this hard, cold Roman world.

Can Epicureanism do it? Never. Can Stoicism do it? Hardly; for the sweetest of Stoics sat at the gladiatorial spectacle, "impassible through all the hours, for the most part, indeed, actually averting his eyes from the show, reading, or writing on matters of public business; yet, after all, indifferent. He was revolving, perhaps, that old Stoic paradox of the *imperceptibility of pain*." Paradox, indeed; and a paradox somewhat cruel and mocking for the generality of men who are not Stoics, and to whom pain is not imperceptible, but very real, perhaps the most real thing in all this world. "*Sunt lacrimæ rerum.*" That is what Epicurus never knew. That is what Marius had never found in all his Cyrenaicism; that was what he must find, so that at times it seemed to him as if the world had nothing else worth seeking.

"We are constructed for suffering!" he writes in his journal. "What proofs of it does one day afford, if we care to note them, as we go, — a whole long chaplet of sorrowful mysteries." Somewhat different from the tone of "Cupid and Psyche" and the dreams of Flavian!

Here it is that Marius meets the spirit of Christianity then abroad in the world. The gospel of the sick and poor found him, too, in the calm, pure faces of its worshipers, in their *otherworldliness*, their super-human joy. It found him in the white-robed children, in the strong, free music of their hymns. It found him, more than all, in that touching letter from the churches of Lyons and Vienna, with all its sacrifice, with all its pain: "Last of all, the blessed Blandina herself, as a mother that had given life to her children, and sent them like conquerors to the great king, hastened, with joy at the end, to them, as to a marriage feast; even the foe owning that no woman had ever borne pain so manifold and great as hers." It was this spirit, not Cyrenaicism, Marius felt, which would regenerate the world. And yet he himself stands to the end outside of it. It touches him much and teaches him more; it has not won him. The old tyrannical intellect still stands behind and draws him back. The world is regenerated for others, not for him. Oh, the pity of it, the infinite pity of it! That no one has ever come to heal this miserable war! That is what gives the book its sadness. Not that Marius has not his sacrifice also; for this opening of his heart bears fruit with him, too, in its way, and he tells himself that, perhaps after all, one's highest gain, one's highest emotion, even from the Epicurean point of view, is to be found in that love which lays down its life for its friend. It is in this way that

when he and Cornelius are captured as Christians, he remains in bonds himself and sets Cornelius free, knowing that perhaps death will be the result. But the sacrifice has no religious after sweetness, a bitterness rather, and a hopeless wish that all sacrifice were unnecessary. "Had there been one to listen just then, there would have come, from the very depth of his desolation, an eloquent utterance at last, on the irony of men's fates, on the singular accidents of life and death." All this had happened far from Rome, and the prisoners must be carried thither for trial. But the journey was too severe. Marius's strength failed, and the guards left him in a little hut by the roadside to await the end. It comes at last, not altogether bitterly, though still sadly. If the light had not dawned for him, at least he felt that a new day was breaking on the world. And the Christian souls about him watched his fading life with tenderness.

"In the moments of his extreme helplessness their mystic bread had been placed, had descended like a snow-flake from the sky, between his lips. Soothing fingers had applied to hands and feet, to all those old passage-ways of the senses, through which the world had come and gone from him, now so dim and obstructed, a medicinal oil. It was the same people who, in the gray, austere evening of that day, took up his remains and buried them secretly, with their accustomed prayers; but with joy also, holding his death, according to their generous view in this matter, to have been of the nature of a martyrdom; and martyrdom, as the church had always said, a kind of sacrament with plenary grace."

Yet, after all, the conclusions one gets from this life of Marius are not quite definite enough. It is the same complaint we made in the beginning. It will be said that you cannot sum up a man's life in any single formula. So many moods, so many impulses, cannot be reduced to one impression of any sort whatever. Certainly; and yet almost every one's inward life, given the circumstances which have moulded it, stands before you in a sort of wholeness. Now, to me at least that of Marius does not. I cannot feel that Mr. Pater is always quite clear about the character he has in hand, and the chief figure seems to share a little in the vagueness of the lesser forms which surround him. Yet the very subtlety of analysis which causes this vagueness has its value. Perhaps bolder strokes and more dramatic treatment were inconsistent with the peculiar fineness which gives the book its charm.

I have said nothing yet of Mr. Pater's style, because it is every-

where evident that his style is subordinate to his matter. I do not mean by that that he has no thought of style. Everything he has written shows the contrary. But his style follows the thought, and takes form from it; he is not of the school which studies phrases for their own sake. Yet, in spite of this, in spite of the subtlety and delicacy of the ideas, I sometimes think that his greatest charm lies in expression. It would be a curious thing to point out the change which has come about from the best English style of the last century to that of this, a change as great, if not greater, than that from the style of the Elizabethans to the style of the last century. Take any of Dryden's great prefaces, for instance, or Swift, at his best, and compare it with some pages of Ruskin or Hawthorne. And the same is true in French of the change from Voltaire to Chateaubriand. Some people will prefer one and some the other; though a catholic taste will find the best specimens of either each perfect in its own way. Only you must be sure to have the best, and it would be hard to find better examples of the modern style than can be taken from Mr. Pater. It is not that his style is without defects. It unquestionably lacks vigor and distinctness, unquestionably lacks power, as the best modern styles too often do. More than that, it is frequently careless, or appears so, in the unpleasant repetition of words, for instance: "And on the crown of the head of the David there remains a morsel of *unhewn* stone, as if by one touch to maintain its connexion with the place from which it was *hewn*." This is very common with Mr. Pater, and certainly might be avoided: a slight thing, but a very annoying one. And, further, in his effort to obtain new and delicate effects, he sometimes uses words which are new and over-delicate: "The worshiper was to recommend himself to the Gods by becoming fleet and serpentine and white and red like them." I am not quite sure what "serpentine" means, but I am very sure that the word is somewhat beyond the limits of perfect Atticism, and one finds other cases of the same sort.

But this is not an occasion for fault-finding. A style like Mr. Pater's ought to be taken in thankfulness, without too much questioning, and only a prayer for more of the same kind. For what richness it has, and what sweetness always! Every word has its meaning with him, and its value, and even the last defect I mentioned comes from an effort to charge words with more meaning than they can bear: —

"The sense of a certain delicate *blandness*, which he relished,

above all, on returning to the chapel of his mother, after long days of open-air exercise, in winter or stormy summer." The word will hardly hold all the vague emotion which is forced into it.

And the descriptions! I have already spoken of the Mona Lisa in the "Renaissance Studies," but Marius is full of such things. Mr. Pater's rendering of nature has not passion. Passion, in any form, is not frequent in his writing. But all his description has such infinite delicacy, such sensibility to form, to movement, to color! And his wonderfully skillful use of words comes in to help him. Everywhere he has phrases which give nature a new meaning, as subtly as ever Shelley: "Firm, golden weather," "Days brown with the first rains of autumn," "And yet so quiet and wind-swept was the place," "Dun coolness," "It was the very presentment of a land of hope; its hollows brimful of the shadow of blue flowers." And he has longer descriptions, all touched with the same enchantment. Take one among so many.

"The orchard or meadow, through which their path lay, was already gray in the dewy twilight, though the western sky, in which the greater stars were visible, was still afloat with ruddy splendor, seeming to repress by contrast the coloring of all earthly things, yet with the sense of a great richness lingering in their shadows. Just then the voices of the singers, 'a voice of joy and health,' concentrated themselves, with a solemn antistrophic movement, into an evening, or 'candle' hymn, *the hymn of the kindling of the lamp*. It was like the evening itself, its hopes and fears, and the stars shining in the midst of it, made audible. Half above, half below the level mist, which seemed to divide light from darkness (the great wild-flowers of the meadow just distinguishable around her skirts, as she moved across the grass), came now the mistress of the place, the wealthy Roman matron, left early a widow by the confessor Cæcilius, a few years before."

But by far the most remarkable piece of style in Marius is the discourse delivered by the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, after his triumph, to the assembled Roman people. Dramatically considered, it is, perhaps, a little out of character. Though we know that Aurelius did sometimes exchange the emperor's throne for the philosopher's chair, it is hardly to be supposed that in the midst of the conventional solemnity of a great public festival he would deliver such a very philosophical discourse as this, a dis-

course which the vulgar would hardly have heard without a yawn. But, setting this point aside, and we can well afford to do it, the discourse remains a wonderful piece of work. Of course little, if any, of it, is original. It is pieced together from the emperor's "Thoughts," a fragment here and a fragment there; but the piecing is so skillfully done that it makes a far more consistent whole than the "Thoughts" themselves. And the style, though delicate as everywhere else in the book, is stronger than is usual with Mr. Pater. Take the very first sentence. Collier translates: "Examine the size of people's sense, and the condition of their understandings, and you'll never be fond of popularity or afraid of censure."

Mr. Long translates: "Penetrate inward into men's leading principles, and thou wilt see what judges thou art afraid of, and what kind of judges they are of themselves."

Mr. Pater's paraphrase runs thus: "Art thou in love with men's praises, get thee into the very soul of them, and see!—see what judges they be, even in those matters which concern themselves."

What a difference! And there is the same difference all through. Certainly such a rendering may be called a translation in the fullest sense of the word, and those who would know Marcus Aurelius in future must study him here. I wish I could quote it all. In so much richness it is hard to choose.

"How soon may those who shout my name to-day begin to revile it, because glory, and the memory of men, and all things beside, are but vanity,—a sand-heap under the senseless wind, the barking of dogs, the quarreling of children weeping incontinently upon their laughter."

"I find that all things are now as they were in the days of our buried ancestors,—all things sordid in their elements, trite by long usage, and yet ephemeral. How ridiculous is it then, how like a countryman in town, is he who wonders at aught. Doth the sameness, the repetition of the public shows weary thee? Even so doth that likeness of events make the spectacle of the world a vapid one. And so it must be with thee till the end. For the wheel of the world hath ever the same motion, upward and downward, from generation to generation. When, when shall time give place to eternity?"

I said the true Marcus Aurelius was to be found here; but has not that cry something of a pain which the emperor never knew? Is it not rather the voice of Marius himself?

III.

If "The Renaissance" is the root, and Marius the stem, the "Imaginary Portraits" are the flower. In these Mr. Pater's critical insight and his imaginative sensibility melted together have produced the most delicate work he has ever done. They are not all equal, however. To take the last first, the sketch of "Duke Carl of Rosenmold," seems to me the least satisfactory of the four. It stands, perhaps, for the ideal Goethe; but the ideal Goethe could never have been very human, and Duke Carl, in spite of his light and joyousness, is a little vague, a little in the air. Much less so is the first Portrait, that of a "Prince of Court Painters." The life and development of Watteau are sketched by the hand which drew Marius, with the same grace, the same sweetness, the same delicate sadness brooding over all. Only here, Mr. Pater has, I think unfortunately, adopted a dramatic form, or I should say, an objective form, in that his study is made, not in his own person, but in that of a lady who knew Watteau and loved him. I say "unfortunately," because in the actual representation of character Mr. Pater is not strong. This is shown by the fact that in the whole four hundred and fifty pages of Marius there is not a single conversation, setting aside translations, except the few words exchanged at the death-bed of Flavian, and this, too, when often, as when Marius visits the emperor and his family, it seems as if conversation would surely be the simplest way of developing the story. The "Prince of Court Painters" shows Mr. Pater's weakness in this direction even more strongly. It is true that he does occasionally remember what he has undertaken and give a little dramatic touch as, in the journal, where Watteau's painting of another woman is alluded to; but constantly he speaks as no woman in those times could have spoken, and alludes to things which must have been beyond her ken. You never feel that it is really any one but himself. One's mind is quickly made up to this, however, and then everything is forgotten but the exquisite workmanship. What a description is this:—

"The sullenness of a long wet day is yielding just now to an outburst of watery sunset, which strikes from the far horizon of this quiet world of ours, over fields and willow woods, upon the shifty weather-vanes and long-pointed windows of the tower on the square—from which the Angelus is sounding—with a momentary promise of a fine night."

Have we not seen it all of us, here as well as in Valenciennes,

the long light over the willows on the shifty weather-vanes and the melancholy Angelus sounding?

If I have ventured to find fault with the first portrait and the last, it is only because the other two are perfect, each in its kind. "Denys l'Auxerrois" has perhaps no one passage which stands much above the rest, or beyond other parts of Mr. Pater's writing; but it is conceived and developed in the most exquisite unity and harmony with hardly a weak point anywhere. It is the same old mediæval France which Mr. Pater dwelt on in his essay on "Aucassin and Nicolette," that strange middle age with its wild fancies, its grotesque passions, its childish glee, and, above all, its inexplicable sadness, forever brooding over something it cannot understand, over a past too deep for it, over a future which hangs unfathomably far away. But Auxerre! "Its most characteristic atmosphere is to be seen when the tide of light and distant cloud is travelling quickly over it, when rain is not far off, and every touch of art or time on its old building is defined in clear gray." And Denys himself, when he stirs and startles Dean and Canon and Prebendary in that mad game of ball, and when he turns Auxerre upside down with his strange, half-animal fascination. And the madness which took possession of them: "Heads flung back in ecstasy — the morning sleep among the vines, when the fatigue of night was over — dew-drenched garments — the serf lying at his ease at last." It is the old Greek Bacchanalia, but still with the touch of sadness in it, not wild, not free, not spontaneous, not childlike any longer. And Denys as he works in his quiet refuge among the monks, — Denys as he frames his organ, as he wanders in irresistible frenzy out into the world again, narrowly escaping from his enemies by plunging into the stream. "Some indeed fancied they had seen him emerge again safely on the deck of one of the great boats loaded with grapes and wreathed triumphantly with flowers." Last of all, Denys with a wild longing for the old enthusiasm, the old adoration, making his way among the crowd at the festival, rousing the passion of the mob, torn limb from limb, so that "the monk Hermes sought in vain next day for any remains of the body of his friend. Only, at nightfall, the heart of Denys was brought to him by a stranger, still entire." Is not this all, one of those stone dreams which has stolen down some midsummer night from a cathedral portal to bewitch us? A sweet bewilderment of lutes and pipes and cymbals, a wild cry, a flash of light, and it is gone.

Sebastian Van Storek is deeply contrasted with the preceding,

and shows Mr. Pater in a different and stronger vein. Instead of Auxerre and mediæval France, we are in Holland, in Holland which seems modern even as it was two hundred years ago. And yet here, too, is something of the same sadness, the same shade, but clearer and colder as the northern climate would, in its nature, be. And the main subject is as cold as the general treatment. Strange picture, this intoxicated idealism, this Spinozism run mad! Is it not fascinating, absorbing, the story of this youth who with the charm of life around him, grows colder and colder, shuts himself into his cabinet where he could "yield himself with the only sort of love he had ever felt, to the supremacy of his difficult thoughts. A kind of empty place" where "Of living creatures only the birds came there freely." And as he goes on everything human falls more and more away from him. Art falls, a trouble, a mere disturbance of the divine peace after all. Love falls away, the woman was not worthy of him. To his mother who reproaches him: "She must needs feel, a little icily, the emptiness of hope, and more than the due measure of cold in things for a woman of her age, in the person of a son who desired but to fade out of the world like a breath," he answers: "'Good mother, there are duties towards the intellect also, which women can but rarely understand.'" Last of all fades the enthusiasm of the idea itself. The one eternal, substance, all-thinking, all-enfolding, inspires love no longer, but indifference only. "And at length this dark fanaticism, losing the support of his pride in the mere novelty of a reasoning so hard and dry, turned round upon him, as our fanaticism will, in black melancholy." And the end comes. But, as in the case of Marius, sacrifice softens the harshness of it, makes it pardonable. "Only, when the body of Sebastian was found, apparently not long after death, a child lay asleep, swaddled warmly in his heavy furs, in an upper room of the old tower, to which the tide was almost risen; though the building still stood firmly, and still with the means of life in plenty. And it was in the saving of this child, with a great effort, as certain circumstances seemed to indicate, that Sebastian had lost his life."

IV.

If I have said half of what I feel, I have shown those who would care for Mr. Pater's writing that they would care for it very much indeed. It is easy to praise it vaguely, but nothing can render its infinite grace and indescribable charm. You must go to the books themselves. Read them in their natural order:

the "Renaissance Studies," then "Marius," then the "Portraits." If you like one you will certainly like all. If you do not like the first, you will hardly care for the others.

I do not know whether it is worth while to insist upon the limitations to all this. I have indicated them. Mr. Pater has not dramatic power, the power of presenting characters. Neither is he a writer to go to for intellectual or moral support. Certain people might find these in him; but most of us would not. Nor is he an artist of the highest order, in spite of his style; he has not the broad, swift, unerring touch of the great masters. I have said that his description had not passion. I mean by that, that in spite of delicate shades and subtle insight, he never could write such things as Keats's "Nightingale": —

"Now more than ever seems it rich to die,
To cease upon the midnight with no pain,
While thou art pouring forth thy soul abroad
In such an ecstasy!
Still wouldst thou sing, and I have ears in vain —
To thy high requiem become a sod."

Or this, in another strain, of Obermann: —

"La paix d'un lieu semblable n'est qu'un abandon momentané, sa solitude n'est point assez sauvage. Il faut à cet abandon un ciel pur du soir, un ciel incertain mais calme d'automne, le soleil de dix heures entre les brouillards."

An intensity of this high order Mr. Pater has not, either in his description of nature or of human life. And there is one thing more. This melancholy, this sadness, which haunts all his writing, is it quite healthy, quite sound? After "Marius," and even more, after "Denys" and "Sebastian," does not one need a breath of this fresh, cold, winter air? Because the melancholy is so seductive, it is all the more dangerous.

But it would be ungracious to complain, or even to remember these things, when so much is given us. I see Mr. Pater's admirers already branding me as a traitor, and I would let no one be more enthusiastic than myself. After all, the broad, all-embracing artists are more praised, more admired; but are they so much treasured as those who turn only to a few, singing to them secretly the music they best love to hear?

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CURRENT MISQUOTATIONS.

"VERIFY your quotations," was the advice said to have been given by a professor on his death-bed as a quasi-legacy to a pupil to whom he had promised to leave his most precious literary possession. The names of the testator and legatee in this unique testamentary disposition are not forthcoming, nor is it stated whether the legatee was altogether satisfied with the shape which the legacy assumed. The same advice was, however, given as a sort of "*donatio inter vivos*," in another case where both the parties are well known. The story is told in the charming volume of Memoirs which Charles Julian Young, son of the tragedian of that ilk, has left to the world. Speaking of the Rev. John W. Burgess, of Oriel College, "an accomplished man, and a great Biblical scholar," he writes: "On one occasion when Dr. Routh" (the venerable President of Magdalen College) "had been saying many kind and encouraging things to him (Mr. B.), the latter asked him to give him some advice that might stay by him and be of use to him in his future life. 'Always, verify your citations,' was the answer." Mr. Burgess we may suppose turned to good account the advice of the Master of Magdalen. But, as a rule, assuredly, this advice has not the property of "*staying by*" those to whom it is given. All accept it in theory, but almost all ignore it in practice. Were it not so, the writer should not have had so much difficulty in selecting from the mass of current misquotations those given in this paper. They will be found to be, generally, old familiar friends, veritable household words; and, no doubt, most persons, when told that in using these expressions they are guilty of misquoting, will be as much surprised as Molière's Monsieur Jourdain was to learn that he had all his life, without knowing it, been speaking prose. My examples are drawn from a great variety of sources. Shakespeare, Milton, and all the great English poets have suffered more or less in the process of being quoted, and even the sacred text has not escaped entirely unscathed. But what is a misquotation? I would answer that there are three different ways in which a passage may be misquoted: 1. The words may be wrongly given; 2. The meaning given to the passage may be different from that intended by the author; and 3. The passage may be attributed to a wrong person. In each of these cases alike the passage is misquoted, although in common parlance that term is usually limited to cases where there is a verbal mistake in the quotation.

Some of the misquotations which I shall cite will be found to have taken such firm root, and to be so thoroughly established by general usage not only of illiterate and vulgar, but of cultured and well-read persons, that it will be almost impossible now to disturb them. Any one found fault with for using them may urge in his defense the Horatian *dictum* which makes common usage the final arbiter in such matters :—

“Si volet usus

Quem penes arbitrium est et jus et norma loquendi,”

which Conington translates, —

“If usage will it so, to whom belongs

The rule, the law, the government of tongues.”

Every one who has given any attention to our English colloquial speech is well aware how much it is indebted to our English Bible. Consciously or unconsciously every day and hour of our lives we are making use of the phrases and expressions of the Old and New Testaments. They form the very warp and woof of our ordinary speech. That under these circumstances a passage from the Bible should be occasionally misquoted would be but natural; but that, with our Bibles daily, or at least weekly, in our hands, any passage could be continually and universally misquoted may well seem incredible. It is, however, true. Who has not heard, nay, who has not again and again employed the hackneyed quotation, “He who runs may read”? It is not only constantly used in common conversation, but it is also a favorite commonplace of poets, prose writers, and public speakers. And who has ever seen or heard the words used in any sense but this — “that the writing is so legible that a man can read it as he runs.” But assuredly the Hebrew prophet from whom the quotation is taken neither said nor thought of saying anything of the kind. Habakkuk is foretelling the vengeance which the Chaldeans would inflict upon the land because of its ungodliness, and writes (chap. ii. 2): “And the Lord answered me and said, Write the vision and make it plain upon tables that he may run that readeth it.” Obviously the prophet is to write so plainly that any one who reads it may understand it and run away and escape from the coming vengeance. It is not that he may run and read, but that he may read and run. Strangely enough the learned theologian Dr. Wordsworth seems to give the sanction of his high authority to the vulgar but certainly erroneous use of this quotation from Habakkuk.¹

¹ See note on Galatians vi. 11, in Wordsworth's Greek Testament.

In his "Budget of Paradoxes," a book containing much curious and forgotten lore, the great mathematician De Morgan informs us that the well-known passage from the prophet Daniel, "Many shall go to and fro and knowledge shall increase," stands on the title-page of Montucla's "History of Mathematics," in its Latin form, "Multi pertransibunt et augebitur scientia," as a quotation from Bacon! Bacon had indeed made use of this passage from Daniel as the very appropriate motto for his great work, the "De Augmentis Scientiæ," and Montucla, who was probably better acquainted with mathematics than with the Vulgate, may naturally have supposed that Bacon was the author of his own motto.

The Bible is sometimes, as we have seen, robbed of what belongs to it; but, on the other hand, it is sometimes improperly credited with what does not belong to it. There are several proverbial sayings which are very generally, but erroneously supposed to be taken from the Bible. "God tempers the wind to the shorn lamb," and "Cleanliness is next to Godliness," both come under this category. Both are, without doubt, very excellent sayings, but certainly not Biblical. The former, we are told by the compiler of "Familiar Quotations," was first used by Sterne, who puts it into the mouth of Maria in the "Sentimental Journey." He adds that it is an adaptation of the old French proverb, "A brebis tondue Dieu mesure le vent," and that a very similar passage occurs in that curious repertory of old saws, Herbert's "Jacula Prudentum" —

"To a close shorne sheepe
God gives wind by measure."

The other passage — "Cleanliness is next to Godliness" — is given with quotation marks in one of John Wesley's sermons. But the origin of it is not known. The compiler of "Familiar Quotations" says that a Jewish lecturer reported in "The Jewish World" asserts that this proverb has been for centuries taught by the Rabbis in the Talmud, both as a religious principle and as a sanitary law. The common sayings, "Pouring oil on the troubled waters," and, "The war horse scents the battle from afar," are also, as a recent writer in "Notes and Queries" says, very generally believed to come from the Bible. But the Bible will be searched in vain for either of them. On the other hand, as the last-mentioned writer says, the expression by the "skin of my teeth," which many regard as vulgar slang, is in reality Biblical. It is the unhappy Job (ix. 20) who exclaims in the bitterness of his anguish, "I am escaped with the skin of my teeth."

From the preceding examples of Biblical misquotations it is clear

that many persons, unconsciously no doubt, are guilty of violating the command laid down (Deut. iv. 2), not to add to or take from what is written in the sacred word.

From the Bible to Shakespeare, our uninspired Saxon Bible, the transition, for the purposes of this article, is natural and easy. Shakespeare assuredly comes next after the Bible, as the well-head of English quotations. His works furnish us with a perfectly inexhaustible fund of quotations suitable for every conceivable emergency. Multitudes of his felicitous sayings have become "familiar in our lips as household words." So familiar, indeed, that in many instances their origin is entirely forgotten, and they are employed without any reference to the author. It was, if I mistake not, Mrs. Malaprop who said, that she could not bear Hamlet, it was so *full of "quotations"!*

That many of these innumerable quotations from the Shakespeare storehouse should, in passing from mouth to mouth, have got twisted either in form or meaning, and in this altered state should somehow have crystallized for popular use, is only what might have been anticipated. The late Mr. Richard Grant White, a learned and acute Shakespearean student, cites a striking example of a passage from Shakespeare which is frequently used, and always in a sense quite different from that which Shakespeare intended.

"Shakespeare," writes Mr. White, "makes Ulysses say to Achilles (Troilus and Cressida, Act iii. sc. 3) that there is one petty trait of human nature which shows that all men are akin, and that trait is that

'All with one consent praise new born gauds
Though they are made and moulded of things past,
And give to dust that is a little gilt
More laud than gold o'er dusted.'"

"He introduces this," continues Mr. White, "by saying, 'One touch of nature makes the whole world kin,' that *touch being this petty trait*. The meaning is so clear that no man who was capable of editing a spelling-book could mistake it, but some reader of Shakespeare having seized upon the isolated line and having misapprehended it as meaning that one natural touch will unite the whole world in the bond of common kindred, it has gone with this meaning over the civilized globe, and is so used by hundreds of thousands who have never read a line of Shakespeare, by millions who never read a line of Troilus and Cressida, in a wholly different and almost opposite sense to that in which Shakespeare

wrote it." In the last line quoted from Troilus and Cressida I have ventured to substitute "gold" for the common reading "gilt." The emendation had occurred to me and is, I find, proposed by Staunton. The passage as altered suggests another from the play of King John, which is frequently misquoted: —

"To gild refined gold
To paint the lily, to throw a perfume on the violet
Is wasteful and ridiculous excess."

This passage is generally given —

"To paint the lily and adorn the rose
Is foolish and ridiculous excess,"

where *adorn the rose* is introduced without any authority, and "foolish" substituted, stupidly, for "wasteful."

The very common but absurd expression "heart of hearts" is another instance of a strange misquotation from Shakespeare. Hamlet says to his friend Horatio (Act iii. sc. 2): —

"Give me that man who is not passion's slave,
And I will wear him in my heart's core,
Aye, in my heart of heart, Horatio,
As I do thee."

Here "heart of heart" is plainly but the repetition or enforcement of the previous expression, "in my heart's core," and in this sense the words are perfectly intelligible. But the phrase "heart of hearts" must be admitted by every one who takes the trouble to analyze it for a moment to be an utterly meaningless, and, as I have already said, absurd expression. And yet this meaningless expression is constantly used, no doubt with the supposed sanction of Shakespeare, by classical speakers and writers. Nay, two at least of our greatest English poets, Wordsworth and Shelley, have stamped the words with their approval.

The former poet in his noble ode on "The Intimations of Immortality," has the following line in the last stanza of the poem: —

"Yet in my heart of hearts I feel your might."

And Shelley makes use of the same words, "heart of hearts," in his strangely named and very extraordinary poem, "The Epipsychidion."

The words of Macbeth's pitiless wife when urging the hesitating Thane to the murder of the gentle Duncan, —

"Screw up your courage to the sticking place,"

are almost always given, "Screw up your courage to the stick-

ing point." And the passage in the same play, "I'll make assurance *double* sure," is changed into "I'll make assurance *doubly* sure." The line from *The Tempest*, Act iv., s. 1, —

"We are such stuff as dreams are made on,"

is usually quoted, "such stuff as dreams are made of." The saying of the inimitable Dogberry, "Comparisons are odorous," is very commonly attributed to Mrs. Malaprop. But this is a libel upon Sheridan's delightful blunderer. What she does say is, "No caparisons, Miss. Caparisons don't become a young woman." Some persons may learn with surprise that two passages from the play of *Richard III.* as presented on the stage, which are special favorites with "the groundlings," are not Shakespeare's. "Off with his head, so much for Buckingham," and "Richard's himself again," are both interpolations introduced by Colley Cibber in the acting play. The list of Shakespeare misquotations might easily be extended. I shall, however, only mention one other, in many ways a remarkable one, which may not unfitly close my reference to the mighty bard. The passage is taken from the *Tempest*, generally believed to be the last or almost the last play written by Shakespeare (if, indeed, the Baconians will allow us to say that Shakespeare wrote anything!); the words are uttered by Prospero, who is supposed to represent Shakespeare himself, and finally the passage is graven upon the monument to Shakespeare in Westminster Abbey, where, incredible as it may seem, it is misquoted!

Who is not familiar with the noble speech addressed by Prospero to Ferdinand at the close of the *Masque* in the fourth act of the *Tempest*. It is so beautiful that I shall be excused for giving it *in extenso* : —

"Our revels now are ended. These our actors
As I foretold you, were all spirits, and
Are melted into air, into thin air,
And like the baseless fabric of this vision
The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
Yea, all which it inherit shall dissolve,
And like this unsubstantial pageant faded
Leave not a *rack* behind."

This splendid passage is, as the compiler of "Familiar Quotations" observes, almost invariably misquoted, —

"And like the baseless fabric of a vision
Leave not a *wreck* behind,"

mixing up the beginning and the end of the speech, and using the word "wreck" instead of "rack," now universally accepted as the right reading. On the monument to Shakespeare in the Abbey, where the whole passage is given, *wreck* is improperly used in the last line for "rack."

That others should thus grievously misquote our great poet is not so wonderful, perhaps, when we find him guilty of misquoting himself. In the very last scene of the most amusing comedy of Twelfth Night the clown quotes the forged letter by means of which the shrewish serving-maid Maria, that "most excellent devil of wit," as Sir Toby calls her, betrays the conceited steward Malvolio into such a ludicrous exhibition of fantastic folly. The clown says, "Some are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness *thrown* upon them;" "*thrust*," not *thrown* being the word used in the original letter. Staunton does not think that this misquotation was, as Dyer suggests, "either an oversight of the author, or an error of the scribe or printer," but that it was a "purposed variation, common to Shakespeare in cases of repetition, possibly from his knowing by professional experience the *difficulty of quoting with perfect accuracy*." As however it is a "clown" who thus misquotes, the example cannot be cited as a precedent for educated persons, but rather perhaps as indicating a custom "more honored in the breach than the observance."

In the foregoing remarks I have not alluded to a class of passages from Shakespeare, and their name is Legion, which are generally quoted as though they expressed the personal convictions, the fixed opinions of the poet on the subject to which they relate. Many of these passages, as Lady Martin (Helena Faucet) says, "although most apt in the mouths of his characters, were never meant to be taken as universally true." "What," continues Lady Martin, "can be more absurd than the too common habit of quoting, as if it expressed Shakespeare's personal conviction, the phrase 'What's in a name'? No man, we may be sure, better understood how very much there may be in a name. As Juliet uses it, "Romeo and Juliet" (Act ii. sc. 2), the phrase is apt and true. In the rapture of her love it was nothing to her that Romeo bore the name of the enemy of her house. What were ancestral feuds to her, who saw in him 'the God of her idolatry'? 'His gracious self' was her all in all. What then was in his name? But the phrase is not only meaningless, but false, when cited, as it too often is, without regard to person, place, or circumstance."¹

¹ *Shakespeare's Female Characters.*

Examples of misquotations of this sort, not only from Shakespeare, but many other celebrated writers, might readily be multiplied. The subject, however, is a large one, and would take us too far afield for the purpose of this paper. It would, moreover, be adding to the three classes of misquotations, to which I proposed at the beginning of this paper to confine myself, a fourth and entirely separate and distinct class. I shall content myself therefore with this allusion to this large branch of the subject of misquotations.

Shakespeare suggests Milton. But the author of "Paradise Lost" has not given us nearly as many popular quotations as the many-sided, myriad-minded bard of Avon, who was in touch with nature at every point. The quotations, and therefore the misquotations, from Milton are relatively few. I certainly have not noticed more than three or four of the latter, and they occur in "Lycidas." The very last line in this poem, —

"To-morrow to fresh *woods* and pastures new,"

is almost invariably quoted, —

"To-morrow to fresh *fields* and pastures new,"

which makes the latter half of the line a mere tautology. This line was misquoted in the first edition of Forster's "Life of Dickens" but corrected in the second. In the same poem Milton calls the love of fame, —

"That last infirmity of noble mind,"

a line very commonly quoted, —

"That last infirmity of noble *minds*."

In some editions of Milton indeed the line is given in this way. But a reference to the passage will show that the rhyme requires "mind," not "minds."

"Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise
(That last infirmity of noble mind)
To scorn delights and live laborious days,
But the fair guerdon which we hope to find."

Another passage in "Lycidas" is almost always understood and quoted in a sense quite different from what Milton intended.

"And every shepherd tells his tale
Under the hawthorn in the vale."

It is generally supposed that it is meant here that Corydon is whispering a tale of love in the ears of his Phyllis. Whereas the poet merely means that the shepherd was engaged in the prosaic work

of counting his flock to see that he had his full number. The author of "Words and Phrases" quotes a parallel from Dryden :

"She takes the tale of all the lambs."

Our next example is from the opposite extremity of the literary pole : Butler's "Hudibras." From Milton to Butler, from "Paradise Lost" to "Hudibras," is indeed from the sublime to the ridiculous. And yet, is there not one point (pardon me, shade of Milton !) in which there is a resemblance between the poems, namely, that no one likes a large dose of either at one time. But, after all, the passage in question is one falsely attributed to Butler. It is this : —

"But he that fights and runs away
May live to fight another day."

Few passages have given rise to so much controversy as this. Numerous articles have from time to time appeared in "Notes and Queries," and elsewhere, in reference to their authorship. Much learned dust has been raised, but little has been established beyond the fact that the lines, wherever they may come from, are *not* in "Hudibras." Doubtless they have a Hudibrastic ring, and very closely resemble the following lines, which are found in that poem : —

"For those that fly may fight again,
Which he can never do that's slain."

It has been asserted that the disputed passage is found in "Musarum Deliciæ," published in 1656, a scarce book, of which Sir John Mennis and Dr. James Smith were the joint authors. But, unfortunately for this assertion, the lines are not found in any of the editions, and they are many, of that work, in the British Museum. Again, it has been argued, with some show of reason, that Goldsmith is the author. In "The Art of Poetry on a New Plan," a work compiled, with Goldsmith's assistance, by Newberry, the publisher, the lines in question are given as Butler's. It is suggested that Goldsmith, quoting from memory, gave Butler's lines incorrectly, and hence all this literary pother. If this be so, and it seems not improbable, it is another evidence of the necessity of "verifying our quotations."

To the compiler of "Familiar Quotations" I am largely indebted for the preceding facts respecting this quotation. The sentiment embodied in the lines, though neither heroic nor poetical, is a very natural one, and doubtless found expression at a very early period in the history of that pugnacious animal, man. It certainly is as

old as Demosthenes, who, when reproached for running away at the battle of Cheronæa, replied : —

Ἄσπερ δ' ἐφύγων, καὶ πάλιν μαχήσεται,

of which the lines ascribed to "Hudibras" are a literal translation. Indeed, there seems reason to suppose that the sentiment may be traced to a still earlier classical source, it being alleged to be a translation of one of the few fragments remaining of the Greek poet Menander.

"Everything by *turns* and nothing long,"

is a common misquotation of a line from Dryden's "Absalom and Ahitophel" : —

"Everything by *starts* and nothing long."

And the very common quotation : —

"When Greek meets Greek then comes the tug of war,"

is misquoted from Lee's "Alexander the Great," who writes : —

"When Greeks join'd Greek, then comes the tug of war,"

where the author is speaking, not of Greek fighting against Greek, but of the powerful resistance of the Greeks, when united against Philip of Macedon.

Few persons who use the quotation : —

"Welcome the coming, speed the parting guest,"

are aware that it is Pope's, and probably still fewer recognize it as a translation of old Homer's line in the *Odyssey*, xv. 74.¹

Χρὴ ξείνονα παρόντα φιλεῖν ἰθὺλοντα δὲ πέμπειν.

Elsewhere Pope writes : —

"For I who hold sage Homer's rule the best,

Welcome the coming, speed the parting guest."

The splendid plagiarist, Shakespeare, who improved everything he borrowed, was, no doubt, indebted to sage Homer's line above given for the speech which he puts into the mouth of Ulysses, in *Troilus and Cressida* : —

"For time is like a fashionable host,

That slightly shakes the parting guest by the hand

And with his arms out-stretched as he would fly,

Grasps in the comer."

It has been the hard fate of Lord Roscommon that the only lines of his which are quoted nowadays are attributed almost universally to Pope.

¹ In his *Lives of the Poets*, Johnson tells us that Fenton translated Books 1, 4, 19, 20; Broome, Books 2, 6, 8, 11, 12, 16, 18, 23; and Pope the remaining 12 Books of the *Odyssey*. So that the 15th Book is Pope's translation.

One of these is : —

"Immodest words admit of no defense,
For want of decency is want of sense."

Another is : —

"Choose an author as you choose a friend."

Both these quotations are taken from Roscommon's "Essay on Translated Verse."

"Among the most hackneyed quotations of the day," writes Mathews, "is the line

"Small by degrees and beautifully less,"

which is invariably misquoted from 'Henry and Emma,' a parody published in 1821 on Matthew Prior's 'Nut Brown Maid.' Describing the dress of Emma, the lover says : —

"No longer shall the bodice aptly laced,
From thy full bosom to thy slender waist,
That air of harmony and shape express
Fine by degrees and beautifully less."

All the preceding examples of misquotation are found in standard English writers, with whose works most educated persons are tolerably familiar. It cannot, then, be matter of wonder that when we leave the vernacular, and venture to quote from a dead or foreign language, of which the majority of the quoters know but little, we should frequently make serious blunders.

Few passages from the Latin Classics are more frequently used by speakers and writers than the concluding words of Sinon's speech, in the 2d Book of the *Æneid*, line 65 : —

"Accipe nunc Danaum insidias et crimine ab uno
Disce omnes,"

which Thornhill, in his recent admirable translation of the *Æneid*, happily renders : —

"Hear now this fraud, and be one caitiff Greek sample of all."

The last four words of Virgil are almost always quoted : —

"Ex uno disce omne,"

which could not possibly form part of a Latin hexameter, were it not open to objection also on other grounds. The passage, strange to say, is quoted incorrectly in the London "Quarterly Review," and quite recently by the scholarly Archdeacon Farrar, in his article on "Africa and the Drink Trade" in the "Con-

temporary" for July, 1887. Some few lines before the passage just mentioned are found the words: —

"Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes,"

which may be rendered, —

"The Greek still dread, tho' gifts his hands pretend."

This passage is generally quoted omitting the "et," and making the line consequently unscannable.

Of all Latin authors, Horace is, no doubt, the most popular with the English, and the one most frequently quoted. Of Horace's popularity with the English, Theodore Martin gives an amusing illustration in the sketch of Horace which prefaces his marvelous translations of the "Odes." The Italian peasants living in the neighborhood of Horace's tomb are, he says, quite persuaded that Horace was an Englishman because so many of them come to visit his tomb. One of the most common quotations from Horace is the line, —

"In venies etiam disjecti membra poetæ,"

which Conington renders, —

"The bard remains, unlimb him as you may."

This is almost always quoted "*disjecta membra poetæ*," words which could not possibly find a place in any hexameter.

Few Latin expressions are more common than "*Cui bono*," and, strange to say, it is invariably used incorrectly, and with a meaning which it never could have conveyed to a Roman. By those who use the words so glibly in their English speeches or writings, it is employed as if it meant "What is the good of it," or, "What use is it." It is assumed that there is a grammatical concord between the words, whereas a very elementary knowledge of Latin grammar would have made them familiar with the fact, that the words are an instance of what grammarians call a *double dative*, and that the real meaning of the words is, "Who benefits," or, "For whose advantage is it." Andrews, in his Latin dictionary, gives numerous examples from Cicero and Livy of the classical use of the expression, and mentions a case where the question "*Cui bono fuerit*" was very pertinently put by a Roman advocate in a trial for murder, meaning, "for whose advantage was it." "*Cui bono*" is the abbreviated form of the above query.

The French expression "*nom de plume*" is a very serviceable one much in vogue with English speakers and writers, especially journalistic writers, and is, no doubt, regarded by all who use it as one of those compendious phrases which we are content to bor-

row from the French, those masters of happy colloquial expressions. It has, however, been satisfactorily shown by a recent writer, in "Notes and Queries," that the expression is not only not of French origin, but that it is never used by the French, who employ in this sense the words, "*nom de guerre*" or *pseudonym*. It is, in fact, a pure English invention. I am, therefore, warranted in putting down this expression as a misquotation. And a very remarkable, possibly a unique, one it is. For in this case the English nation would appear to be responsible not only for uttering but for coining the counterfeit metal. It is curious to find "*nom de plume*" translated from the French into English as "Pen-name." In Whitaker's Reference Catalogue for 1886, we have a "List of the Pen-names of English authors."

So far the misquotations cited have been taken from books. There is, however, a large and interesting class of misquotations of the words used on memorable occasions by distinguished historical personages. I do not propose at present to do more than glance at this tempting field of investigation; partly because it would unduly extend this article already sufficiently long, and partly because this branch of the subject of "misquotations" has already been largely worked out by Mr. Mathews in the chapter on "The Illusions of History" in that pleasant book, "Half Hours with the Best Authors," and very learnedly and exhaustively, so far at least as French history is concerned, by Mr. Edouard Fournier in "L'Esprit dans L'Histoire." It is, on the whole, somewhat uncomfortable reading. One is pained to find how many of one's venerated idols are thrust from their pedestals by these iconoclastic writers. In fact, it is all too plainly proved that very few indeed of these memorable utterances, "*Mots historiques*," as the French style them, were really spoken on the occasions with which they are usually associated, or by the persons to whom they are generally attributed. What Englishman will not be grieved to find that Mathews calls in question the correctness of the famous order which Nelson is said to have issued just before the battle of Trafalgar, "England expects every man to do his duty." The order really issued by Nelson, Mr. Mathews tells us, was, "*Nelson* expects every man to do his duty," and he adds that the word "England" was substituted for Nelson by the officer whose duty it was to telegraph the order to the fleet, simply because he could find no flag by which to telegraph the word "Nelson." Mr. Mathews does not give us his authority for the above statement, and I should be glad to find that it was not correct.

I cannot refrain from noticing here the amusing account given by Mathews of the coinage of a celebrated French "*mot*" usually supposed to have been uttered by the Comte D'Artois, brother of Louis XVIII. at the time of the Restoration, but of which he was utterly innocent. The count is supposed to have concluded his address to the brilliant company who welcomed his Royal Highness as he rode into Paris with these words: "Il n'y a rien de changé. Il n'y a qu'un François de plus." The fact was that the count in reply to the address which was read to him stammered out a few confused sentences—by no means epigrammatic. Talleyrand felt that the occasion was one which required something striking, and accordingly the proper and historical speech was made to his order by one of his literary friends. Mathews gives the history of the genesis of this famous "*mot*"—how it was tentatively and painfully elaborated. We have, indeed, plainly set before us from beginning to end the "forged process" by which on this occasion the "whole ear" not only of France but of the entire world was "rankly abused."

But I must not permit myself to dwell longer on this class of misquotations—their name is "Legion." For the purpose of this paper, it must suffice to have referred to them thus briefly, and to have pointed out two recent writers who have treated of this branch of my subject at some length. The array of current misquotations presented in the preceding portion of this paper will, I trust, sufficiently show that the advice given to his friend by the President of Magdalen was not by any means uncalled for—"Verify your quotations."

E. A. Meredith.

TORONTO, CANADA.

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF ATHEISM.

SOME beliefs have causes, and some beliefs have grounds. That is, some beliefs have no rational warrant, but are the outcome of circumstances, internal or external, according to psychological law; while other beliefs have reasons which justify them. The former are merely events in the individual consciousness, and have no objective and universal significance, whereas the latter belong to the world of fact and truth. In looking over human beliefs, one comes upon many of the former class. They are the

products of psychological causes, rather than deductions from logical grounds. In studying them, after discerning their irrationality, we can only inquire how they came about. We ask what there is in the human mind, or what there was in the circumstances of their origin, which could lend to nonsense the appearance of sense. Thus we study the ancient mythologies and traditional errors of the race. We seek to find their root in general psychological laws, or in those laws together with the historic circumstances of their development. In both cases we seek to exhibit them as the necessary outcome of their antecedents according to mental laws; and also to form some idea of the state of mind, or stage of development, which made such conceptions possible and acceptable.

Atheistic belief is to be understood largely in this way; for it too is a product of psychological causes rather than a deduction from rational grounds. It arises naturally in certain stages of mental development, and even seems to possess a high degree of rationality. And yet, as a philosophy, it is inane and barren. As a solution of the world problem, it is purely verbal. It gives no insight, and leaves the facts opaque and impenetrable. Law and system are asserted as facts about which no more can be said. Intelligence is referred to the non-intelligent, consciousness to the unconscious, purpose-like action to the non-purposive, reason to the non-rational. In short, every important factor of the world is referred to something very like its contradiction; and we are left utterly without any insight into the possibility of the alleged explanation. It is not a matter of understanding, but of faith. Nevertheless, this view has seemed to many to be of very great speculative significance. Our aim is to consider some of the psychological facts and logical oversights which have led to this strange over-estimate of atheism as a scientific explanation and a philosophical theory. We study, then, what may be called the natural history of atheism.

A leading reason for this curious fact is to be found in the crude realism of spontaneous thought. This lends itself very readily to atheism. Owing to the form of our sense-perceptions, the mind very naturally comes to take the notion of material thing as its typical conception of reality. Spirit may be doubted, but matter is unquestionably here. And so far as the senses go, there seems to be no reason for denying that these things may be self-existent and eternal. The impressions of the senses, on the one hand, and the formal law of identity and the category of substance, on the other, unite to build the conception of material

thing into a solidity and self-sufficiency which make it the cornerstone of all spontaneous thought. When to this is added a hearsay knowledge of the indestructibility of matter, it is hard to believe that we have not in matter an absolute and eternal existence.

However, thought in its instinctive unfolding never follows out a single principle to the exclusion of others which are also implicit in the nature of intelligence. It rather allows them all to work together and produce a product which is indeed somewhat amorphous, but which in some way provides for all our mental interests. And the mind in this stage, while it keeps the notion of thing well in view as the type of reality, also has a strong teleological bias. It insists on bringing its objects under the category of purpose; and it stoutly maintains not only that things are, but that they are for some end. The union of crude realism with teleology was for a long time secured by pointing out that not merely the existence of matter, but also, and more especially, its combinations, must be accounted for. The existence itself might possibly be independent, but its combinations show abundant marks of a designing mind. So Paley says: "In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there. I might possibly answer, that, for anything I know to the contrary, it had lain there forever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer." He goes on to show that this answer could not be given in the case of a watch, as the adjustment of its parts would constitute a problem which the mere existence of the raw material would not solve. So Chalmers found the problem of natural theism not in the existence of matter, but in its "collocations." Many speculative theists were even content to view matter itself as coeternal with God, and as furnishing the uncreated condition for a divine activity of arrangement and coördination.

This division of labor, according to which matter supplied the being or substance of the cosmos, while mind was the ground of its order and harmony, was made acceptable and even necessary by another conviction of instinctive thought. This was the belief in the complete inactivity of matter. In spontaneous thought, matter is as manifestly inert and inactive as it is manifestly real. It is necessary, therefore, to look beyond matter for the ground of all action, change, and motion. This conviction expressed itself in the various arguments for a prime mover and first cause. But with the development of physical science, this necessity of transcending matter began to seem less stringent. The conception of

matter as dynamic led many to find a sufficient cause of cosmic changes in matter itself. The conception of material combinations as not consisting in the external juxtaposition of mutually indifferent lumps, but as resulting from the essential laws and nature of the physical elements themselves, threw doubt upon the earlier argument from "collocation." The seeming designs and purposes in the cosmos were no longer viewed as something foreign to matter and impressed upon it from without, but rather as resulting necessarily from the nature of matter itself. Thus the categories of being and causation were united in the notion of matter; and when to these the notion of law was added, nothing more seemed needed for the explanation of the world. Thus the movement began of replacing God as first cause by force, and God as mind by law.

This movement had a rapid development. Instinctive thought had viewed matter as forceless and chaotic. Physics began to speak of matter as a collection of elements endowed with subtle and wonderful forces. Instinctive thought had viewed matter as amorphous and lawless. Physics began to find law and form and complex structure everywhere. Instinctive thought had viewed design as something impressed upon matter from without, as human plans are impressed upon an indifferent material. But science began to view the so-called designs as resulting necessarily from the laws of the elements, and to discredit the notion of external design and designer as a "carpenter theory." Instinctive thought had looked beyond matter for a cause. Now it began to be asked, Why go beyond matter? Why not rather find the cause in matter itself? If our earlier thought of matter did not provide for the facts of experience, why not enlarge our thought of matter so as to include the facts? A cause we must have. Let us call that cause matter. But we cannot tell in advance what the possibilities of matter are; we must wait for experience to reveal them. When, however, new possibilities are revealed, we are not to look for something beyond matter; we must rather enlarge our conception of matter itself. A study of water in its ordinary forms would give no hint of the amazing structural forces revealed in its crystallization. A study of matter in its amorphous condition would never suggest its latent chemical powers. But in such cases we never dream of looking beyond the elements themselves; we simply conclude that they are more and better than we had thought. And when it comes to cosmic questions, we continue in the same line, and find in matter itself, which is ever growing

more mystic, subtle, and wonderful, the sufficient promise and potency of all cosmic manifestations.

Every one familiar with the literature of this subject for the last thirty years will recognize this line of thought as an old acquaintance. It was the substance of some famous essays and addresses, and seemed decisive to not a few. In fact, this view was a cross between phenomenalism and crude realism. The former factor seemed to remove the absurdity of attributing power to matter conceived as body, and also made it possible to define matter as the "mysterious cause of phenomena." The second factor gave to that mysterious cause an essentially material character and an appearance of self-sufficiency. When to this the name, matter, was added, little was needed to complete the argument. And yet, in strict logic, it was only a debate over a name. The crude conception of matter, held by spontaneous thought, was given up, and matter was defined as "the mysterious cause" of cosmic effects. It is plain that in that case the nature of this mysterious cause is not determined by its name, but remains a problem for investigation. If the facts point to reason, foresight, and purpose in this cause, there is nothing in our logic to forbid assuming them. But here our crude realism and the association of ideas warped our logic; and the lumpish conception of matter lived along in the background of our thought and gave color to our whole system. When we sought to explain life and mind as the outcome of matter and force, we saw that any definition of the latter which excluded the former must be inadequate, if not untrue. Then we enlarged the definition, and deduced life and mind accordingly. But after the deduction we forgot the enlargement, and matter returned to our thought in its earlier guise. Logically, the result should have been to spiritualize matter. Practically, the result was to materialize thought. Even those speculators who stoutly proclaimed that science deals only with phenomena and knows only phenomena fell a prey to this crude realism. Underlying their theories was an atomistic ontology which always carried with it the negation of intelligence. In this way a scheme of thought was built up around a materialistic core. Cosmic activities were activities of matter. Cosmic laws were laws of matter. Cosmic processes and products, then, must be referred to matter. Evolution, which is properly a mode of procedure, was thus made a theory of material causation, to the no small scandal of logic and to the great alarm of the weak. And as the thoughtless ontology of the senses implicitly

ruled our thought, there seemed to be neither place nor need for mind in the cosmos. Of course, in logic that crude ontology had been entirely superseded. Matter was no longer that simple, unrelated being which bore no marks of anything beyond itself; it had rather become an incarnation of complex rational relations, and had lost all claim to be considered as the ultimate reality. The unwillingness to view matter as indifferent material, moulded by external power, had indeed dispensed with the "carpenter" conception of design, but only by making matter itself a teleological incarnation. But all of this was lost sight of in the identity of the term, matter, and in the persistence in uncritical minds of the metaphysics of the senses. The senses furnished the ontology. A superficial reflection modified this by bringing into it the notion of causation and an element of mystery; and thus a "transfigured realism" was reached which claimed to be the last word of speculation.

Under the influence of this curious compound of instinct and reflection, the oddest conclusions were drawn. The realms of mind and matter were established in mutual exclusion; and whatever fact could be brought under the control of physical law was looked upon as wrested from the control of mind. The more law, the less God. The more order, the less intelligence. These were the maxims, regarded as axioms, which ruled our thought. To believe a thing designed, it was necessary that we should not know how it was done. Theists looked anxiously for breaks and missing links as the only sure proofs of intelligence; and the reign of law was to them a phrase of direst import. The rising tide of matter threatened to submerge God and the soul alike in its all-embracing flood. As break after break was reduced and the continuity of law was discovered, many felt that it was only a question of time when overwhelming atheism should be upon us. Non-theistic speculators, on the other hand, held the same view, and delighted in it. God was only a provisional hypothesis, to explain what matter in the present state of knowledge could not explain. But with each new discovery, that hypothesis was becoming less and less necessary; and the end would be, as one prophet put it, that science would at last conduct God to the frontier and bow him out with thanks for his provisional services. The line of thought left no other possible outcome. The ontology of the senses, plus a superficial reflection, could only result in a mechanical system which had no place for intelligence.

It is a dictum of some idealists that realism is atheism. With-

out assenting to this claim in all its breadth, it is easy to see how crude realism, when it becomes reflective, may tend toward atheism. This tendency is further strengthened by the notion of necessity, another category of spontaneous thought. By means of it, the untrained mind succeeds either in hiding the wonder of the world from itself, or in imposing upon itself a purely verbal explanation. This will best be seen by reflecting upon the use made of the notions of law, reign of law, result of law, etc.

The conception of a reign of law implies a system in which nothing is unrelated and indifferent, but all things are bound together in a common scheme of interaction, so that all coexistences and sequences are determined by fixed rules. Given antecedents must have fixed consequents, which shall be definite both in kind and degree; otherwise like causes might have unlike effects, and there would be an end of law and system. Such an order we find in the cosmic process. The factors which enter into it are balanced against one another in an exact system of interaction. If an atom changes its place, all others within the grip of gravitation must change to correspond. Change in one implies change in all. And the amount and direction of this change are most accurately determined. All the laws of force are numerical. Chemical combination and the interchange of energy are equally so. In each chemical change, just so much of one element combines with just so much of another. In each change of place, the intensities of attraction and repulsion are instantaneously adjusted to correspond. Weight and measure, weighing and measuring, are universal. This fact is one of the perennial wonders of existence. The fundamental reality, whatever it be, does actually proceed according to fixed rules, and in such a way as constantly to realize profound geometrical, numerical, organic, and teleological conceptions. If we suppose that reality to be unintelligent and atomic, then we have the conception of a manifold of atoms, no one of which knows anything of itself, or of its neighbors, or of its own laws or products. Yet these atoms do constantly mutually adjust themselves according to a rational scheme, and in such a way that the outcome of their ignorant co-working seems so profoundly rational that the vast majority of the race have held that nothing short of God would be equal to it. If we conceive this fundamental reality as blind but non-atomic, as a persistent mechanical force, therefore, then we have the conception of a blind power which knows nothing of itself, or of what it is doing, or of the laws it founds and follows, or of the myriad purpose-like products

which it incessantly produces and maintains, but which, nevertheless, does work so admirably, so wonderfully, as to impress most minds with the conviction that a supreme intelligence is conducting the process. The unintelligent cause produces an intelligible work. The non-rational reality produces a rational cosmos. The unconscious produces the conscious. Non-intelligence produces intelligence. When in astonishment we ask, How can these things be? we are told that they are the outcome of law. We reply that the fact of law itself, that is, the fact of universal procedure by fixed rules to intelligible and rational results, is the very fact to be explained; and then we are told that that fact is necessary. It springs from the essential nature of matter or force, and we cannot go behind it. Thus the uniformities of cosmic procedure are unwarrantably transformed into necessities of being which need nothing beyond themselves, and which explain everything else.

The reasoning here is noteworthy. If the cosmic order were founded in conscious intelligence, all agree that nothing short of omniscience and omnipotence would be equal to it. All agree equally that an order of law would be one of the leading indications of such an intelligence. But our thought halts on matter, and we proceed to found the order in matter itself. But matter as indefinite and unconscious existence would not provide for fixity and continuity. Let us view the order, then, as founded in necessity, and all will be clear. Whatever is necessary cannot help being what it is, or occurring as it does. If we include the cosmic order and all cosmic products in this necessity, we see at once that they could not well be otherwise, and there is no longer any room for wonder or surprise. The work is completed by conceiving this necessity as allied with matter or as founded in it. This alliance excludes intelligence, as a matter of course. The necessity, to be sure, is hypothetical. No reflection upon the notion of matter or persistent force will reveal any of the laws or factors of the cosmos as a necessary implication, and no reflection upon the laws as uniformities of procedure will detect any trace of necessity. The necessity is known to be there, and to be adequate to the outcome, by hypothesis. Thus matter supplies the being, and a hypothetical necessity founded in matter supplies the form of the universe, and nothing more is needed. In this way, by uniting the notion of necessity with crude realism, we reach that grotesque inversion of reason which makes the very fact of a rational order a ground for denying the presence of a controlling

reason. By this time our logic becomes very brief and cogent. Matter is the cause of cosmic processes because we have defined it to be such. Matter is made adequate to the work, first, by definition, and, secondly, by endowing it with whatever properties it may need in order to get along with the facts. Finally, we are not to be surprised at anything which matter does, as it works under necessary law. If we do not see how things come about, we know by hypothesis that they must come about as they do. No question, then, can be asked about cosmic products, because, as necessary, they could not be otherwise. Hence teleological questioning and teleological wondering are as much out of place in physics as they would be in mathematics. The argument is the same if, instead of matter, we speak of "persistent force," or any other form of unconscious existence viewed as basal.

The inanity of such an outcome is self-evident. Its sum is that things are what they are, and that no more can be said about it. Meanwhile, the mind is simply deluding itself with its own notions of matter and necessity; and while giving itself all the airs of progress and pluming itself upon its penetrating criticism of traditional notions, it is really moving in a circle and chasing its own shadow.

The same oversights are to be traced in the familiar attempts to displace teleology by mechanical explanations of the facts. These all consist in constructing a system of material causes so as to include the facts, and then drawing out what was put in. After we have included the facts, the wand of necessity is waved over the work, and this stifles further inquiry. To doubt the explanation is to doubt the persistence of force or the universality of necessary law, etc. But here again our crude metaphysics only leads us round and round in a circle. By multiplying words, however, the radius of this circle may be so enlarged that the unprogressive character of our movement fails to be perceived. It may be worth while to make this plain.

In any system of necessary causes, it is impossible for new departures to arise, or for products to be evolved which have not always been implicit in the system. Such a system at any point must contain the potentialities of all its future unfolding down to the minutest details. A system of general laws alone would account for no specific fact. The laws of motion apply to all motions, but explain none. The law of causation alone includes no particular effect. Space as the condition of all form explains no actual form. General laws explain particular cases only as they

work under particular conditions. A general law is only a major premise, from which nothing follows until a minor premise is joined with it, and then the conclusion will vary with each variation of the minor premise. Whoever, therefore, seeks to explain the special facts of existence must look beyond the general laws to the definite conditions under which they work; and the laws, plus the conditions, explain the facts because, in principle, they contain them, just as the premises contain the conclusion.

We reach the same result by reflecting on the law of the sufficient reason, the principle of all explanation. By this law, when we refer effects to causes, we are not permitted to refer them to any and every cause, but only to causes which implicitly contain the effects. If anything could produce everything, there would be an end of all reasoning. But going back along the causal series in this way, we never escape the present, but always implicitly carry it with us. We may make a cross-section of the cosmic process wherever we will, and we find the present potential in it. We come to no period of primal indefiniteness and homogeneity which has developed into the present; but everywhere and always we find a definite system of law unfolding its definite implications to the exclusion of all others which we may conceive as possible. In such a system, supposed to be necessary, there is no room for chance, no room for new departures, no room for lifting the system above itself by a series of happy hits and lucky survivals, and no room for any possibilities beyond the necessary implications of the actual. Whatever is now actual has always been at least potential, and whatever the future shall unfold is now implicit. All reality is, potentially or actually, from everlasting, and whatever has not been was never even possible. In such a system, the only progress possible is from the implicit to the explicit, or from the actual to a successive realization of its implications. There is no progress from nothing to something, or from a meaningless something which is almost nothing to an ordered and significant universe. This, then, is the gist of the mechanical explanation of teleological problems: we construct a system to fit the facts, and then draw out what we put in.

The inanity of this procedure has seldom been adequately recognized; and there has been a very general assumption that a necessary system can in some way do something more than unfold its own implications. We may, then, begin with the raw rudiments of being, and by a system of trial and rejection, or by natural selection, in the course of a very long time we may hope to

advance beyond those bare beginnings to the complex forms of cosmic and organic existence. Some have thought that in infinite time all combinations must be hit upon, and the fit ones must survive. Others have sought to show how a simple, indefinite, incoherent homogeneity (bare existence) must develop into a definite, coherent heterogeneity (the actual cosmos) through continuous differentiations and integrations. The nebular hypothesis has been appealed to as showing how any diffused matter must by necessary mechanical law build up a solar system; and, in particular, natural selection has been advanced as showing how, by the survival of the fittest, organic forms may be built up without intelligence or purpose from raw material which has no essential relation to such forms. These efforts have seemed to many to be marvels of analytical and constructive power, and, withal, to be victoriously successful. No one need look very far or long to find elaborate recipes for building a rational and purpose-like universe from bare and indifferent raw material.

The oversights and illusions upon which such attempts rest are already plain to us. There is a perpetual see-saw between matter as the senses give it and matter as enlarged by definition. The former is taken as the starting-point. Having in it no element of relation and organization, it awakens no teleological questioning, and seems quite self-sufficient. But matter in this sense refuses to evolve or advance at all. The only matter from which we can deduce anything is the matter with the new definition; that is, the matter which has been defined so as to include the effects. That this should succeed in evolving need not surprise us. The apparent illustrations of matter passing from the indefinite to the definite are reached by mistaking indefiniteness for the senses for indefiniteness for the reason. We can trace the cosmic process backward until we reach stages where the present forms of phenomena were lacking. We reach a nebulous period, and then, through forgetting the first principles of logical method, we conclude that we have reached an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity. But this indefiniteness is only for the senses. Clear thought is forced to find the present everywhere implicit in the past. If we reach a nebula, it is not a nebula in general, but a nebula potential of order and life and mind and civilization. But by forgetting this fact, by ignoring the complete determination of all existence in a necessary system, and by oscillating confusedly between matter as given by the senses and matter as redefined, we contrive to give this wretched see-saw the appearance of profound

wisdom. In our regress in the cosmic series, we forget the definite outcome, and thus seem to reach the vague and formless. This, being next door to non-existence, demands no explanation. Then from this as a starting-point, we proceed to deduce the universe, not by any logical insight, but purely by remembering the definite outcome again, and connecting it, under the form of necessity, with its formless antecedents. In both cases we violate the simplest laws of thought. When, in a necessary system, we seek to determine the cause of effects, we find that an adequate cause must implicitly contain the effects; and when we seek to determine the effects of a given cause, we find it impossible to deduce any effect which is not latent in the cause. Of course, the effect need not be in the cause in its phenomenal form; but the cause must be such as, under the circumstances, to imply and necessitate the effect. Otherwise we are trying to draw a conclusion from premises which do not contain it. But if the fundamental reality does implicitly contain all cosmic manifestation, our alleged deduction only describes the order of unfolding, and contains no progress. If it does not implicitly contain the outcome, the deduction is impossible, like a conclusion from no premises. No system that stops short of free intelligence as the ultimate ground of the cosmos can escape this dilemma.

As a result of these oversights, there has been a very general failure to grasp the true relation of theism and atheism. Atheism was long supposed to operate with a known cause, matter; while theism was viewed as affirming a hypothetical cause, God. The proximate causes of phenomena are known to be real and material, and, for all we can say, they may be eternal. But causes are not to be multiplied beyond necessity, and hence we must not think of transcending matter until we have learned all its possibilities. Thus there was thrust upon theism the task of proving a negative, — a task which, proverbially difficult in any case, was especially so here, because the notion of matter, having no clear meaning, admitted of being perpetually redefined so as to include any desired contents. The elusive nature of such an opponent is manifest; and the logical futility, or rather fatuity, of such a contest is evident. Still by skillfully appealing to crude realism, by humbly disclaiming insight into all the possibilities of matter, and by reflecting upon the limitations of human knowledge and the illimitable vastness of the possible, this purely verbal shuffle may be given the appearance of great logical rigor and a severely scientific aspect. In truth, both theism and atheism are competing

theories concerning the nature of the basal reality; and both alike are equally hypothetical and speculative. Neither God nor matter is seen to cause anything. Phenomena alone are seen; their causes are reached only by speculative reflection upon the facts. The problem, then, is this: How shall we think of the fundamental existence? As blind or seeing, rational or irrational, conscious or unconscious? In attempting to solve this problem we should need to put both views alongside of the facts and of one another, and see which, the mind and experience being what they are, renders the facts the more luminous and intelligible. When this is done, it is easy to reach a decision. The unconscious, unintelligent, irrational reality, even when aided and abetted by necessity, gives a highly opaque account of the origin of the conscious, the intelligent, and the rational.

The failure to see that both theism and atheism are speculative theories which must be judged by their respective adequacy to the facts is at the bottom of the fancy so current in this field, that atheism is sufficiently established by picking flaws in theistic argument. Every one acquainted with the literature of this subject will recognize that the chief force of atheistic treatises lies in critical cavils at theistic logic rather than in any positive demonstration of the superior rationality of atheism. This making of grimaces at theism is oddly enough mistaken for a proof of atheism. Such procedure is really infantile, and can be excused only by the fact that the crude ontology of the senses seems to justify it. But if we allow that theism does not properly demonstrate its claim, it is still possible that its argument is vastly more cogent than that of its opponent. If we grant that theism has difficulties, it may be that atheism has more and greater. Granting that the purpose-like products of nature do not prove an intelligent cause, it is plain that they do not prove a non-intelligent cause. The constant movement in the universe according to law may not demonstrate that the basal reality is conscious of those laws, but it certainly does not show that it is unconscious of them. The logician knows very well that in this realm there can be no proper demonstration; it is only a question of finding the most rational and luminous solution of the problem of the world and life. Atheism has often been right brilliant when skirmishing with theism, but it has given little attention to showing its own positive adequacy to the facts and its superiority as an ultimate explanation. Theses like the following are rare in atheistic treatises: On the Irrational as the best Source of the Rational; On the Unconscious as

the only Explanation of the Conscious; Blind and Unintelligent Agency as the only Luminous Account of a Rational Work; On the Superiority of Unreason to Reason as a first Principle. Yet these and similar theses are involved in the atheistic position; and it might lead, if not to progress, at least to silence, if the holders of that view could be induced to devote themselves for a while to their consideration and establishment. And silence would be progress.

A glance at the more subtle questions involved in the problem and theory of knowledge would reveal a series of difficulties which do not exist for popular thought at all, and of course not for popular atheism. A study of these questions would show that not every theory of things is compatible with trust in knowledge, and especially that atheism is a suicidal theory, when developed into its implications. But this field has been so little worked that it is hard to persuade the rank and file even of philosophers that the problem of knowledge is a real one, or that the bearing of a speculation upon that problem is any test of its truth. We take knowledge for granted; and when some critic points out the suicidal nature of a theory, such is our good-nature that we decide the implications of the theory must be aberrations of the critic. For how, we ask, could any sane man accept such insane conclusions? That insane conclusions point to insane premises of course escapes us. Thus the theory is defended from itself by instinct, and retains all its strength for attack.

But into this field we forbear to enter. We have not sought to disprove atheism, but only to inquire how it is that a theory which, when clearly understood, scarcely needs disproof should yet seem to many to be a great speculative achievement. The reason is to be found in the instinctive realism of the senses joined to a highly superficial type of reflection, in which thought gropes blindly without any proper knowledge of its own aims and methods.

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EDITORIAL.

A FOREIGN CRITICISM OF OUR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.

THE "London Times" took occasion of the late meeting of the Republican National Convention to express a most unfavorable opinion of the American way of obtaining a chief Executive. It characterized that way, in substance, as a method attended by corruption and disorder, and as one necessarily involving the choice of second-rate men, while not allowing the individual citizen any real influence in the selection of the new ruler. The nominating convention, said the "Times," is absolutely controlled by wire-pullers, who, in secret conclave, make the "platform" and select the candidate. In shaping the one and choosing the other, they have, as wire-pullers might be expected to have, supreme regard to the prejudices of the lowest class of voters. The result is, that the American citizen finds his share of influence in the appointment of a President limited to a choice between two men, neither of them to his taste, standing each upon a declaration of principles in no just sense representing his own views. This, the "Times" thinks, practically equivalent to no influence at all. "The ordinary American citizen has not a whit more liberty of selection, when the office of President comes to be filled every four years, than any subject of the German Empire when the throne becomes vacant."

These statements are, of course, absurdly wide of the truth. It is obviously impossible that a set of wire-pullers should control a national party convention.

A party strong enough to have a reasonable hope of electing its candidate is likely to contain more than one man able and influential enough reasonably to hope to be its candidate for the presidency. The influence with the party possessed respectively by these aspirants will give them each a following in the convention. Ambition will brace each one to cling to such chances of the presidency as belong to him. Through their loyal supporters in the convention they will be conflicting forces in it, and so compel it to an open choice. The history of parties, we believe, supports this reasoning. National conventions have not been dominated by a secret directory of wire-pullers, but have represented the preferences of various sections of the party; and in their final action have taken the step to which the conflicting forces necessarily led.

Such a course gives the individual voter all the influence that the nature of the case permits. The candidate chosen may not be the worthiest representative of his party. He is sure to be one of its strong members, and not to be of the type most pleasing to the lowest grade of its voters. To nominate such a man would be to court defeat. If, as the "Times" says, "availability" counts relatively too much in the selection

of a candidate (that is, the likelihood that the nomination will be acceptable to the mass of the party, and those other voters least hostile to it), this proves that the candidate is not forced upon the party by a political clique.

In saying that the American citizen, in voting for a man put forward by his party, and representing its political ideas, does not exercise political power; that he has no more influence in the appointment of a President than the German citizen in the appointment of an Emperor, the "Times" is simply childish. Are we a nation of dupes in feeling responsibility for our votes? When, in 1884, a Democratic succeeded a Republican President, did the American people have no more influence in securing the change than the German people had in securing the change of imperial policy involved in the present Emperor's ascension to the throne?

It must be admitted, however, that the "Times'" criticism has, in spite of its gross exaggerations, a certain value. We feel, in reading it, that we can understand, and, to some extent, sympathize with its dislike of some things which belong to our way of making presidents.

We have already said to ourselves that the Nation pays an important price for the privilege of electing a Chief Magistrate. Able men are tempted to seek popularity by questionable methods. Party contest is apt to become bitter and unfair. Candidates are coarsely attacked. The strain upon good nature is severe, if the election is close. The vociferation is wearisome. We dread the opening of the campaign. We are greatly relieved when it is over. We are inclined to ask, in our secret heart, whether the price we pay for our privilege of electing a chief magistrate is not unduly large. Our suspicion finds support in the fact that in this matter we have departed from the intentions of the framers of our government. They foresaw that the choice of a President by popular vote would occasion intrigue and turmoil, and therefore tried to give the selection to the Electoral College. Did they not plan wisely here, as elsewhere? Is not the country suffering from the effect of its departure from their intention?

The misgiving suggests a glance at the larger facts involved. They plainly show, we believe, that the benefits which the popular presidential election brings vastly outweigh its cost.

To begin with, a strong Executive is an absolute necessity of our political system. The love of power which Congress has, in common with all legislatures, makes it a necessity. Members of a representative body naturally honor it, and wish to see its prerogative maintained. They take a generous view of the extent of its prerogative; for the corporate consciousness is not, like the individual, restrained by the dread of egotism. They will be sure to put such powers as they believe it to have to constant use, for the life of a representative body is its activity. What is it for, except to make laws? By legislating it must, therefore, be always showing its right to exist. This implies that a national legislature will try to dominate the nation; to extend the ample powers which,

in any case, it must have at the expense of the other departments of government. Hence the Executive power, to maintain itself, must be deeply rooted in the national life. This means that the person wielding it among us must be elected by the people. Only a President called to rule by direct popular vote could withstand Congress in case of a conflict of authority. The people would not support a magistrate not chosen by them in resisting their representatives. Congress would raise the cry of "dictatorship" with fatal effect. And without the consciousness of popular approval few presidents would have the heart to struggle against the momentum of so many united wills, impelled by corporate pride and the consciousness of public favor. Plainly, then, the Constitution would not have served the nation as it has done, if the article providing the method of choosing the President had not been disobeyed in spirit. Mr. Lowell rightly said, in a recent address, that the moral courage of the two Republican senators who voted not to sustain the impeachment of President Johnson, "saved us from the creeping paralysis which has seized upon French politics." If the recent course of politics in France shows us that a popular government must have an Executive independent of legislative control, it justifies our people in taking the selection of President from the Electoral College.

To admit this is cheerfully to accept all unpleasant accessories of a presidential election. None of us believe our form of government to be exempt from serious disadvantages; our preference for it only indicates our belief that when those are weighed against its advantages, the balance of good is greater than is the case with other political systems. It is to be expected that the defects of a democratic government will be most annoyingly apparent in an election which is its most striking and characteristic act. As the intrigue and clamor and invective of a presidential election do not prevent it from doing its appointed work of giving the nation a President of strong character, and sustained by the consciousness of popular support, they need not greatly depress us. They are, after all, evils which belong to the outside of the body politic, and are like those diseases which affect the outside of the human body, more unpleasant than dangerous. If able politicians use demagogical arts in furtherance of ambition for the presidency, they employ them openly, and are sure to be exposed. If mean attacks are made upon the party candidates, they are sure to be repelled, and made the ground of counter attack by powerful journals. The worst result likely to come from the heated discussion of the private characters and public careers of the nominees is a lessening of popular respect for the Chief Magistrate. One might well deplore the effect upon public virtue of a belief entertained by nearly half the people that their ruler is a bad man. But is it not true that perfunctory and unsupported accusations make as little permanent impression here as elsewhere? Does not a President, on the whole, gain credit for whatever good qualities he possesses? And we

are not willing to admit that the people can elect a bad man to their chief office.

Is not the prejudice against presidential elections largely due to the offense given to a fastidious taste by their concomitants? The noisy demonstrations in nominating conventions, the "typical insignia," at which the London "Times" jeers, the emblematic "huge straw hats," and "flails," and "tin pails," and "red bandanas," are thought silly and dishonoring to the serious matter in hand. The editorial of the party organ is felt to be intemperate, even coarse. The political processions often carry banners inscribed with satire, neither refined nor witty. It is an unseemly process of making a ruler over a great nation, is the secret thought. But these things give no ground for a criticism of our political system. They belong to popular manners; they are the democratic way of arousing and showing interest in politics; not an altogether graceful way, but certainly not vicious nor even ungracious. To make them the occasion of a criticism upon our political system is as childish as it would be to attack parliamentary government because members of the House of Commons wear their hats while the House is in session, and hoot at speakers whose sentiments displease them. No one claims that the act of voting, the only civic act which the citizen does in relation to the presidency, is not performed, on the whole, in a quiet, self-respecting way.

Were the evils involved in the conduct of our presidential elections much greater than they are, they would be outweighed by an indirect benefit which these exciting contests bring; namely, that of increasing popular interest in politics, and deepening the popular consciousness of nationality.

The one indispensable condition of good government in the United States is, of course, a hearty interest in politics felt by the mass of the people. If the mass of voters do not care how they are governed, they are sure, as we long since learned, to be governed badly. To keep personal affairs from absorbing the attention of the citizen, to the exclusion of public matters, is the most serious task which the friends of good government have to perform. Can any one doubt that it would be vastly more difficult but for the presidential election? Does not this one, by virtue of the appeal which it makes to the imagination, and by its control of vast sympathetic forces, excite an interest aroused by no other? Surely the fact that the presidential vote of a State or town is always larger than the vote cast at the state election just preceding, or following, shows this. And it is also apparent in the fact that the citizen attaches more importance to his presidential vote than to any other one which he casts. Men speak with satisfaction of having cast their first vote for a distinguished President, as if glad that their civic life commenced in so worthy an act. A previous ballot cast for a state official or a Congressman would be passed over as of less account.

The superior power of a presidential election to draw men to the polls shows that is the most potent force in our political life to keep alive a

sense of civic responsibility in the average citizen. His immediate personal interests are not at stake; he votes because he feels his union with the State, and desires to recognize it. If he be a young man, the warmth of the contest kindles his spirit, and in that warmth of feeling political ideas are readily assimilated. They may be partial and one-sided, but they belong to the conduct of public affairs, and attach the mind which holds them to the State. It is a far more important thing that the individual voter should greatly desire that the State be well-governed than that he have just conceptions of the way its affairs should be managed. This concern is fostered by the presidential election as by no other agency of our national life. And with political zeal and enthusiasm national feeling is fostered. Voting for President is the one act which expresses membership in the Nation. The presidential election is the one undertaking in which all citizens heartily participate. Hence the feeling of nationality, one supremely important in every self-governing people, of especial importance in the life of a people so numerous and widely-scattered, and having such diversified interests as our own, is fostered by it. As has been recently said: "It is the one thing that binds all together, from Maine to Texas, and from Oregon to Florida. All Europe was astounded at the outbreak of loyalty to the Union during the war, and certainly nothing does more to keep it alive than this embodiment of common interest in the presidential election."

THE STUDY OF THE CRIMINAL.

WHO is the criminal; does he belong to a species; what causes, personal or impersonal, produce him; what methods of discipline and training are most likely to effect his reformation; — these and the like questions indicate the present direction of the science of penology. When it is said that of the three objects of prison discipline, the protection of society, the punishment of crime, and the reformation of the criminal, public attention is now turned especially to the last object, what is meant is, that society has exhausted its defensive resources against the criminal, and that the laws relating to him are for the most part conceived and executed in the interest of justice. Society is well garrisoned and policed, the State is vigorous, just, and humane in the use of its authority, yet the criminal remains. In some communities the criminal classes are upon the increase. It is becoming more and more evident that for its protection society must take the aggressive. Apart from all questions of philanthropy, the public safety demands the careful study of the criminal in his antecedents, his personal characteristics, and the possibilities of his reform. Hence the recent efforts of the most intelligent penologists to define the criminal as he exists under present social conditions.

The problem has already been greatly simplified by eliminating certain factors. So long, for example, as religious and political offenses were classed with ordinary crimes, and the heretic and the agitator with ordinary criminals, there could be no real science of penology. Justice even

was impossible under religious persecution or political tyranny. But with the advent of religious toleration, and under the increase of political rights, a whole class of public offenses passed away. In this country, at least, offenses against the State must have some connection with actual crime, as in the case of the Chicago Anarchists, to call for the punishment of the offender.

So, too, in the abolition of the death penalty for petty crimes, and of imprisonment for debt, and in the more careful discrimination of the statutes in regard to crime, the element of injustice has been practically eliminated from the administration of the law. The criminal is respected in his rights, is allowed the fullest opportunity for defense, and seldom, if ever, suffers beyond his deserts. Not infrequently the criminal is seen to have the advantage, in the working of the law, over society.

A great advance also has been made through the proper classification of criminals. Under the old system of indiscriminate imprisonment, every prisoner was of necessity the worse for his confinement, the young offender hardening under the presence of the old offender, and the evil influence of the old offender reacting upon himself. The establishment of separate institutions for youthful criminals, the separation of women into prisons under suitable management, and the grading of prisons for men have made reforms possible, which otherwise could not have been attempted. A like advance in the management of the county jail would prove of inestimable value. With some notable exceptions the county jails, with their indiscriminate herding of prisoners of all ages, sometimes of both sexes, and even of witnesses, without employment or training, are simply the hot-beds of vice and crime.

Many points of improvement in the management of prisons and in the treatment of the criminal might be mentioned, but we are convinced that further advance, in any large way, in the science or application of penology awaits the careful study of the criminal, a study which shall be at once scientific and sympathetic, and to be carried on within the prison and without. Those who come into contact with the criminal under confinement will naturally study the man himself in his individual nature, to determine how far he represents a type, and to discover what methods of treatment will avail most toward his reformation. Those whose relations to the criminal are more general will inquire with equal care into the causes which are at work to create a criminal class, and to discover what methods of prevention can be advised. The criminal, if he be such by hereditary disposition, or by early training, or by profession, or by habit, is the most marked variation upon the ordinary type of man of which society is obliged to take note. Heretofore it has been content to take notice of his deeds, to catalogue and define the crimes which he might commit. The sign of present hope for the criminal and for society is, that society is beginning to take account of the man himself in those characteristics which make him dangerous, as they reveal him in his strength and in his weakness.

It has been, for instance, an immeasurable gain toward the successful treatment of the criminal, to learn that the source of farther danger from him lies more frequently in the weakness of his will than in the possession of specially depraved appetites and passions. The whole system of training and discipline, which has given so good results at Elmira and Concord, is based upon this discovery. Every effort is there made to strengthen and reinforce the power of the will in right habits of action. As one of the speakers at the recent Prison Convention in Boston remarked, what the criminal needs is the capacity for "moral storage." It is the object of prison discipline to create this capacity, and to supply it with moral energy. Methods will vary, according to the stress laid upon educational or religious forces, but the object is the same. The moral nature must be enlarged. The man must be made positive where he is negative. When the process has been carried on far enough to restore him to the normal state of manhood, he can be trusted with himself and in society. Until this point is reached, he is not a safe man. He may be as dangerous through the insufficiency of his moral power as the incorrigible criminal. The one will act under calculation; the other under temptation, or by the control of more positive companions. The principle of the indeterminate sentence allows the constant testing of the criminal in the process of reconstruction. But the use of this principle requires the utmost insight and study on the part of those who hold the future of the criminal in their decision. The State, therefore, cannot afford to trifle with the management of its prisons through its appointments, or by its legislation. A "political" warden is, at best, a bungler, with the liability of infinite harm to those under his care, and through them to society. No appointment of the State is fraught with greater possibilities for good or evil than that of prison officials. A wise, resolute, humane warden will advance the cause of prison reform through his study of criminal life. He will not be above the most painstaking learning. He will not make hasty generalizations. He will not use easy methods. He will not aim at superficial and temporary results. However practical he may be, he will be a profound student into the type of human nature before him. He is really a student in psychology, and through his investigations may make the most important contributions to the science in the direct interest of the public morality and security.

But the study of the criminal under discipline, in his idiosyncrasies, must be supplemented by the equally careful and persistent study of the causes which are producing the criminal. In so far as he belongs to a species or class, he comes into it by heredity, or as the product of certain causes which are at work with appreciable uniformity and exactness. All criminals, of course, do not represent a given type. Some are such by accident, and cannot be classified: neither can they be accounted for, nor their action be foreseen and prevented. It is the criminal

whose course can be forecast, whose action can be predicated from the knowledge of the man, whom we can refer to a class. Such criminals can be measurably accounted for. The causes which are operative in their development can be ascertained, if sufficient pains are taken to investigate the nearer and more remote relations of cause and effect. We suspect that we are in the habit of giving too easy a solution to much of the crime of which we have knowledge. We naturally associate drunkenness with crime, but it is quite possible that we have overestimated it as a responsible cause. Nearly all criminals drink, but drink may not have made them criminals, or incited to any particular crime. Heredity will, doubtless, take higher rank as an original cause, as we learn more of the origin of criminals by families. The impression created by the startling revelations made in the history of the Juke family has been revived and intensified by the investigations of the Rev. Oscar G. McCulloch, of Indianapolis, into the history of a large number of families which he has traced with considerable minuteness. Pernicious literature is, doubtless, one of the most exciting causes to crimes of a certain kind. The allurements to bold courses of evil is more and more frequently found in the cheap novel, which constitutes the daily reading of the city gamin. But we will not speculate upon this matter by suggesting possible causes. We wish to urge the most rigid and complete investigation.

It will not be easy to apply the remedy when the causes of crime are better known. When a disclosure like that of the history of the Juke family is made, the natural thought is, such a family must be suppressed; a race like that must not be allowed to propagate itself. But how shall the State act to this end. In a paper presented at the Prison Convention it was urged, with no little ability, that the State (and the Church) were grossly remiss in the regulation of marriage. But what if the State should be stringent to the last degree in reference to the marriage of unfit persons. The result might be, and probably would be, simply an increase of illegitimacy. Education, on the other hand, if it could be applied, can no longer be considered a sufficient restraint. The percentage of those in prisons who can read and write is constantly increasing.

We apprehend that the criminal out of prison is identically the same person with the criminal in prison. The problem is to find him out before he commits the overt act, and then to devise ways by which he shall be subjected to a treatment which shall approach the discipline which his more fortunate fellow is receiving at the hand of the State, in the person of a trained master of his kind.

THE LONDON PROTESTANT MISSIONARY CONFERENCE.

"The General Conference on Foreign Missions" is a body composed of delegates from Protestant Missionary Societies. At the recent meeting in London one hundred and twenty-two societies are reported to have been represented. This includes women's societies. Fifty-two societies

in England, Scotland, and Ireland were represented by one thousand and sixty members of the Conference; fifty-one societies in the United States were represented by one hundred and fifty delegates; six Canadian societies by twenty-seven delegates; thirteen Continental societies by twenty-two delegates. We presume that missionaries are counted under their societies. Very likely the official report will show some variations from these statistics, since we find varying numbers in different journals; but they probably make a fair impression of the variety and proportion of the membership of the body. It is essentially a conference of societies, and has the limitations as well as advantages of such a composition. Taking it for what it is, and making all necessary allowance for the current tendency to magnify organizations and their methods, the recent meeting was evidently a successful and important one. It emphasized, and we hope will be found to have promoted, Christian unity. Probably its greatest usefulness is along lines of personal influence and inspiration invisible and untraceable. A large number of important practical questions in the conduct of missions was introduced. The mere enumeration shows the magnitude of the missionary enterprise at this day. The most attractive meetings were those at which the largest questions were discussed with the most freedom. No one seems to have doubted that missionary methods need open discussion, careful revision, and constant readaptation. The men who have most thoroughly studied their fields of labor, who most fully recognize the necessity of adapting their work to the existing conditions of thought and life, and who best understand the gospel as a revelation of exhaustless life and power, are the men most needed at such gatherings, and when they appear are quickly and gladly recognized. On the whole, the missionaries present seem to have had a fair opportunity, and if officialism sometimes made itself unduly felt, the spirit and outcome of the meeting count effectively on the side of larger and freer methods of conducting foreign missionary operations — a result to be profoundly grateful for. The directions indicated in which such progress is to be anticipated are, wiser doctrinal teaching, more diversified instrumentalities, — the theological missionary and the evangelist being supplemented by the industrial missionary, the medical, the scientific, — a truer apprehension of the continuous and progressive development of the Kingdom of God through manifold human agencies and by most diverse operations of the Spirit. One thing is specially clear. While there is room in foreign missionary work for men and women of very different degrees of intellectual power, there is now an urgent demand for men of highest capacity and most thorough education. The problems never were more complex, the opportunities more exacting as well as commanding. May our missionary societies, through which the Church is now acting as never before, and which have upon them the gravest responsibility, have wisdom so to administer their trust as to cause young men to see their opportunity.

We add, from reports of special meetings of the Conference, extracts

from remarks by Sir William W. Hunter and Sir Monier Monier-Williams.

Speaking of the progress of Islam in India, — a subject on which he is an acknowledged authority, — Sir William Hunter said : —

"He was prepared to prove that Mahomedans were increasing neither more quickly nor more slowly than the other portions of the population. Many who took part in that discussion" [in the London "Times" over Canon Taylor's paper] "seemed to overlook the fact that the famines, which some years ago carried off vast numbers of the Hindoo population of Southern India, did not extend to the northern provinces. After going over the figures carefully he was convinced that whereas Islam during the past ten years had increased ten and a half per cent., Christianity had gathered within its folds sixty-four per cent. during the same period."

Sir Monier Monier-Williams spoke of Buddhism in comparison with Christianity. If we mistake not, this eminent student of the "Sacred Books of the East" entered upon his investigations anticipating quite different conclusions from those which he has reached. He said : —

"The fundamental points in favor of Christ's religion were these. The Christian Book was held by its votaries to be an unveiling of God from his dwelling-place — Heaven. It made known no mystical talismanic lessons in order to give point to its words. The characteristics of Buddhism were that it utterly repudiated all claims to supernatural revelation. He might mention a legend having great currency in the island of Ceylon. This story told how 500 bats were there living together in a cave, where a couple of Buddhist monks were daily engaged in reading the sacred law of 'The Light of Asia.' These bats attained to such a high standard of sanctity by simply listening to the sounds of the words as they fell from the monks' lips that after death they were born again as men, and again dying at once became gods. But some will ask, Was it not a fact that the teaching alike of Buddha and of Christ was a system of self-sacrifice? I own that Buddha taught the doctrine of self-sacrifice, and I am quite ready to admit that it is told of him that on one occasion he put out his own eyes, that on another he cut off his own head, while on a third he cut in pieces his own body in order to rescue a dove from the claws of a hawk. But we must not forget to note the enormous differences between the respective kinds of self-sacrifice characteristic of the two systems. Christianity insists inexorably on the death of selfishness, Buddhism insists on the extinction of consciousness as the one object of existence. In the one system the true self is raised from earth to heaven by intense piety; in the other self is annihilated by the practice of a false form of unselfishness, which has for its ultimate aim the annihilation of the *ego*, or, in other words, the utter extinction of all personal individuality. Christianity and the Bible say, 'Aim at holiness of heart, sanctity of your aims and affections.' Buddhism roots out these utterly. If you wish for true holiness, Christianity teaches that the highest form of life is intensity of love towards God and men as made in his likeness. Buddhism insists that the highest stage of existence is non-existence (Nirvana), and that all kinds of love especially become utterly extinct. The Gospel of Christ says, 'Go and earn your own bread by honest work, support your own families.' Marriage, it preaches, is honorable in all ranks of life, and the bed undefiled. Wedded life and love are the true field in which

holiness grows. The Redeemer himself honored weddings with his presence and his benediction, while He took up the little children in his arms and blessed them. Buddhism, on the contrary, abhors wedlock, and bids us shun married life as a burning pit of live coals. If we are already married, it bids us forsake, each man, his wife and children. Instead of such a life, it bids us enroll ourselves among the celibate monks who spend their whole lives in the meditation of Buddha's law — *i. e.*, if you are in the highest state of Buddhist sanctification. And here came in the important contrast between the two religions — that no Christian trusts to his own works as the sole meritorious cause of salvation, but is taught to say, 'I have no merit of my own, and when I have done all I am but an unprofitable servant;' whereas Buddhism, on the contrary, teaches that every man must trust to his own merits only. Fitly do the rags worn by the Buddhist monks symbolize the wretched patchwork of their own self-righteousness. Not that Christianity ignores the necessity for good works. On the contrary, no other system insists so strongly upon a lofty morality, but it is meant only as a thankoffering to our Saviour, only as an evidence of faith, never as a meritorious instrument of our salvation. Lastly, he must advert again to that most vital of all distinctions which separate Christianity and Buddhism forever. Christianity treats life as the most precious and most personal of all our possessions, God himself as the highest example of intense personality, as the great 'I am, that I am,' which teaches us that we are to thirst for a perpetuation of the personal existence with which He, our Heavenly Father, has endowed us in his mercy. It is a gift from his hands. Hence we are to thirst for the living God himself, and for conformity to his likeness; while Buddhism sets before us as the highest of all aims utter extinction of personal identity, the utter annihilation of all existence in any form whatsoever. It proclaims as the only true creed the ultimate resolution of everything into nothingness, of every entity into sheer non-entity. 'What shall I do to inherit eternal life?' asks the Christian. His Bible and his conscience tell him to believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, and he believes and lives. 'What shall I do to inherit eternal extinction of all life?' asks the Buddhist. To have to ask such a question seems an absurdity indeed. Which of the two teachers are we to choose as our Saviour and our eternal hope? Is it to be 'The Light of Asia,' or 'The Light of the World'?"

THE ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF WOMAN'S WORK IN THE CHURCH.

THERE are many signs that Protestantism is waking up to the importance of organized Christian work by women. The carefully prepared article in the June number of this REVIEW on "European Deaconesses" rendered an impressive testimony to the progress and power of this new development in Great Britain and on the Continent. It is gaining favor in this country. At its meeting in New York last May "The General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church" approved of the institution of deaconesses "to minister to the poor, visit the sick, pray with the dying, care for the orphan, seek the wandering, comfort the sorrowing, save the sinning, and, relinquishing wholly all other pursuits, devote themselves in a general way to such form of Christian labor as may be suited to their abilities." Careful regulations were provided for the ap-

pointment and certification of deaconesses, and for their work either singly or in association. "The Pan-Presbyterian Council," which has just met in London, is reported to have approved unanimously a report presented by Professor Charteris, of Edinburgh, recommending the organization of women's work in every congregation, and the institution of an order of deaconesses. Dr. John Hall, of New York, was one of the speakers on the occasion.

The growth of women's missionary societies, both for home and foreign work, has been in this country the most marked expression of this general movement. The spontaneity of their origin and their rapid progress show a vigorous life. They are quite sure to obtain a great increase, since there is still ample room for such expansion. It is, however, indispensable to such growth, if it is to be at all commensurate with opportunity and need, that they sedulously guard a principle which has been the secret of their power. What this is can sufficiently be illustrated by referring to one of these Boards whose last annual report we happen to have before us,—the "Twentieth Annual Report of the Woman's Board of Missions." The document is a book of 248 pages. Besides the "Constitution" of the Board, "By-Laws," and other information respecting organization, reports from twenty-two branches, etc., etc., it contains a review of what has been accomplished during the twenty years of its history. The record is an inspiration.

"Twenty years ago this Board had no school-building of its own to which to send its first seven teachers. Time would fail me to tell how one after another it has assumed the support of institutions that were then existing; how one after another new day and boarding schools have been opened; new buildings erected; homes, hospitals, and dispensaries built. More than \$200,000 have been paid for these buildings." "Twenty years ago, in the fields now occupied by the American Board, . . . there were 10 female boarding schools with 350 pupils; and 352 common schools, with a female membership of 3,103. To-day the American Board has 41 female boarding schools, with a membership of 2,318; and 878 common schools, with an estimated female membership of 13,766. Of this number we count as our own, 28 boarding schools, with not far from 1,800 scholars, and 215 common schools. Our little band of seven missionaries in 1868 has increased till we claim 102 missionaries, supplemented by 132 Bible women." Similar Boards have been organized in the Interior, on the Pacific, in the Hawaiian Islands, and in Armenia. The present Board has twenty-three Branches, each with numerous auxiliaries.

When now we study this remarkably successful organization we are struck at once with the fact that it embodies and carries into effect the principle of responsibility. It is not a bureau, nor a mere agency, but a sisterhood. Its constituency is a membership. It awakens throughout the body of its supporters personal interest, secures personal devotion, and this largely because everywhere there is responsibility in support, management and control. This is secured by making the Annual Meeting, at which officers are elected, largely a delegate body. An "Auxiliary" may be formed in any church, village, or district. Twenty such

may become a "Branch." Each Branch can appoint delegates. Some of its officers are *ex officio* voters at all meetings of the "Board." Besides this there is in the subordinate associations a constant development of responsibility, by meetings, reports, discussions, enlistment in special service. "All Branch Societies and Auxiliaries, not connected with Branches, will be held responsible for work assumed by them," says one of the By-Laws. Perhaps there is nothing more suggestive to the student of organizations in the review from which we have quoted than these sentences: —

"For the first six years of the life of the Board one day sufficed for its annual meeting; but in 1874 two whole days became necessary; and in 1879 another was added, — not as a public meeting, but for a more informal conference with officers of branches. In 1884 the Board, by formal action, changed its constitution and became a delegate body.

"In addition to its regular meetings, two conventions have been held for executive officers and delegates of branches. One in October, 1875, lasting for three days was held in East Boston, . . . a second in September, 1886, was held for two days." . . .

There is the secret — "a delegate body"; action through conference; direction which admits of and implies participation by the whole membership. The Woman's Board, as well as the similar organizations in the Interior and on the Pacific, acts in connection with the American Board. "The Secretaries and Prudential Committee of the American Board," says the Constitution, "will constitute an Advisory Board, to whom missionary candidates approved by the Executive Committee will be referred for appointment." It has, however, its own Treasurer, decides for what objects it will spend its funds, receives reports from all whom it supports, and has in all respects the freedom essential to its responsibilities.

We think the principle which underlies its success is clear from these statements. An interesting commentary is supplied by the fact that its funds have grown proportionally so rapidly that it is practically paying a portion of the salaries of not a few missionaries of the American Board, under the form of appropriations for the wives of these missionaries! Its success, also, has excited criticism. The Woman's Board of the Interior, it is said, is working, as respects contributions, disadvantageously to the old Board. Such complaint is wide of the mark. If the "old Board" will be as wise as the Woman's it will have no trouble. The latter is an organization "vital in every part;" the former is too much by far a "corporation" and even a "bureau." It needs sorely to learn a most practical lesson from the women's societies — the power of the principle which underlies their organization, and does not its own.

The problem for all Protestant benevolent societies is, how to reach the individual giver. They do not begin to do so as do the Roman Catholic. They cannot use the principle of authority. Let them trust far more that of evangelical liberty. Have not all our older Congregational societies something to learn in this regard? Home and foreign work cannot be

developed to its full power until every church member, every donor in sympathy with its aim, is made practically a director.

In the Congregational churches woman's work for Home Missions is not so well organized, or proportionately so well developed, as for Foreign. There is, perhaps, danger of the formation of too many societies. There is danger of a graver sort, that of failing to grasp and apply the principle of responsibility which we have been dwelling upon. Women's work for domestic missions will become effective in proportion as it embodies and uses this vital principle. The best collectors of funds will be found to be those who have a voice in their management. The surest way to increase interest in a cause is to enlarge the number of participants in its direction. In our judgment it is for the highest interest of all the general Congregational societies, through which women's organizations may work, that these associations should have a large and unembarrassed sphere of self-direction. They should not be a mere collecting agency for other bodies. Nor can they perform most successfully even this function if they are nothing more.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

A GENERAL VIEW OF MISSIONS.

X. BRITISH AMERICA.

INDIAN missions, like the Indians generally, have often received from us but a very languid attention. We are only slowly working ourselves free of the haughty assumption, the reflex of our own past unscrupulousness, that the aborigines of our continent are doomed to so speedy an extinction, as to make it almost a wasteful luxury of feeling to throw away much interest upon them, living or dead, in time or eternity. Yet, though we see the Sandwich Islanders, beyond all doubt, wasting away before our eyes, we are not thereby restrained from rejoicing that so many souls from among them have been gathered into the Kingdom of God, and that the closing generations of the race, considered collectively, have been elevated and dignified by the brightness of Christianity. Now they, while a much more graceful and winning people than the Indians, are not so strong, either in mind or body. But, "whom you have wronged you hate." However, the problems and obligations that we put aside will insist on meeting us somewhere and somehow. And it sounds strange, if any one should say, that while the conversion of a dying man is worth much, the conversion of a dying race is worth nothing.

But we are at last making up our minds that the Indians are not a dying race, even within the United States. Putting aside the rifles of the white men, who, it is computed, are able to kill about one Indian for every quarter of a million dollars spent upon the assassination, the more direful agencies of small-pox, measles, and fire-water still persist in leaving the figures of the Indian census very much at a stay. Even the closely surrounded Senecas and Cayugas of New York we understand to

be slowly increasing. Indeed, Mr. George Bancroft, who estimates the whole number of Indians between the Lakes, the Gulf, the Atlantic and the Mississippi, as having been in 1620 not over 200,000, says that descendants of the vanished tribes of New England herself have been found on the prairies, besides those who, like the Stockbridge tribe, have been conveyed thither.

Nothing exhibits more ludicrously the narrowness of our old induction concerning the doom of the Indian than that we should have so complacently overlooked the not absolutely insignificant fact that to the south of the United States the aboriginal race does not give the least sign of an intention to disappear. In Mexico the pure Indians alone are nearly 4,000,000 out of less than 10,000,000. And the "Nation" attests that they are of extraordinary longevity, are exempt from consumption and rheumatism, and, which is not very flattering to the assumptions of the European race, commonly lead their classes in the schools. Our northern Indians are not so highly endowed, but they are of the same race, though by no means of a closely related branch of it. In Peru it appears that the whites are fast dying out, and that the day is in view when the Indians will be the controlling race. In Venezuela, it is said, the Indians are the very soul of the Liberal party, while at the same time immovably attached to the Roman Catholic Church, a fusion of opposite currents of thought which certainly has nowhere else been very thoroughly carried through. In brief, we may understand once for all that on these two continents, taken as a whole, the aboriginal race has not the least thought of being daunted or discouraged out of existence, or into insignificance. Only in the Antillean archipelago, where its numbers were few, its physical development slight, and its morals hideously degraded, did it vanish altogether.

We have therefore at last given up the policy of Extinction, and turned to the entirely unexceptionable policy of Absorption. Indeed, even in our earlier years, as Mr. Brace suggests, there was probably more of this than we are quite willing to own, provoked as we are by the amusing absurdity of European conceptions of our population.

The Indians are externally not an interesting race. And certain accomplishments popularly ascribed to them are more imaginary than real. They are not good marksmen, nor good horsemen. With equal practice, they are vastly inferior to the whites, and would doubtless be equally inferior as scouts. A Pawnee who has rode all his life will tumble off his horse's back at the least check, as if this distinction belonged rather to the Red Knight than to the White. On the other hand, their hard, impassive countenances conceal an intensity of feeling, and often a depth of religious susceptibility, of which they are little suspected. Both these qualities have been abundantly evoked in the Canadian missions. We lay at the basis of this report the account of the work of the Church Missionary Society in British America given in the "*Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift*" for 1887.

Roman Catholic missions in Canada had long flourished, as we all know, and had brought in large numbers of the Indians. Self renunciation and self devotion have never been carried to a higher point among Christians, nor accompanied by a more beautiful humility, and sweetness of spirit, than among the Jesuit missionaries of the North. Mr. Parkman, by his portrayal of them, has rendered an illustrious service to universal Christendom, and to universal humanity. My honored friend, Prin-

cipal Grant, may well claim them enthusiastically for great heroes of the One Faith. And Eliot found himself greatly drawn to the captive Jesuit missionary whose visit to him is described by Parkman and referred to by Farrar. But assuredly the labors of these men redounded rather to their own spiritual perfection than to any conspicuous advantage of the Indians. The best of saints may be sorely enmeshed by doctrinal limitations. And Rome is so hopelessly persuaded that the sacraments confer saving grace without any subjective preparation whatever on the part of the recipients, beyond the simple absence of intended sin, that we must not be surprised to find her Indian converts becoming devoted Catholics and remaining about as thoroughly savages as ever. We can well believe the Jesuit who in Rome told Mr. Seymour that one of his missionary brethren in Canada, having baptized a platoon of Indians, and coming back a number of months afterward to confess them, found that they had not committed a sin in the interval, and that therefore "there was no matter for the sacrament"! "I was alive without the law once." We will therefore turn to missions which assume that salvation is to be wrought out through the living mind and the living conscience. Rude simplicity is easily compatible with a rooted Christianity, but savagery is not. If the Jesuits themselves would leave off their edifying embellishments, and pious fictions, we should doubtless discover among their Indian converts many fruits of regenerate life which now we cannot see for the sickening disguises in which they have wrapped them up.

"Huge, cold, lonesome, these," says C. Busse in the "*Zeitschrift*," "are the predicates of this mission-field." The Dominion of Canada, in its present extent, embraces 3,500,000 square miles. Herr Busse, giving comparisons meant to render sensible the vastness of the region to his fellow Germans, remarks, that from the Red River, the birthplace of the Church missions, to the mouth of the Mackenzie, is a journey equal to that from London to Mecca, while from Metlakatla, on the Pacific, the scene of the unhappy conflicts between Mr. Duncan and the Society, to the Moravian station Hoffenthal on the Labrador coast, is a distance equal to that between Berlin and Zanzibar. Of this region, however, the field of operations of the Church Missionary Society embraces only the former domain of the Hudson's Bay Company, that is, Rupert's Land in its wider sense, Manitoba, British Columbia, and the Northwest Territory, in all nearly 3,000,000 square miles.

The great lakes and rivers, the inosculation of these with each other, and the portages which at once impede and assist communication, need no description to us, though in reducing our report from a European original we necessarily convey over some of those touches which render it more appreciable by rendering it less familiar. We are aware of the uniformity of climate between the Rocky Mountains and Hudson's Bay; the mercury in winter standing for several weeks together at -40° . At Stanley Station, 55 N. L., the Rev. Mr. Hunt relates that with a hot stove in the room they found it at the breakfast table -25° , while at dinner they had to break the ice in their tumblers every time they wanted to drink. The compensation to this is found in the bracing purity of the air, and the infrequency of storms. There, as with us, and perhaps in still greater measure, the Fall is "the queen of the seasons."

The number of Indians in the whole Dominion, by the census of 1871, was 81,136; by that of 1878, 103,367; by that of 1881, 105,690; and by that of 1883, 110,505. A census of these wild tribes, however,

must of course be largely guess work. Allowing its approximate correctness, it appears that the aborigines fail to recognize their manifest destiny and duty to become extinct. The Christian Indians, as is natural, are the most disposed to increase. Of these, 75,000 only are found in the wider Rupert's Land, a land thirteen times the size of Germany. "Verily, a lonesome land."

A line drawn from the Upper Athabasca over Portage la Loche along English and Churchill rivers to where the Churchill empties into Hudson's Bay is about the boundary between the two great families of Indians found east of the Rocky Mountains. These are the Chippewyans, or Tinné, to the north, and the Crees to the south. Akin to the Crees are the Saulteaux and the familiar Ojibbeways, whose old name of "Chippeways" must not lead us to confound them with the Chippewyans. The Crees and their kindred belong to the great Algonquin family, so familiar to our forefathers, as including alike Powhatan and Massasoit, and various chiefs and tribes between, against the ominous background of the fierce Iroquois. The wandering Dakota bands of the North are of course the deadly enemies, as of the Ojibbeways, so of the Crees.

The Indians have been tricked off by us with so many fripperies of cheap sentiment which they never entertained, but which they soon discovered that it was supposed to be the proper thing to put on in their conferences with the whites, that it is doubtful whether their references to the Great Spirit are anything more than rhetorical "properties." At the same time, as Mr. Parkman remarks, they had so strong an instinct — these sylvan Platonists — of finding a supernatural archetype of each class of beings, that we might expect to find the Jesuit teachings of the One God soon retching in some such form, far beyond the limits of conversion. In reality they lived, like most other heathen, chiefly under the dread of evil spirits, and under the influence of medicine-men or magicians. Yet in Mexico and Peru they had developed great religions, some fearfully cruel, others mild and comparatively beneficent. But in the North nothing among them has been developed or organized.

Herr Busse remarks that notwithstanding the cession, by the Hudson's Bay Company, of its rights of possession and sovereignty to the Dominion of Canada, it still exercises over the immense tracts of the Northwest such an influence as no king has over his subjects. Its former influence, we need not say, was mainly one which made Gain the first god, and Vice the second. Its two hundred trading-posts radiated, not light, but darkness. The population which grew up around them mostly combined "the heathenism of the mothers with the ungodliness of the fathers." Major Semple, in 1815 governor of York Fort, exclaims, speaking of the feuds between rival companies: "I have seen the ruins of houses, granaries, of a fort and palisades, but not the smallest church; I am ashamed to say that through the whole length and breadth of the Company's territory not a single house of God is to be found." The Company, intent on gain, and its agents, intent on gain and baser things, jealously discouraged every attempt to enlighten and regenerate the Indians. At last the Christian conscience of England awoke, especially under the appeals of the evangelical party of the Established Church. A region larger than Europe, hitherto reserved for the chase and for heathenism, was brought under a new order of things, under a policy sincerely directed to the elevation and protection of the aborigines. Emi-

gration is bringing its own dangers, but the Government and the Company are no longer accomplices.

Protestant missions in the Northwest began in 1820. The Church Missionary Society then sent out the Rev. JOHN WEST, primarily to labor among the white settlers, but also among the Indians. One yearly opportunity, uncertain at that, was at that time available for communications with England. The thousand miles from Hudson's Bay to the Red River occupied six weeks in an open boat, during the October frosts. Mr. West did not allow himself to be diverted by the urgency and fruitfulness of his pastoral work among the long-neglected whites from seeking the salvation of the Indians likewise. He was aware, indeed, that there had been made among them large application of the purified magic of rosaries and images, but he very justly reasoned that whatever this might do for them, a Christianity of knowledge and conscious experience was likely to do very much more. Throughout the whole vast region the missionaries who have entered into the gospel of Paul find unrelenting rivals, as in primitive days, in the missionaries who claim, on most equivocal evidence, to be sustained by the authority of Peter. And it is sometimes difficult to know whether or not we ought to learn at last, as Paul did, to be thankful that Christ is preached in any way.

West, followed by Jones, made a beginning, and in 1825 came W. Cockran, "the Oberlin of Rupert's Land." "He labored forty years in this mission, laying out all his energies for the training of the Indians to Christianity and civilization. His unwearied efforts to found a settlement exclusively for the Indians, where their specific national and intellectual character could be more fully developed, and they themselves better guided, than was possible among a mixed population, were finally crowned with success, and he saw arise on the Red River, two or three leagues south of Lake Winnipeg, a pleasant Indian settlement which has since then ever more expressively rendered testimony to the Indian's capacity of culture." After this he formed a settlement at Grand Rapids, which grew to a community of 600 souls, with school and chapel, then at Netley Creek, where to his infinite joy the Indians first consented to put their hands to the plough, encouraged by the favorable oracle of a medicine-man, who repented of his own authorization when it was too late. "The scoffs of the fur-dealers, who had derided Cockran's undertaking as the whimsey of a crazy enthusiast, gave way to reluctant admissions of his success when cabin after cabin rose in quick succession, and when the river-banks, which till then had lain waste, were covered with herds of cattle; a windmill was built for the astonished Indians to grind their corn at; a pleasant church, whose white steeple overtopped the stately oaks around it, was consecrated January 4, 1837. The Indians showed intense delight in the worship of God, and after the morning exercises, a number of the younger ones would often accompany the missionary thirteen miles to a second service. This more than compensated for the terrible winter rides, and the more terrible summer plague of the mosquitoes. Mr. Smithurst wrote once, after he had been tormented almost, and his horse quite, to death by their stings: "O for 30 below zero!"

Yet after twenty years of labor on the Red River, the Indian communicants were numbered rather by scores than by hundreds. The gospel was then transplanted to the Saskatchewan, and for this enterprise an Indian was chosen, HENRY BUDD, "who is first in the noble succession of native pastors, and whose name has become renowned in the missionary world.

In the summer of 1840, this native teacher and catechist, now twenty-eight years of age, and a baptized Christian of eighteen years' standing, the first-fruits of the Indians, began his journey of 600 miles northward to be accomplished by boat. He was accompanied by his wife and mother. Here, at the confluence of the Saskatchewan and the Basquia, he founded Devon, now an Indian village of 600 or 700 families, all Christians, gathered around their Christ Church, whose white walls are conspicuous far and wide." Here first, apparently, labors of translation into the native language were undertaken. The extraordinary difficulty of translating from a language of the Old World into a language of the New is well understood. The American tongues are of a type entirely unique. They are supposed, indeed, in some remoter than prehistoric time to have passed like other languages from a monosyllabic through an agglutinative stage. But they have left this so far behind that their words are now formed by the most extraordinary processes of polysynthetic incorporation. The only Old World tongue presenting even a distant analogy is the Basque, which we are authentically assured that Satan tried for thirteen years to master and gave up the attempt in despair. No wonder then that Cotton Mather intimates that the infernal powers were found decidedly halting in their Indian. Unhappily, however, with or without the knowledge of the tongues, they seem only too well acquainted with the tribes. But after five years of toil, the Rev. John Hunt, assisted by Henry Budd, had translated the Gospel of Matthew, and a great part of the Book of Common Prayer into the Cree language.

"The maintenance of uninterrupted religious influence over the Indians was impeded by the fact that the majority of them were detained away for months together on the hunt. Yet they not only returned to the station for the celebration of the Christmas and Easter festivals, and gave practical testimony to their Christianity, while away, by observance of the Sunday, and by holding meetings for prayer, but the glad tidings of Christ were also carried by them into regions never trodden by the foot of a missionary, so that, now from this side, now from that, urgent entreaties soon came for 'praying-masters.'" Meanwhile the number, both of ordained English, and of unordained Indian, missionaries, was increasing, though too slowly. In 1849, the first Bishop of Rupert's Land was appointed, Dr. David Anderson. In his first visit to Devon, he confirmed 110 Indians, expressing great surprise to find them so thoroughly grounded intellectually, and to all appearance experimentally, in the faith. The Bishop at the same time consecrated the church, giving it the name of Christ Church. A dispassionate observer writes respecting Devon: "You would think yourself transported back into the midst of civilization, when, on rounding one of the majestic windings of the river, you suddenly have before your eyes the pretty white church, surrounded by farm-houses and waving grainfields. It was a quiet summer evening; the steeple was reflected in the stream and gilded by the last rays of the declining sun. The church is on the south bank of the river, and near it, a commodious parsonage, a pretty school-house, and various dwelling-houses. So richly has God blessed the preaching of the gospel in Devon, that now in 1857 there is no longer a heathen to be found there. All are, at least in name, Christians; and the upright, well-ordered life, led by a great part of them, proves that they have not received the grace of God in vain. The soil is less fruitful than that

on Red River, and the cold severer, on account of the east winds that sweep over Hudson's Bay. Yet the mission farm is cultivated with success. Wheat does not thrive well, but barley and potatoes are grown. The Indians are becoming more and more civilized, and though in a certain measure dependent on hunting and fishing, they are better disposed than once to establish themselves in fixed settlements."

Henry Budd had now, for ten years, shown himself so efficient and faithful a worker, that Bishop Anderson thought it expedient to admit him into the ministry. Accordingly, in 1850, he was ordained Deacon in St. Andrew's Church, Grand Rapids, in the presence of a congregation of 1,100 persons. "It was a memorable day in the history of the Mission, when the missionaries of the Church of England first saluted an Indian colleague." His diary expresses, in moving words, the deep sense of unworthiness with which he allowed himself to be invested with the sacred trust, which he never betrayed or neglected. In 1853 he was ordained priest.

In 1852 Budd was sent out to a new pioneer work. It was hoped that a fruitful field of labor might be found at Nepowewin, fifteen days' journey to the westward of Devon, in the neighborhood of the plains, where many thousands of Indians streamed together, and where the hunt of the buffalo was pursued on the largest scale. The Indians there, however, growled hard, and declared that wherever the white man set his foot, the moose and buffalo began to disappear. And doubtless Budd's Christianity made him a white man in their eyes. The old chief, however, soon laid aside his opposition, and, with his wife, was baptized in 1854. But the great mass were perseveringly hostile, and thus the large hopes which had been founded on this station were disappointed. Besides the liquor trade, which was carried on from the neighboring Fort à la Corne, and also by American smugglers, it was unfortunate for the success of the work that Henry Budd was called away, once for months, and once for three years, the latter time to resume temporarily the pastoral care of Devon, leaving Nepowewin in the charge of an Indian teacher, who did not succeed in winning a single heathen. From 1857 to 1867, it is true, he was almost uninterruptedly resident in Nepowewin. But he was almost always alone, so that on his absences at the various trading-posts the work stagnated or even retroceded at the central station. It is the law, as of all warfare, so of the warfare of Christ, that no small part of the work shall consist in the heroic exemplification of tenacious patience in the long contest of insufficient force with frustrating conditions. This grief of disappointment was intensified by a heavy succession of domestic bereavements. In 1856 Henry Budd lost a daughter twelve years of age. In 1857 a son died who was at school in St. John's College on the Red River. In 1860 he was bereaved of a second daughter. In 1864 came the severest blow. His eldest son Henry, Bishop Anderson's favorite, had for three years attended the Church Society missionary school in England, Islington College, and having been ordained deacon and priest, was appointed his father's assistant, being thus "the first-fruits of the second generation of native clergymen." But, having in England recovered from an illness which brought him to the verge of the grave, he was again attacked at home and carried off, followed within six weeks by his mother and a sister of fourteen years. Henry Budd, therefore, now growing old, having married his eldest daughter to a native clergyman, and having placed his four youngest sons at

St. John's College, remained quite alone. "It is edifying to read in his letters of that time how, under these severe afflictions, he stays himself upon God's grace, and in his weakness draws from it ever fresh strength and joyfulness, humbling himself under God's chastening hand in penitent faith. 'I thank God for it all,' he once writes, 'for I am persuaded that only out of Fatherly love has He thus chastised me. He saw how my heart still clave too strongly to those dear ones whom He had only, in his mercy, intrusted to me for a certain time. I shall have to thank the name of God through all eternity that He, as I humbly hope, has finally, even though in so painful a manner, weaned me from earthly leanings, and strengthened me to seek in Him alone, and in his eternal love, my heaven, my all, so that henceforth I have the most ardent longing to know no other will than God's, and to rest submissively in his hand.'" There is here an ascetic opposition, Catholic rather than Scriptural, between love to God and human affection; but showing the consciousness that the love of the creature needs to be purified by affliction into a channel of the love of God.

In 1867 Henry Budd returned to Devon, "and labored there with unweariable zeal for eight years longer, enduring meanwhile sorrow almost past the power of man to bear, in the deaths of his four remaining sons, who, like their elder brother, all died during their course at St. John's College, but ever rising over each blow into new faith and hope." Besides the care of the spiritual and bodily welfare of the growing population of Devon, it was also incumbent upon him several times in the year to visit the out-stations and trading-posts of the Saskatchewan region. These toilsome journeys were performed sometimes by canoe, sometimes on dog-sleds, or snow-shoes; and when called to them the now solitary man was obliged, at Devon, to shut up his house, close his school, and give over the church services to the Indian elders. Besides the darkness of heathenism, he found, I need not say, the demon of strong drink everywhere in his way. His Devon community, however, had renounced all commerce with those who dealt in liquors, and on the accession of the Dominion to authority this traffic was finally suppressed. "In other respects, also, the community at Devon gave their faithful pastor much occasion for thankful joy, illuminating the evening of his life with the consoling consciousness, that he had not, among them, labored in vain or spent his strength for naught. The Sunday services were regularly attended by all the people, except so far as compelled, in winter, to be absent on the hunt, or in summer as steersmen for the fur-traders. And as the congregation grew from year to year, there were always enough at home to fill the church on the Sundays. Not less satisfactory was the work in the Sunday and the week-day school, where many learned to read the Bible fluently in their mother-tongue," having no one who dared to come between the wants of their souls and the word of their God. "Every year new houses arose; more and more land came under the plough, and more and more care was bestowed on the improvement and increase of the cattle.

"In Easter week of the year 1875 the sorely tried, but well-approved servant of God entered into the joy of his Lord, after having for thirty-five years labored among the men of his race along the Saskatchewan." He was succeeded by his son-in-law, H. Cochrane, and he by a third Indian pastor, J. R. Settee. Thus Devon, not doomed we hope to fade away like the "praying-towns" of Eliot's converts, remains an encour-

aging centre of Christian force in the heart of the North under an encouraging succession of native pastors. Its Boreal latitude has helped to save it. The Bishop of Saskatchewan, in his report for 1886, describes its people thus: "The Indians are all poor in this world's goods, but they show themselves, as a body, to be Christian in their outward life, and I have reason to believe that many of them are truly the children of God. They all show a great appreciation of Christian ordinances and means of grace. They attend church well and join heartily in the services, especially in the singing; they come to Holy Communion in large numbers; they bring their children to baptism, as a rule, at the earliest possible period, and their ordinary life will compare favorably with that of white people. I repeat, they are very poor; their love for ordinances ought not to be measured by what they give towards their support. They are of the poorest of Christ's brethren."

Meanwhile, from the original seat of the missionary work, on the Red River, new stations had been coming up, Fairford, Prairie Portage, Westbourne, Fort Pelly, Touchwood, Scantebury, Islington, and Lansdowne. And between 1850 and 1860 the work of the Society began to extend itself to the far North, and along Hudson's Bay. The latter missions now form the diocese of Moosonee. The population of this diocese consists of 8,000 Crees and 4,000 Ojibbeways, besides some Eskimos and Chippewyans. Here, of course, the material conditions are exceedingly disheartening. Agriculture is impossible; hunting and fishing are the only means of life. Regular instruction and regular worship, therefore, are extremely difficult to maintain. Yet the Christian Indians must be very far away if they do not return for the Christmas and Easter festivals, and for occasional Sundays between. "And though the opportunities of Christian instruction are few and brief, the Indians are so much the more zealous in the use of them. And though you can seldom talk about hunger for the bread of life among the heathen, yet among these children of the wilderness, who have so bitter a struggle for their earthly existence, there is often found a touching craving for heavenly benefits. Many a toilsome day's journey are they often ready to make, and many an opportunity of the chase do they neglect, that they may not fail of meeting with the missionary in his appointed time. During their wanderings and upon their hunting-grounds they regularly observe morning and evening prayers, and regularly maintain Sunday services, and the more advanced among them seek to instruct the less advanced in the reading and understanding of the divine word. The syllabic alphabet, invented by the Wesleyan missionary Evans for the Cree language, has proved a true blessing to the wandering tribes. So simple is it, that three days' instruction is said to be enough to render almost any Indian independent of a teacher, needing only practice to become a fluent reader. We find in almost every volume of our sources the eulogies of this invention of the Wesleyan missionary. 'Without this,' says Bishop Horden, 'we should never have accomplished our present results; the time which we can spend at our out-stations is so brief that if we had to use the Roman characters, scarcely any of our people at these stations would have been able to read at all, whereas now almost all the adults are able to read with more or less fluency, and also to write.'" I may remark, that not knowing just where to turn for many of these quotations, I am retranslating them from the German. "Letters circulate among the Crees and the Ojibbeways, just as among Europeans, and I dare say

among the Chippewyans also; and nothing delights me more, when messengers come in from remote stations, than to receive a number of well-written letters from our native Christians.' "

John Horden, originally a simple school teacher and catechist in this region, being visited by Bishop Anderson in 1851, was found so thoroughly qualified that he was at once ordained deacon and priest, and in 1872 became bishop of his desert diocese, in which you may travel 150 miles without meeting a human being, but in which, as another missionary says, "it is good to roam through the wilderness with such as are endeavoring to serve God, and to find their way to heaven." Here, as previously farther West and in the farthest North, Archdeacon Kirkby long labored, a man who ought to be sought for more largely by all our churches, and not left to our Episcopalian brethren alone, if they would become filled with enthusiastic interest in this Northern Dawn, and would learn to know in living presence, how there may be combined in one the cheerful self-renunciation of a Catholic saint and the healthy domesticity of a Protestant minister. He was able in 1876 to announce the end of heathenism at York Factory. And on James Bay (that is, we suppose, its western side) Mr. Horden writes in 1871: "My work here has now assumed an altogether pastoral character. Heathenism, as a system, with all its abominations, has vanished, and our difficulties are those of newly-founded churches. Our summons now is: Awake, thou that sleepest, out of thy indifference, sluggishness, formalism, and whatever else deadens the Christian life. Assume thy responsibility and rejoice in thy privileges." Here, too, the race, severe as the climate is, appears to be rather increasing than diminishing.

In 1858 the first decided step was taken by the Society beyond the Missinippi into the far North. Archdeacon Hunter, setting out in June, in two months' time reached Fort Simpson on Great Slave Lake, in 62° N. L., the great rendezvous of the Slave Indians. He was joyfully received by the agents of the Company, who promised him their heartiest concurrence. In 1861 Mr. Kirkby adventured himself upon a journey to the Yukon River, the first missionary who had visited these "ends of the earth." At Peel River Fort, in 68° N. L., a chief gathering point of the finely developed race of the Tukudh Indians (as the name is spelt by Herr Busse), there was among these an extraordinary outburst of penitent confession, and they abandoned heathenism and its kindred abominations in masses. Of these, however, a great part have been secured by the Roman Catholic missionaries, who do not, like Paul, feel the slightest shame in any part of the world at building on other men's foundations. There are, however, in the diocese of Mackenzie River somewhat over 4,000 Protestant Indians, of whom it has as yet been thought expedient to admit less than a hundred to the communion.

The one original diocese of Rupert's Land has now multiplied into five, the others being Moosonee, Saskatchewan, Athabasca, and Mackenzie River, forming an ecclesiastical Province, of which the Bishop of Rupert's Land, Machray, is also Metropolitan, thus retaining a general superintendence over the whole of the original diocese: His colleagues and suffragans, in the order of the dioceses, are Horden, Penkham, Young, and Bompas. In the five dioceses there are about 8,000 baptized Indian Christians, besides an unspecified number of adherents. Of these, 1,062 are communicants. I observe that the diocese of Qu'appelle,

under Bishop Anson, is a part of the metropolitan province, but it is not included in the Society's mission. The Society has also a North Pacific mission, with 786 baptized Indians. The disputes between the Society and Mr. Duncan have led to the breaking up of the important station of Metlakahltla. Of all absurdities the greatest is that which represents this lamentable collapse to have been brought by the encroachments of Ritualists. The Church Missionary Society a patron of Ritualism! We might as well accuse Bishop Coxé of being a patron of Romanism.

The Wesleyans have also one or two thousand members in these districts, and through the invention of the syllabic alphabet are at work in all the work of their Anglican brethren.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

WHAT IS THE BIBLE? An Inquiry into the Origin and Nature of the Old and New Testaments in the Light of Modern Biblical Study. By GEORGE T. LADD, D. D., Professor of Philosophy in Yale University. Pp. 491. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1888.

This book is in intimate relation with the author's "Doctrine of Sacred Scripture," published in 1883. In that massive monograph the nature of the Bible as inferrible from its own phenomena, and from the opinion of it held by the church catholic, was discussed with reference to the needs and demands of students of theology. The endeavor is made in the present work to take the lay reader into the discussion. The question involved is one in which he may be presumed to have the keenest interest. The method employed in answering it and the reasonableness of that method can, it is assumed, easily be made plain to him. The Biblical and historical facts which furnish the data for the final conclusions can be so succinctly given as not unduly to tax his attention. If he is not fully informed of the processes by which knowledge of those facts is reached, he is only asked for a confidence required by workers in all inductive sciences who seek to win the public to their views. Indeed, dependence upon the specialist is here less absolute, for the layman has before his eyes in his English Bible many of the phenomena examined, and has had in reading it made some use of the method by which scientific conclusions are deduced from them.

He may therefore be properly asked to learn from a survey of the pertinent facts what the Bible is. Assuming this, Professor Ladd has made (to borrow his own language) "a statement of the answer which critical investigation gives to the question, What is the Bible, made with (as I hope) due regard to that brevity, clearness, and freedom from discussion of the more doubtful matters, which the average reader rightly expects and requires."

Viewed as an endeavor to restate the arguments and conclusions of the earlier work with reference to the needs of a larger audience, the present work is very successful. To begin with, a change of arrangement, excellent for the end in view, is made, in opening the discussion with a sketch of the history of Christian opinion respecting the Scripture; thus

conciliating any prejudice the reader may have entertained against the propriety of subjecting the Bible to examination for the sake of finding out what it is. The chapters giving the results of Biblical study are lucid; those in which philosophical and dogmatic questions are discussed are free and vigorous.

The account given of the history of church opinion regarding Scripture is, relatively to the rest of the book, more satisfactory than was the corresponding part of the earlier work. There one felt that the writer had entered for a special purpose the department of theology least congenial to him. The results of his work were good so far as they went, but not so full as the scale of the work demanded, and were presented in a more perfunctory manner than the conclusions reached in other parts of the field of inquiry. In the shorter book one does not expect scientific completeness, and the facts given seem sufficient for the preparatory work assigned them. The writer, conscious of their sufficiency for his present purpose, uses them with freedom and power. The style of the book before us is much more readable than that of "The Doctrine of Sacred Scripture." Without pretension to elegance, it is clear and sufficiently diversified. It has the ease and movement which come from well-digested knowledge and mature opinion.

The present volume is then admirably fitted to commend to the general public Professor Ladd's view of the way in which an intelligent appreciation of the Bible must be obtained, and of the main conclusions which those who take that way must reach. That his method is a sound one, and the results it gives trustworthy, we firmly believe. And we are confident that his book will sooner or later be recognized as among the most important contributions to Christian apologetics furnished by the scholarship of our generation.

Edward Y. Hincks.

LA NOBLE LEÇON. Texte Originale d'après le Manuscrit de Cambridge, avec les Variantes des Manuscrits de Genève et de Dublin suivi d'une Traduction Française et de Traductions en Vaudois, moderne. Publié par Edouard Montet, Docteur en Théologie, Professeur à l'Université de Genève. Avec Fac-simile. Non ut doctior, Sed ut melior. Quarto, pp. vii, 95. Paris: Libraire G. Fischbacher, Société anonyme, 33, Rue de Seine, 33, 1888.

This edition of the famous Waldensian poem deserves a place in every college and public library. Professor Montet is well known to scholars by his "Histoire littéraire des Vaudois du Piémont, d'après les manuscrits originaux conservés à Cambridge, Dublin, Genève, Grenoble, Munich, Paris, Strasbourg et Zurich, avec Fac-simile et Pièces justificatives," published in 1885. In this history Dr. Montet followed up the critical study of the sources of Waldensian history begun by Todd and Bradshaw in Ireland and England, and by Dieckhoff and Herzog in Germany. He treated with special thoroughness the writings which belong to the pre-Hussite period of Waldensian history.

The "Nobla Leyçon," Dr. Montet maintained with other scholars, was written about the beginning of the fifteenth century. As this opinion is still disputed Dr. Montet publishes the poem from the oldest text, with a translation into modern French, and two versions into special dialects. He supplies also a historical Introduction, Notes, copious lists of various readings, and six helpful fac-similes. In an Appendix an account is given of a newly acquired doctrinal Vaudois manuscript at Dijon, of critical value,

especially in connection with other documents in the libraries of Geneva, Cambridge, and Dublin.

The date of the poem has attracted special attention from its bearing on the dispute respecting the origin of the Waldenses, and the antiquity of their religious opinions. Morland, Cromwell's Envoy to the Duke of Savoy in 1655, when the Protector intervened for the protection of the Vaudois, brought back important manuscripts, which he deposited in the Library of Cambridge University. They were thought to have disappeared, and severe imputations were cast upon the good faith of Morland and others on this account. In 1862 they were all discovered, in their proper place, having never been abstracted. Among them was the text of the "*Nobla Leyçon*" now published by Professor Montet. As Morland published and translated, the sixth and seventh lines ran thus:—

"Ben ha mille e cent an compli entierament,
Que fo scripta lora, Car sou al derier temp."

"There are already a thousand and one hundred years fully accomplished,
Since it was written thus, For we are in the last time."

The natural interpretation was that the author wrote early in the twelfth century; an opinion which accorded with the Waldensian claim to a great antiquity, and with a Protestant polemic which sought for a church preserved in continuous evangelical purity amid the corruptions of Roman Catholicism. Critical writers, indeed, like Mr. Hallam and others, argued that the years might be counted from the end of the first century and thus the time of Waldo be reached; but the gain was insufficient to remove all difficulties, and the theory remained undisturbed that there must have been Waldenses before Peter Waldo. The recovery of the Morland documents changed all this. It was discovered that some one had altered the sixth line, leaving visible beneath his erasure the figure 4. Another manuscript also was found in the same collection which gave the same reading in Roman numerals. Thus the author claimed, according to these texts, that fourteen hundred years had passed since it was written "we are in the last times." These Cambridge manuscripts are believed to be about half a century earlier than the oldest of the two which give the earlier date; that is, the oldest documents give the reading with the latest date. The internal evidence is strongly in favor of the oldest text. So far as now appears the poem originated in the first half of the fifteenth century. While it loses something of the polemic interest with which it had been invested on account of its supposed age, the poem gains in other particulars. Everything about it now is consistent and natural. It is the fruit of a movement all the more instructive because it was not an out and out anticipation, in its beginnings, of the Reformation. It is most instructive to observe what great results followed from a conscientious and fearless adherence to one or two simple truths. In doctrine and ritual for generations the Waldensians were mostly Roman Catholics of the better sort, trying with all their might to carry out in life the religion they had learned from the Bible, in the church, and from tradition. They were bent on pure living, but their conception of the Christian life was legal and ascetic. At two points, mainly, did they come into collision with Rome. They gave supremacy to the Word of God as they understood it, and they renounced sacerdotal mediation in forgiveness. These were greater principles of reform than they knew. Their imperishable honor is to have practiced upon them even at the cost of life.

The "Nobla Leycon" is a poem irregular and faulty in metre, and marked by no sign of great genius. But it is grave, simple, sincere, and has the charm insured by these qualities. It recites the leading facts in the Biblical history of religion, from Adam to Anti-christ. Now and then the moral is sharply pointed, and there are suggestive touches of a realistic imagination. The Biblical principle of the Waldensian movement is not formulated in it, but the authority of Scripture is taught by its use. The antagonism to the reigning sacerdotalism is pronounced, as when the writer says:—

"C'étaient les Pharisiens qui le [Christ] persécutaient,
Et ceux du roi Hérode et l'autre gent sacerdotale."

One can see the flash of the eye of the whole early Waldensian party in the words "e l'autra gent clerchia," the other clericals besides Pharisees who persecute. The doctrine of forgiveness is vigorously asserted in lines which also reveal the daring which made it reformatory:—

"Pour moi, jè l'ose dire, car cela est vrai,
Que tous les papes, depuis Sylvestre jusqu'à présent,
Et tous les cardinaux et tous les évêques, et tous les abbés, tous ensemble,
N'ont pas assez de pouvoir pour absoudre, qu'ils puissent pardonner
A n'importe quelle créature seulement un péché mortel.
Dieu seul pardonne, ce que nul autre ne peut faire."

The poem is of deep interest as a clear reflection of a type of Christian life, and for a study of certain elements which mediæval piety contributed to Protestantism, especially to Puritanism. We may have occasion to notice this elsewhere, and therefore will not pursue the thought here.

We should add that the poem and its editor's Introduction are of special value to students of the history of literature, and of the development of the languages of Southern Europe. We trust that the linguistic results of studies of Vaudois manuscripts to which allusion is made in the Preface will be made public.

Egbert C. Smyth.

MANUAL OF CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES. By GEORGE PARK FISHER, D. D., LL.D., Titus Street Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Yale University. Pp. ix, 123. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1888. 75 cents.

Professor Fisher has again illustrated the advantage in having elementary text-books prepared by masters in science. Firmness of touch, definiteness of statement with sobriety and caution, proportion, comprehensiveness, brevity with perfect clearness,—these are essentials in a compend or primer, and they require of an author consummate knowledge and superior didactic and literary power. In larger works Professor Fisher has presented elaborate discussions of critical questions connected with the historical origin of Christianity. He has also followed his "Outlines of Universal History" with a "History of the Christian Church." He now gives, in briefest compass, a statement of the leading arguments for Christianity designed to meet the wants of those "who have not time for the study of more extended treatises." The book is divided into eighteen short chapters, whose titles suggest at once its perspicuity and comprehensiveness. The author is a worthy successor of Paley in simplicity and grace of style, and the skillful use of historical argument. The comparison suggests also the advance that has been made in the science of Apologetics, especially in the emphasis and relation of arguments and in

criticism. Improvement upon Paley is specially marked in the treatment of the argument from miracles, both as respects their evidential function and their proofs. Connected with this is the greater stress laid upon the internal evidence, or the testimony of Christianity to itself. The argument for "The Genuineness of the Gospels" suggests what progress scholarship has made since Paley wrote, and how wise it is to trust scholarship.

Professor Fisher's candor and sobriety of judgment appear in all his publications. He knows how to keep within defensible lines, and not to say too much. In only one instance have we questioned a statement in this compact volume. On page 56 the language seems to imply that the Peshito canon was formed in the first half of the second century, according to the most competent scholarship. Perhaps all that is intended is, that its beginnings, particularly as respects the Gospels, may be referred to that date. But in view of Baethgen's investigations even of this claim it must be said, *adhuc sub judice lis est*. This, as we have said, is the only doubtful statement we have noticed in an argument covering very numerous facts, and crossing constantly disputed lines. One or two instances of the wisdom born of careful critical scholarship we cannot forbear noticing. In treating of the genuineness of Matthew's Gospel Professor Fisher is careful not to rest his case on the proposition that our present Gospel is throughout genuine, that is, composed by the Apostle whose name it bears. It is enough, for evidential purposes, that it was in existence in its present form before the actual destruction of Jerusalem had compelled the disciples to distinguish between that event and the end of the world. "If any portion of the book had another author than Matthew," remarks Professor Fisher, "that author was a contemporary disciple of sufficient authority to secure an undisputed acceptance of what was thus connected with the Apostle's composition. This editor of Matthew would stand thus on a level with Mark and Luke." Another instance of this wise caution is the implied concession that the Apostles' expectation of the speedy coming of Christ may be "found to tinge the abbreviated reports of the predictive utterances of Christ which are presented in the Gospels." We are impressed at this point with the advantage to the "Evidences" which accrues from a natural — not to say simply honest — exegesis, when we find that such an interpretation of the apocalyptic portions of Matthew's Gospel supplies a cogent argument for the conclusion that any revision of this Gospel which may have been made must be dated so early as to leave its value as historical testimony unimpaired.

Toward the close of the chapter on "The Genuineness of the Gospels" there is an important remark suggestive of something further. "It has been shown that the four Gospels were written by Apostles and well-informed contemporaries. Even if their authorship and date could not be definitely ascertained, there is good reason to believe that in their contents the story which the Apostles told of Jesus, his teaching and works, is fairly embodied." This implies that there is extra-canonical evidence as to the origin and nature of Christianity. For popular impression at the present time, we query whether it would not be worth while to add a chapter to the volume before us which would show that, apart from the evidence given in the canonical books, we have that of numerous Christian churches, whose existence and faith cannot be explained without accepting the substantial truthfulness of the Gospels. We question also whether the fact, stated on page 104, of the work of the Spirit has not a significance for the "Evidences" which deserves elaboration. If Christianity

is more than truth and fact, should not its proofs embrace more? When once it is realized that a religion — or rather the religion, universal, absolute — is to be guaranteed, the historical evidence, though indispensable, is seen to be incomplete. This was Lessing's service to Apologetics. Possibly this side of the argument might with advantage be somewhat more definitely exhibited, but we throw out this and preceding remarks merely as suggestions. The work has a definite purpose which determines its scope, and is throughout admirably executed.

Egbert C. Smyth.

PRACTICAL STATISTICS: A Handbook for the use of the Statistician at Work, Students in Colleges and Academies, Agents, Census Enumerators, etc. By CHARLES F. PIDGIN, Chief Clerk of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor. Boston: The William E. Smythe Company. 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ \times 6, pp. vi, 201. \$1.50.

This book is unique and of the greatest value to the practical statistician of any sort, though its material and methods are necessarily those of official statistics. We say necessarily, for the book puts into orderly form the results of fifteen years of official work in the Bureau, which is the parent of all similar offices in this country, and which is the admiration of the great statisticians of both Europe and America for its scientific methods and rich, practical results. The author is withal an accomplished mathematician and an inventor of many remarkable methods and pieces of statistical apparatus. His book sets forth in great clearness and with fullness of detail the actual work of a statistical bureau, from the preparation of schedules and the instruction of subordinates to the examination, tabulation, and presentation of results. There are added chapters on the value of statistics and some of their special features. But these are far too brief.

The fidelity of the book to its aim marks its special value, but reveals its limitations for general use. Being the outgrowth and exact representation of the thoroughly scientific work of a State official, its value to those who do religious and other statistical work is not very direct, though by no means inconsiderable. If the last chapters could have been expanded and illustrated by concrete examples, as the earlier ones are most abundantly and interestingly, the book would have been better still. Scores of devices or machines are named like the card, chip, and slip systems; the automatic door, counting machine, sorting boxes, and the like, many of which are constantly used in the office. And that is all. But if the author had shown us, for example, that the card system means the putting of all the facts gathered about a single individual, family, or church, upon a single card, with suitable numbering, so that with the use of various devices for counting we can easily get as many tables of distinct results as combinations can be made from these several numbers, the value of this part of the book would have been much greater. Such a method introduced into religious statistics would turn their present meagre results into tables of great variety and fullness.

But aside from this useful work by Mr. Pidgin, there is great need from an equally competent source of a good handbook that will present in a scientific way *both the theory and practice* of statistics in a convenient form for the use of the ordinary writer and speaker, to say nothing of those who make greater use of statistical material. For one thing, the

principles that govern the interpretation of statistics, so that one can give their real meaning without addition or diminution, should be the subject of one or more extended chapters in such a work. The unaided good sense of the reader should not be the sole reliance for detecting the statistical fallacies that beset his path. Many an author lies in the ditch beside those he has attempted to guide because he has no scientific knowledge of the simplest rules of statistical interpretation. Such a comprehensive text-book ought to come soon.

Samuel W. Dike.

AUBURNDALE, MASS.

THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE: with an Introduction, two Prefatory Essays, and Notes Critical and Explanatory. By W. L. NEWMAN, M. A., Fellow of Balliol College, and formerly Reader in Ancient History in the University of Oxford. Vol. I. pp. 580. Introduction to the Politics. Vol. II. pp. 418. Prefatory Essays. Bk. I. and II.—Text and Notes. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1887.

Twenty-five years ago a young Fellow of Balliol delivered at Oxford some brilliant lectures upon the Politics of Aristotle. The same scholar has now given to the world these royal volumes, the fruit of twenty-five years of patient study carried on unobtrusively and often in ill health. It is an example of that fine devotion of a lifetime to the investigation of truth which is refreshing in our age of shoddy literature and science. It is a noteworthy indication of the trend of much serious thought that the Clarendon Press has brought out two great editions of Aristotle's Politics within three years—the one before us, and Professor Jowett's edition of 1885.

We are too apt to consider the main problems of government as settled, and democracy as the final form of government. But the most thoughtful are by no means sure that such is the case. They find in the anti-democratic Aristotle food for their reflections, and upon every page material for thought.

The editions of Professor Jowett and Mr. Newman rather supplement than conflict with one another. Professor Jowett's is a translation, with literary introductions to each book, and notes that are literary, and explanatory almost to an absurdity. Mr. Newman's is an edition of the Greek text, the notes to which are scholarly and critical. Both editions are incomplete. Mr. Newman's text and notes to the remaining six books are yet to appear, while Professor Jowett's volume of philosophical and explanatory essays, to which Mr. Newman's first volume corresponds, is not yet in the printer's hands.

Let no one look for the geniality and literary finish that so characterize Professor Jowett's translations in Mr. Newman's volumes. Mr. Newman's English is strong, clear, and, considering his absorbing occupation with Greek authors and their German editors, remarkably free from foreign idioms. We are unable to regard the sentences at the top of page 466, vol. I., as perfectly clear: "The death of Hermias left his niece and adopted daughter without a protector, and Aristotle married her, partly out of attachment to his memory, partly for her worth and unmerited misfortunes. He may have already left Hermias before he experienced this severely felt blow at the hands of Persia—a blow soon to be far more than repaid by his great pupil." We

cannot avoid the impression that "this severely felt blow" refers to his marriage.

The student will close these volumes with a wish that he were a thorough Greek scholar; or, if such is the case, profound gratitude for the same, and enthusiasm for Greek culture and literature. In this is implied the only serious criticism upon Mr. Newman's work,—and this from the point of view of the general reader, rather than the scholar. Every page of these two large volumes is blackened with Greek type; and there is plenty of Latin for those who desire something more familiar. It is a curious commentary upon those for whom this work is intended that Mr. Newman usually translates his German. Perhaps by another generation English-speaking scholars will be as familiar with German as with Greek and Latin. An edition of this work with the Greek in the foot-notes, and the translation of the same in the text, would multiply many times its readers; for it is a work of very great interest to every thoughtful man. The reply is obvious. This edition is for scholars; and scholars are, I am sure, grateful for it. One's interest in the work, and admiration of its profound scholarship, increases with every page. One admirable feature is the fullness of the Greek and Latin quotations, especially from authors not easily accessible. One needs scarcely any book but his Plato and Aristotle beside him. Editors of classics are too apt to take it for granted that every one has a complete classical library at his elbow.

Mr. Newman's familiarity with Greek and Latin writers is astonishing. Not that he is the least pedantic, for every quotation is helpful and apt. Admirable, too, is the closeness of his contact with modern thought. He is constantly illustrating Aristotle's meaning by current thinking, or quotation from some of our great modern classics in political science. This is saying that Mr. Newman is not only a most exact and profound Greek scholar, but also a broad-minded thinker of unusual insight and power of expression.

The modesty of the author is most pleasing. He is constantly writing "may it not be," and venturing "to suggest," when he is to give a bright thought or a happy solution of a difficulty. Naturally candor is an intellectual trait of such a man. In vol. II., note upon i. 8, 1256, b. 20, he says: "I have explained the expression in the first of three ways in vol. I., page 128; but perhaps on the whole the third interpretation is the one most likely to be correct." This does not indicate at all a wavering of thought, but a most delicate sense for exact shades of meaning.

Mr. Newman is, as every Aristotelian should be, a good logician, and has a happy way of detecting and expressing logical difficulties. The following, occurring in the discussion of slavery, vol. 1, page 150, is admirable: "Aristotle's arguments may perhaps prove that a human being of the stamp of his 'natural slave' should be subjected to a strict rule; they do not prove that he should be made an article of property."

Aristotle's conception of a non-hereditary ruler, "supreme over the administration," bk. 3, 1287, a. 6, might perhaps have been illustrated by a reference to our President, or even the English monarchy, which is in theory elective. Perhaps it is a defect in Mr. Newman's work that he is less familiar with modern forms of government than with speculations and ethical questions.

We regret that neither volume has an index. Nothing adds so much to the usefulness of a work like this. It is to be hoped that the con-

cluding volume will contain a full index, — or at least such an index of words as Susemihl's edition has.

We hasten to indicate the scope of the work. Volume I. begins with an introduction upon the relation of the Politics to the whole Aristotelian system. This is supplemented by an interesting essay upon the relation of the Politics to the Nicomachean Ethics, — which essay, strangely enough, is published as an appendix to vol. II. The Introduction is followed by a running synopsis of the Politics, chiefly of the first five books. The matter is arranged both by books and topics, and illustrated from every possible source, ancient and modern. The result is not only an exceedingly clear and interesting exposition of the teaching of the Politics, but such problems as the following are directly or indirectly introduced and illuminated: The end and limits of government, rights of inheritance, position of women, law of population, moralization of private property, the laborer, democracy, relation of happiness to external goods, heredity and habit in character, use of leisure, public schools, etc., etc. This is a mere hint of the interesting subjects treated of here.

The latter part of vol. I. is taken up with a succinct account of political speculation in Greece, preceding and following Aristotle, and a sketch of Aristotle's life.

We cannot forbear quoting the following admirable synopsis of Aristotle's aim in education, vol. I., page 349: —

"To train the whole nature, but to train each part of it successively and in the order of its emergence, and to train each part with a view to the higher element which emerges next, and all with a view to the development of reason, — this is the broad scheme of education which Aristotle lays down here. The lesson that in training the body our aims should be to develop the soul (that is, the likings and reason), is still of value, and so is the lesson that the education of boyhood should be addressed rather to the likings and character than to reason. Aristotle seems to hold that what can reasonably be expected of a boy is that he shall love and admire what is good and feel a distaste for what is bad, — that is, that he shall feel rightly about persons and things. He sees that right feeling is not permanently an adequate guide in life, but he holds it to be the beginning of goodness. It needs to become reasoned, but this further step is only possible later on."

How admirable, too, is the statement of the mission of a state: —

"The State exists, then, according to Aristotle, for the sake of that kind of life which is the end of man, — not for the increase of its population or wealth, or (necessarily, at all events) for empire or the extension of its influence. It exists for the exercise of the qualities which make men good husbands, fathers, and heads of households, good soldiers and citizens, good men of science and philosophers. When the State, by its education and laws, written and unwritten, succeeds in evoking and maintaining in vigorous activity a life rich in noble aims and deeds, then and not till then has it fully attained the end for which it exists."

Volume II. contains an exhaustive history of the manuscripts of the Politics, the Greek text of books 1 and 2, with critical notes. These notes are exceedingly readable, — sometimes whole essays in themselves, as the note upon the Cretan institutions, 2, 9, 1271, b. 18. They combine the grammatical with a rich measure of the historical and philosophical.

One can imagine no more profitable or engrossing study for the thoughtful scholar of the present generation than Aristotle's Politics in Newman's edition. We await impatiently the completion of the work.

D. Collin Wells.

ANDOVER.

PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN SCHOOL OF CLASSICAL STUDIES AT ATHENS.
[Archæological Institute of America.] Illustrated. Vol. IV. 1885-1886,
pp. vi, 277 and 11. Boston: Damrell & Upham. 1888. \$2.00.

It is now six years since the American School of Classical Studies was opened at Athens. How important this step was for the cause of classical education may be seen partly in the increased interest in the study of classical antiquity in our schools and colleges, and partly in the valuable series of papers on special subjects connected with Greek archæology which the School has published.

In each volume of these publications epigraphy occupies an important place. Volumes 2 and 3 are entirely given up to reports of Dr. J. R. S. Sterrett's expeditions in Asia Minor; and volume 3 alone contains 651 inscriptions, mostly hitherto unpublished. In volume 4 the paper of Professor F. D. Allen, of Harvard University, director of the School for 1885-86, presents the results of a study of inscriptions for the purpose of utilizing inscriptional poetry "in questions relating to the history of versification, to the text-criticism of Greek poets in certain small details, and to Greek pronunciation." Professor Allen shows that among extant metrical inscriptions — the bulk of which belong to stones of fourth, third, and second centuries B. C. — there is seen a decided preference for elegiac form over hexameter, which increased as time went on. Of course there is the greatest difference imaginable in the quality of these epigrams; "from exquisite bits of verse they range all the way to the absurdest doggerel." But most of them are the work of intelligent persons. About 350 inscriptions — mostly epitaphs or dedications — have been studied by Professor Allen, with reference to structure of metres, quantity of syllables, contraction, hiatus, elision, *v* movable, etc.

"Notes on Attic Vocalism," a paper by Mr. J. McKeen Lewis, considers some "important questions relating to the pronunciation of the vowels and diphthongs in Attic, and the changes they underwent during the Attic period." The chief testimony on these questions is that of Attic inscriptions, the bulk of which Mr. Lewis examined.

Two papers, by Mr. Walter Miller and Mr. W. L. Cushing respectively, discuss the theatre of Thoricus. They are accompanied by ample drawings and photographs, and present the subject for the first time with adequate fullness of treatment. The irregular shape of the auditorium, the apparently studied lack of consistency and symmetry in matters of architectural detail, have been often discussed before, but never satisfactorily explained. The conclusion of Mr. Cushing, however, seems reasonable: That the open violation of almost every law of architecture, both in the planning and construction of their theatre, was due simply to lack of taste and means on the part of the rural deme of Thoricus.

A study of Professor John M. Crow, a student of the first year of the School, is also included in this volume. Professor Crow's paper is devoted to the Athenian Pnyx. After giving citations of the chief passages in the works of Greek authors referring to the Pnyx, with elucidations, Professor Crow proceeds to describe the ruin in the light of these citations. In this description he has the advantage of a plan prepared by Mr. J. T. Clarke "from an actual survey, which is believed to be the first thorough survey ever made of this important site with exact measurements, and by the help of proper instruments."¹

¹ The need of such a survey is strikingly shown in the fact that Curtius

Professor Crow agrees with Chandler (1817), that the so-called Pnyx is the real Pnyx; as against Ernst Curtius (1862), that it is an ἀγορά θεῶν of the Pelasgians, of which the so-called bema is an altar¹ to Zeus Hypsistos. Yet he admits that parts of the ruin seem to belong to a remote antiquity; which suggests to him that "some very ancient structure has been remodeled in order to produce the Pnyx which we now see."

While Professor Crow's study of the Pnyx-question is doubtless the best available for English readers, and is both careful and thorough, it is not, however, convincing. The evidence for the view which he advocates is at no point decisive; it is merely cumulative. But it would not be surprising if further research should confirm in a measure the positions of both parties to the discussion. It is highly probable that the rock-cuttings of the so-called Pnyx — even those of the later period — are pre-Hellenic; that the whole precinct was originally dedicated to religious uses, and would not have been thought of as a place for the popular assemblies and public speaking, except for the desire to locate the Pnyx somewhere, and because some indications point to this neighborhood. It is also quite likely that the Hellenes early appropriated this place for public assemblies; just as they seem to have converted some Pelasgic rock-chambers near by into dungeons, in one of which (so tradition says) Socrates drank the hemlock.

Supplementary notes by Mr. J. T. Clarke accompany Professor Crow's paper; conspicuous among which is the exposition of early methods of quarrying and splitting rock (pp. 227-30), both by swelling with water some dry wooden wedges previously driven tightly into holes prepared for them, and by heating the rock with fire and then dashing water (or vinegar) upon the heated stone.

It will certainly be gratifying to all friends of classical study to know of the prosperity of the American School at Athens. Through generous contributions of friends in this country, it has found permanent quarters in a large and convenient building of its own on the southeastern slope of Mt. Lykabettos; and its library of 1,500 volumes includes all the most necessary books of reference for philological, archæological, and architectural study in Greece. Moreover, the work of the School during the past year, under the inspiration and guidance of the director, Professor A. C. Merriam, of Columbia College, has been most noteworthy, yielding results which Professor Curtius of Berlin has publicly pronounced "epoch-making."

The announcements for the next session of the School promise the services of Dr. Charles Waldstein, of New York, now director of the Fitzwilliam Museum of Art at the University of Cambridge, England, as director for the next five years. Dr. Waldstein will be assisted by an annual director, who will still be sent out each year by one of the colleges cooperating in the support of the school.

Edward G. Coy.

ANDOVER.

makes the area of the semicircular inclosure but 2,536 square metres, while Clarke's measurements make it 6,240.5 square metres.

¹ Professor Crow asserts, on p. 251, that the steps on each side of the so-called bema "are no appendage of an altar." But did not W. M. Ramsay find rock-altars in Phrygia having such steps? See cuts in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. iii., pp. 13 and 42.

BEFORE THE CURFEW AND OTHER POEMS, CHIEFLY OCCASIONAL. By O. W. HOLMES. Houghton, Mifflin & Co.
POEMS. By EDWARD ROWLAND SILL. Houghton, Mifflin & Co.
COLONIAL BALLADS, SONNETS AND OTHER VERSE. By MARGARET J. PRESTON. Houghton, Mifflin & Co.
LYRICS AND SONNETS. By EDITH M. THOMAS. Houghton, Mifflin & Co.
THE UNSEEN KING AND OTHER VERSES. By CAROLINE LESLIE FIELD. Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

It is not without a sense of the humor of the situation that we take up this book of poems by Dr. Holmes with the serious intention of "noticing" it. We know perfectly well beforehand what the verdict will be, because we feel perfectly sure of the facts on which to base it. Dr. Holmes's poems have been noticed for a long time, and it is always noticeable that no one could possibly mistake their author even without the signature.

Dr. Holmes possesses the power of investing the occasional with an interest which long outlasts the occasion. He touches the fleeting and transitory, the trifling at times, and it becomes something of such permanence that we can look on it with pleasure again and again. In this respect, though not more than in some other respects, he reminds one of the poet Horace. We can easily imagine that the genial, witty, hopeful man, of two thousand years ago, who wrote odes to his friends, hymns for national festivals, descriptions of dinner parties, and kind-hearted satire, might have presented us with just such a volume as "Before the Curfew and Other Poems, Chiefly Occasional," had he been born into Dr. Holmes's environment.

The poems here collected, like others by the same author, contain elements of both the laughing and the weeping philosopher; which is only natural in the work of a man who has the insight to perceive the humor and pathos of life within the same glance, and is gifted with a remarkable power of facile expression.

The greater number of the poems will be recognized as having appeared in the periodicals, or in newspaper reports, during the past few years. The longest of the thirty-five is the one delivered at the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the founding of Harvard College.

Dr. Holmes's fountain of youth, which seems to well up perennial in his nature, makes us quite forgetful of the years which have passed over his head, and therefore quite unprepared for the reminder contained in the title of the book.

A melancholy interest attaches to the "Poems" of Edward Rowland Sill. This gifted man died about a year ago at the comparatively early age of forty-six. He had held the chair of English Literature in the University of California, but, having resigned that position, had returned to make his home in Ohio, where he was in the midst of his mental activity and giving unusual promise for the future, when death closed his career.

This little volume is no attempt to present the great body of Mr. Sill's poetical work. It has been gathered at the request of the publishers, who had been attracted to Mr. Sill's contributions to the "Atlantic" and other periodicals.

The *Venus of Milo*, which stands first in the collection, is a poem of exquisite beauty; and, as we proceed in the volume, the same quality, not only in form but in reality, is everywhere apparent.

The poems reveal a rare insight and sympathetic power, with a mastery of form, which place them high in the scale of poetry. As would naturally follow, they are full of suggestiveness. They remind us of some of

Mr. Emerson's poems in their power to stimulate thought. They may be read many times without losing their freshness.

It is with regret that we reach the end of the volume, knowing that we shall have no more from the same hand.

Mrs. Preston has long been known as a writer of graceful verse. The volume which she has here gathered and dedicated to her friend Jean Ingelow is, as we infer, the fruit of some years. Although the "Colonial Ballads" occupy less than a quarter of the 250 pages, the ballad style predominates throughout. It is a style for which Mrs. Preston has an evident liking, and which in many instances she handles with remarkable success. She has had her lines out not only in our Colonial history, but in history in general, as well as in life, and has brought therefrom a variety of incidents, new and old, in order to give them a pleasing and poetical form. Now and then an incident or legend, which we come across in our reading, is poetical in itself in such a way that no different form of statement can heighten the effect. Such a one is the story of the origin of the *Te Deum*; although Mrs. Preston has shown great skill in its treatment.

Of the poems in a style entirely different, we wish to mention *Calling the Angels In* as especially good. In *At Last* there is at least one stanza of marked excellence, the third. Some of the poems were suggested by objects of art seen in travel, and the volume closes with a series of ten pictures of *The Childhood of the Great Masters*.

A refined taste, a noble spirit, and a delicate treatment, combined with easy and natural expression, are characteristics of the volume.

A score or so of sonnets, together with thrice that number of other poems, make up the second volume of poetry which Miss Thomas has published. Those who remember the deserved welcome accorded to "*A New Year's Masque*," less than a half decade ago, and have noticed the rapid succession of Miss Thomas's poems in the periodicals since that time, are not surprised at the appearance of "*Lyrics and Sonnets*" in this beautiful and permanent form.

The quickness with which Miss Thomas discerns the poetical side of things, and her easy command of expression, may have led some of her readers to fear that she was in danger of falling into a writer's temptation of throwing off hasty work, or, at least, work ill matured and far inferior to what her best mood is capable of. The present volume does not justify such fears.

There are passages which seem to be played over by the uncertain light of fancy instead of being presented in the white heat of imagination. Nevertheless, Miss Thomas's natural language is poetry. She handles with remarkable skill a large variety of forms, and never gives the impression that she is striving for effect. She never indulges in those feats of jugglery which are so conspicuous in some of the versifiers of the day. On the other hand, her poems are pervaded by a sweet, sincere spirit, which gives them a charm of their own. Her sympathy with nature is more than ordinary, and with human life it is true and earnest.

Some of the poems suggested by her Greek studies — we take it for granted that Miss Thomas is a student and lover of Greek — are among the best, and are further illustration of the fact that Greek culture is not only capable of stimulating the poetic impulse, but of allowing it to move in the current of modern feeling. *Glaucus* is a charming poem.

Among the others, *Spirit to Spirit* is one of those in which Miss

Thomas strikes the deeper chords, and this she will do more and more as her poetical gift is modified and strengthened by the experiences of life.

The author of "The Unseen King and Other Verses" seems to have a good ear. This is shown by the way she handles the most difficult of our metres, the so-called blank verse, in the poem from which the volume derives its title.

The poems are short, simple in treatment, unaffected in tone, and are upon such themes as (we select almost at random) Arbutus, Meadow-Talk, Greeting, Fourscore, Safe-Folded. Perhaps the daintiest poem in this dainty little volume is the one entitled Two Mothers.

Samuel V. Cole.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society, Boston and Chicago. Summer Assembly Days ; or, What was Seen, Heard, and Felt at the Nebraska Chautauqua. By Anna E. Hahn. With an Introduction by Rev. A. E. Dunning, D. D. Pp. viii, 245. \$1.00.

Danrell & Upham, Boston. Archæological Institute of America. Papers of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. Vol. III. 1884-1885. The Wolfe Expedition to Asia Minor. By J. R. Sitlington Sterrett, Ph. D. Pp. vii, 448. 1888 ; — Archæological Institute of America. Papers of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. Vol. IV. 1885-1886. Pp. viii, 277, 11.

Massachusetts New-Church Union, Boston. The Holy Word in its own Defence. By the Rev. Abiel Silver, author of "Lectures on the Symbolic Character of the Sacred Scriptures," and "The Rationality of the Christian Religion." Third Edition. Pp. 305. 1888. \$1.00.

Silver, Burdett & Co., Boston. The Social Influence of Christianity. With Special Reference to Contemporary Problems. By David J. Hill, LL. D., President of Bucknell University. The Newton Lectures for 1887. Pp. 231. 1888. \$1.25.

Universalist Publishing House, Boston. Manuals of Faith and Duty. No. I. The Fatherhood of God. By Rev. John Coleman Adams. Pp. 96. 1888. Cloth, 25 cents net.

Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., New York. Power and Liberty. By Count Leo Tolstoi. Translated from the French by Huntington Smith. Pp. 132. 75 cents.

Funk & Wagnalls, New York. The People's Bible : Discourses upon Holy Scripture. By Joseph Parker, D. D., Minister of the City Temple, Holborn Viaduct, London; author of "Ecce Deus," "The Paraclete," "The Priesthood of Christ," "Springdale Abbey," "The Inner Life of Christ," etc., etc. Vol. VIII. 1 Kings xv.-1 Chronicles ix. Pp. vii, 360. 1888. 8vo. Cloth, \$1.50.

J. S. Ogilvie & Co., New York and Chicago. Woman : Her Power and Privileges. A Series of Sermons on the Duties of the Maiden, Wife, and Mother, and of their influence in the Home and Society. By Rev. T. De Witt Talmage, D. D. Pp. 200.

G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London. The Heart of the Creeds, Historical Religion in the Light of Modern Thought. By Arthur Wentworth Eaton. Pp. vi, 200. 1888.

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